Arms control in Europe : regimes, trends and threats by Koivula, Tommi et al.
T. K
oivula &
 K
. Sim
onen (eds.)
A
rm
s C
ontrol in Europe: Regim
es, Trends and Threats
Series 1, N
o. 16
National Defence University
PO Box 7, 00861 HELSINKI
Puh. +358 299 800
www.mpkk.fi
ISBN 978-951-25-2950-6 (pbk.)
ISBN 978-951-25-2951-3 (pdf)
ISSN 2342-9992 (print)
ISSN 2343-0001 (web)
The Finnish Defence Forces
Arms Control in Europe:
Regimes, Trends and Threats
Edited by Tommi Koivula and Katariina Simonen
Arms control issues, especially regarding nuclear weapons, have
been a marginal theme on the European security agenda after the
end of the Cold War. One can even talk about the erosion of arms
control expertise in several European countries. At the same time,
nuclear weapons are actively back in States’ defence policies, 
while groundbreaking technological advances such as artificial 
intelligence, unmanned and autonomous weapons systems and 
other innovations have come to influence our contemporary se-
curity environment.
This book is written in response to these alarming developments.
Its purpose is to reconstruct expertise and raise awareness on arms
control and nuclear weapons in Europe. It is a timely collection of
essays by eminent experts in different fields of arms control.
National Defence University
Series 1: Research Publications No. 16
Arms Control in Europe: 
Regimes, Trends and Threats
Edited by Tommi Koivula and Katariina Simonen
MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU 
JULKAISUSARJA 1: TUTKIMUKSIA NRO 16 
 
NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY 
SERIES 1: RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS NO. 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE:  
REGIMES, TRENDS AND THREATS 
 
 
Edited by Tommi Koivula and Katariina Simonen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY 
HELSINKI 2017 
Tommi Koivula & Katariina Simonen (eds.) 
Arms Control in Europe: Regimes, Trends and Threats 
Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu 
Julkaisusarja 1: Tutkimuksia nro 16 
National Defence University 
Series 1: Research Publications No. 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recent publications in PDF format: http://www.doria.fi/handle/10024/73990 
 
 
 
 
 
© National Defence University & Authors 
 
Cover art by Niklas Pennanen / National Defence University 
 
 
ISBN 978-951-25-2950-6 (pbk.) 
ISBN 978-951-25-2951-3 (pdf) 
ISSN 2342-9992 (print) 
ISSN 2343-0001 (web) 
 
Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu  
National Defence University 
 
 
Juvenes Print 
Tampere 2017 
Finland
CONTENTS 
 
 
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations    i 
 
INTRODUCTION     1 
Tommi Koivula and Katariina Simonen 
Why This Book is Important     1 
About the Authors and the Structure of This Book   2 
Acknowledgements     5 
 
Chapter One 
LOOKING FOR STABILITY: AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN        
NUCLEAR DOCTRINES AND ARMS CONTROL  7 
Mika Kerttunen 
Introduction      7 
The Rationale of Becoming and Being Nuclear    9 
To Deter and to Fight: U.S. and Russian Nuclear Postures   12 
Conclusion: The Limits and Potential of Arms Control and Disarmament  22 
Concepts and Abbreviations     30 
 
Chapter Two 
THE US MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, EUROPE AND RUSSIA 35 
Götz Neuneck 
Introduction: A Short History of BMD – From Global Aspirations to Regional Reality 35 
The Current BMD Programs and Rationales: A Closer Look   39 
The EPAA and the Implications for European Security   43 
Some Conclusions     51 
 
  
Chapter Three 
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR          
WEAPONS – TREATY REGIME ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 57 
Katariina Simonen 
Introduction 57 
Historical Steps 58 
Structure of the NPT and Interpretation 61 
Practice of the Parties 64 
Extension and Review Conferences in a Nutshell 67 
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons  69 
Saving the NPT Regime? 72 
Chapter Four 
NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS: DEFINITIONS,  
ARSENALS, CUTS, PROSPECTS  79 
Alexander I. Nikitin 
On Terms, Criteria and Typology 79 
Estimations of Existing Arsenals of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons 82 
Previous Cuts and Measures Regarding TNW Arsenals 85 
American TNW in Europe: Modernization or Withdrawal?  88 
Prospects for International Dialogue on Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons 90 
Conclusions 93 
Chapter Five 
INF TREATY – PRESENT STATE AND WAY FORWARD 97 
Matti Vuorio 
How the INF Treaty was Achieved 97 
Implementation of the INF Treaty 99 
Needs for Possible Modifications to the INF Treaty 100 
Relevance of Ballistic Missile Defence to the INF 104 
Suspected Violations of the Existing INF Treaty 107 
Conclusions and Recommendations 108 
Chapter Six 
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE AND ITS  
CURRENT CHALLENGES 113
Tommi Koivula 
Introduction 113 
The (Cumbersome) Definition of Conventional Weapons  114  
Conventional Weapons in Arms Control 116 
The European Conventional Arms Control Landscape 118 
Whither Conventional Arms Control? – Technological and Military-Strategic Challenges 123 
Turmoil – or New Ways Ahead? 127  
Chapter Seven 
THE PANDORA’S BOX OF MILITARY ARTIFICIAL     
INTELLIGENCE 133
Johanna Friman 
The Pandora’s Box of Military Artificial Intelligence: Introductory Remarks  133 
Uncovering the Need for an Arms Control Regime Regarding Autonomous Weapons 137 
Contemplating the Elements of an Arms Control Regime Regarding Autonomous Weapons 144 
The Pandora’s Box of Military Artificial Intelligence: Concluding Remarks 146 
Chapter Eight 
CYBER: ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT ARMS? 151 
Eneken Tikk 
Introduction 151 
Arms Control – the Discourse in a Nutshell  152 
The Problematique of ‘Cyber’ Security 153 
Cyber Capabilities and Operations: Theory and Practice 157 
Arguments Against Cyber Arms Control 161 
Alternatives to Cyber Arms Control 163 
Implications on Arms Control Theory 166 
Conclusion 168 
Chapter Nine 
CURRENT CHALLENGES REGARDING ARMS CONTROL             
AND THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 171 
Tamás Lattmann 
Introduction 171 
International Law Applicable to Outer Space  172 
UN Bodies Dealing with Questions Related to Outer Space and Arms Control 173 
The Outer Space Treaty 174 
The Partial Test Ban Treaty  178 
Developments Related to Arms Control in Outer Space 179 
Conclusions 184 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 189 
  
i 
List of  Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
ABL  
Airborne Laser 
 
ABM 
Anti Ballistic Missile System 
 
AG   
Australia Group 
 
ALCM 
Air-Launched Cruise Missile 
 
ARF 
ASEAN Regional Forum 
 
ASEAN 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
 
ASMPA  
French system of cruise missiles (Air-Sol 
Moyenne Portee Amelioree) 
 
AWS   
Autonomous Weapon Systems 
 
A2/AD 
Anti-Access Area Denial 
 
BM  
Ballistic Missile 
 
BMDR 
Ballistic Missile Defense Review 
 
BMD(S)  
Ballistic Missile Defense (System)  
 
CBM  
Confidence Building Measures 
 
CCW 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
which may be Deemed to be Excessively 
Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects 
 
CD 
Conference on Disarmament 
 
CFE  
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe  
 
CM  
Cruise Missile  
 
COPUOS 
Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
 
CSBM 
Confidence- and Security- Building Measures 
 
CTBT  
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
 
C2   
Command and Control  
 
C4ISR 
command, control, communications, com-
puters, intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance 
 
DDPR  
Deterrence and Defense Posture Review 
 
DOD 
Department of Defence 
 
DPRK  
Democratic People´s Republic of Korea 
 
DSB   
Defense Science Board 
 
EMD  
European Missile Defense 
 
EMR  
European Missile Radar 
 
EPAA  
European Phased Adaptive Approach 
 
EPW  
Earth Penetrating Warheads 
 
EU 
European Union 
 
FBX 
Forward-based radars  
 
GAO   
Government Accountability Office 
ii 
GBI  
Ground Based Interceptors  
 
GGE 
Group of Governmental Experts 
 
GLCM 
Ground Launched Cruise Missile 
 
GMD  
Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
 
GPALS  
Global Protection Against Limited Strikes 
 
HTK  
Hit-to-kill 
 
HINW  
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons 
 
IAEA  
International Atomic Energy Organization 
 
ICBM 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
 
ICJ   
International Court of Justice 
 
ICoC 
International Code of Conduct for Outer 
Space Activities 
 
ICRAC  
International Committee for Robot Arms 
Control 
 
ICRC  
International Committee of the Red Cross 
 
ICTs 
information and communication technologies  
 
IHL   
International Humanitarian Law 
 
IISS 
International Institute of Strategic Studies 
 
INF  
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces  
 
INF Treaty 
Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range 
Nuclear Forces 
 
 
IO 
information operations 
 
IRBM  
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile  
 
ISODARCO  
International School on Disarmament and 
Research of Conflicts  
 
IT 
information technology 
 
ITU 
International Telecommunications Union 
 
IW 
information warfare 
 
JASSM 
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile 
 
JCG 
Joint Consultative Group 
 
JCPOA  
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
 
JP 
Joint Publication 
 
KV  
Kill Vehicle 
 
LAM 
Loitering Attack Munitions 
 
LAW 
Lethal autonomous weapons 
 
LRSO 
Long-range standoff weapon 
 
MDA  
Missile Defense Agency 
 
MEADS  
Medium Extended Air Defense System 
 
MENWFZ/WMDFZ  
Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons 
and other weapons of mass destruction 
 
MilBal 
Military Balance 
 
 
iii 
MIRV 
Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry 
Vehicle 
 
MLF   
multilateral force 
 
MRBM  
Medium-Range Ballistic Missile  
 
MTCR  
Missile Technology Control Regime 
 
NATO   
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 
NATO ALTBMD 
NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Mis-
sile Defence 
 
NATO MD 
NATO Mediterranean Dialogue (policy) 
 
NIAMDS  
NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense 
System  
 
NCND  
‘Neither Confirm, Nor Deny’ policy 
 
NFU   
No First Use Policy 
 
NGO   
Non-governmental Organisation 
 
NMD   
National Missile Defense 
 
NNWS   
non-nuclear weapon state 
 
NPT  
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons  
 
NSA 
National Security Agency 
 
NSG   
Nuclear Suppliers Group 
 
NTM 
National Technical Means  
 
NWS   
nuclear weapons state 
 
OAS 
Organization of American States 
 
OECD 
Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 
 
OSCE 
Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe 
 
OST  
Outer Space Treaty 
 
PAC  
Patriot Advanced Capability 
 
PAROS  
Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space 
 
PGM 
Precision Guided Munitions 
 
PPD 
Presidential Policy Directive 
 
PRC  
People’s Republic of China 
 
PTBT  
Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
 
PTSS 
Precision Tracking and Space Surveillance 
 
RV  
Re-entry Vehicle  
 
R&D   
Research and Development  
 
SALT  
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks  
 
SBIRS  
Space-based Infrared System 
 
SBT  
Sea-based Terminal Defense 
 
SDI  
Strategic Defense Initiative  
 
SLBM 
Sea (or Submarine) Launched Ballistic Missile 
  
 
iv 
SLCM 
Sea (or Submarine) Launched Cruise Missile 
 
SM  
Standard Missile 
 
SOR  
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty  
 
SORT   
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty 
 
SPX  
Sea-Based Tracking Radar 
 
SRBM  
Short-range Ballistic Missile  
 
START  
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
 
STSS  
Space Tracking and Surveillance System 
 
SVC 
Special Verification Commission 
 
TCBM  
Transparency and Confidence-building 
Measure 
 
THAAD  
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
 
TMD   
Tactical Missile Defense 
 
TNT equivalent  
Trinitrotoluol equivalent - measure of weight 
of conventional explosive equaling by de-
structive power to the yield of a nuclear 
weapon 
 
TNW  
Tactical Nuclear Weapons 
 
UAV 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
  
UCAV 
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle 
 
USG 
United States Government 
 
UCS  
Union of Concerned Scientists 
 
UEWR  
Upgraded Early Warning Radar 
 
UK 
United Kingdom 
 
UN   
United Nations 
 
UNGA 
United Nations General Assembly 
 
UNIDIR 
United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research 
 
UNODA   
United Nations Office for Disarmament 
Affairs 
 
US  
United States 
 
VCLT  
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 
 
VLS   
Vertical Launch System  
 
WMD 
Weapons of mass destruction 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
Introduction 
Tommi Koivula and Katariina Simonen 
 
Why This Book is Important 
rms control has been a marginal theme on the European security agenda for 
several years. This has been the case in particular with nuclear weapons. 
While Russia and the United States, along with the United Kingdom and 
France, have maintained and constantly modernized their nuclear arsenals, the rest 
of Europe seems to have largely lost track of these developments and of the con-
stant reality of nuclear weapons in the European defence policy planning. To the 
extent that nuclear weapons were given attention during the decades following the 
end of the Cold War, concerns of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and Asia 
gained the upper hand at the expense of any regional focus in the European context. 
In the shadow of the war against terrorism, crisis management and other initiatives, 
the existing arms control structures have crumbled – gradually but extensively. In 
fact, as of 2017, the compliance pull of the existing regimes is in jeopardy: what will 
happen to the US–Russia arms control initiatives, such as the Intermediate Nuclear 
Forces Treaty (INF) or to the regimes intended to cover the majority of states of the 
Northern hemisphere, such as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), or 
for that matter, to the globally binding Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT), one of the cornerstones of nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation?  
Only after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis have the deficiencies of the arms con-
trol and the existing Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) system in 
Europe been discussed in public, albeit still very superficially. Likewise, with a few 
notable exceptions, initiatives related to arms control have not led to serious high-
level discussions. What’s more, deeper policy analysis of cause–effect relations of 
various initiatives, such as the US modernization of tactical nuclear weapons in Eu-
rope or the missile defence, is either lacking or politically motivated. Granted, dif-
ferences between countries exist, and while some are very aware of the continued 
risks of the shortcomings of arms control to European security, othersތ attention 
has been considerably less sharp. The security policy discourse by decision-makers, 
the media and the academia on these matters has been conspicuously absent. 
To make matters more complicated, not just public indifference, but also a number 
of technological innovations and the changing ways of political advocacy challenge 
the existing arms control regimes. Groundbreaking technological advances like arti-
ficial intelligence, unmanned and autonomous weapons systems and other innova-
tions have come to influence our contemporary security environment. However 
important and far-reaching consequences they may have, we lack deeper knowledge 
about the implications they may bring about to regional security or global stability. 
Then again, in the face of the often stagnant intergovernmental negotiations on 
weapons systems, the role of the civil society in arms control seems to be in a pro-
A
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cess of rapid organization and mobilization. This activity is evidenced in recent years 
by the successful grass-root campaigns against anti-personnel landmines and cluster 
munitions, or the ongoing international Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, aimed against 
the militarization of artificial intelligence. In essence, a key characteristic to this way 
of campaigning is the passion to reach results more rapidly than through the more 
conventional ways. Also, the civil society has successfully joined forces with the ma-
jority of states not possessing nuclear weapons, contributing to the start of a diplo-
matic process, in March 2017, at the United Nations level on a legally binding in-
strument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. The 
common interest for common action lies in the frustration of both non-nuclear 
states and the civil society regarding the slow pace of disarmament and the embed-
ded risks. However, questions on the effectiveness and implementation of these 
new ways of advocacy linger. 
Thus, as of 2017, we are faced with a rapidly deteriorating and changing arms con-
trol environment in Europe and what seems to be a lacking analysis and maybe even 
lacking understanding of the unfolding developments. To a large extent, the reasons 
for inadequate analysis lie in the decline of arms control expertise and studies in 
several European countries. At the hour of most intense need, there are only a 
scarce number of people knowledgeable to serve decision-makers and to contribute 
to public debate on these urgent but challenging matters. In these circumstances, it 
is not possible to build comprehensive situational awareness, which obviously bears 
directly on the quality of security policy dialogue, decision-making and general 
awareness. It should be obvious that in the case of contemporary weaponry, deci-
sion-making and dialogue based on other than facts is highly dangerous for all those 
involved.  
This book is written with the purpose of helping to close this knowledge gap, i.e. to 
improve and enhance studies and knowledge on arms control, non-proliferation and 
disarmament under the current circumstances. It is hopefully the first of a series of 
similar studies in European defence academies, research institutes and universities, 
serving as an introduction to a complex and evolving, albeit interesting field of study 
highly relevant for the European security.   
About the Authors and the Structure of This Book 
Arms Control in Europe: Regimes, Trends and Threats is a compilation of articles written 
by nine European scholars. Most of its chapters discuss nuclear weapons as a key 
issue in European security, covering great power nuclear doctrines, questions of 
missile defence, nuclear non-proliferation, as well as topical issues related to tactical 
and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Then again, attention is also given to arms 
control from the perspective of conventional weapons and to the specific considera-
tions on outer space as a legal framework for arms control. In addition, issues deal-
ing with cyber security and artificial intelligence are also covered.   
The writers of this volume represent diverse backgrounds. Some of us have exper-
tise in international law, others in natural sciences, international relations, strategic 
studies or diplomacy. This diversity is reflected on the book’s pages as different per-
spectives, emphasizing political, operational, ethical, legal or technical dimensions of 
the issues at hand.   
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The articles of this volume are heterogeneous in the sense that some texts seek to 
address primarily students by emphasizing the very basic questions and issues in-
volved, whereas other articles address more expert readerships, such as research 
institutes, government, armed forces and non-governmental organizations. Howev-
er, common to us all is a willingness to present the contemporary state of key arms 
control regimes and their impact on European security and to discuss the compel-
ling challenges they face today.  
Then again, once the reader familiarizes with the chapters of this volume, s/he will 
soon note that a number of intertwining issues appear and re-appear in the follow-
ing pages. Many articles discuss the implications that changes in modern technology 
have in contemporary armaments and arms control. These changes can appear in 
many forms: modern technology may blur the divide between offensive and defen-
sive weaponry or between weapons of mass destruction and conventional arma-
ments; or it may affect the interconnection between military and non-military capa-
bilities possessed by states. As a consequence, many writers point to an urgent need 
for updates in arms control regimes or for the creation of completely new ones.  
This volume is divided into nine chapters, as follows:  
In Chapter 1 on Looking for Stability: American and Russian Nuclear Doctrines and Arms 
Control, Dr. LTC (Ret.) Mika Kerttunen argues that the Unites States and the Rus-
sian Federation have, despite their political statements, become rather more than 
less dependent on nuclear weapons during the Post-Cold War era. He argues that it 
is important to try to reduce the limited regional and tactical role both countries 
have reinstated to nuclear weapons. Without Russia and the U.S. continuing to re-
duce their armaments and seriously addressing their doctrinal concepts, the future 
of nuclear non-proliferation looks bleak. It is noteworthy that Mika Kerttunen’s 
article contains a special section on key concepts related to nuclear deterrence, in-
tended to support in particular those readers with not much previous knowledge on 
the topic.  
In Chapter 2 on US Missile Defense Systems, Europe and Russia, Professor Götz Neu-
neck discusses the US Ballistic Missile Defense and its European Phased Approach. 
In recent years, regional missile defense in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, in 
response to the proliferation of theater-range ballistic missiles, has returned to the 
international agenda, causing much controversy about the offence/defence relation-
ship between the nuclear weapon states and about regional stability. In the article, 
he especially discusses the significance of European missile defence, Aegis Ashore, 
and its questionable impact on arms control regimes. Having reviewed these issues, 
the article concludes with a discussion of proposals for future cooperation and con-
fidence-building.   
In Chapter 3 on The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – Treaty Regime on 
the Brink of Collapse, Dr. Katariina Simonen discusses the NPT treaty regime, its 
drafting history, contradictions, the present state and its uncertain future. According 
to her, the NPT bargain has become empty with the unfulfilled promise of nuclear 
disarmament. Other ways, such as the Humanitarian Impact Initiative and the fresh 
diplomatic process at the UN level, may succeed in aligning the majority of states 
behind the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. But is this enough to persuade 
the nuclear ‘haves’ to take any steps towards disarmament? 
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In Chapter 4 on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Definitions, Arsenals, Cuts, Prospects, Pro-
fessor Alexander I. Nikitin discusses the complex and evolving field of non-strategic 
or tactical nuclear weapons. He points out that the current political environment 
does not provide strong motivation neither for the withdrawal of American tactical 
weapons from Europe, nor for Russian initiative in cuts or relocations, nor for cuts 
in non-strategic arsenals of third nuclear countries. He argues that while some pro-
spects for dialogue nevertheless remain, any negotiations on non-strategic weapons 
leading to shaping a regime of arms control should take into consideration the nu-
merous interconnections between offensive and defensive, nuclear and convention-
al, and strategic and non-strategic arsenals and weapons. 
In Chapter 5 on INF Treaty – the Present State and Way Forward, Dr. Matti Vuorio re-
views one of the key arms control regimes, the Intermediate-Range and Shorter-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. He points out that the development of new technolo-
gies, in particular the unmanned combat aerial vehicles and the global proliferation 
of ballistic and cruise missiles have raised new problematic issues, leading to treaty 
breaches notified by the US and Russia during the last years. He argues that there is 
a need for an update of the INF paragraphs and more urgently for the parties to 
strengthen their discussions in the Special Verification Commission. These and oth-
er efforts could enable the INF treaty to make a contribution towards stability in the 
world also further on. 
In Chapter 6 on Conventional Arms Control in Europe and Its Current Challenges Dr. 
Tommi Koivula provides with an overview of the existing regimes on conventional 
weapons (CWs) with a particular emphasis on European security. He raises some of 
the most pressing issues and future challenges related to conventional weapons, 
which are apt to affect the general arms control agenda and to bring in challenging 
new normative questions. Particular attention is given to some of the ongoing and 
emerging technological developments, such as the gradual blurring of distinctions 
between weapons of mass destruction and CWs and the advent of the autonomous 
weapons systems. Overall, these changes call for urgent updates in the respective 
arms control regimes. 
In Chapter 7 on The Pandora’s Box of Military Artificial Intelligence Dr. Johanna Friman 
inquires into the external, internal and ethical concerns arising from military artificial 
intelligence. While she does not foresee an impending military ‘robopocalypse’ with 
legions of killer robots dehumanising the battlefield and defying international law, 
she proposes that a constraining-enabling arms control regime needs to be promptly 
negotiated and legally implemented, striking a balance between military and non-
military interests and concerns in order to govern and regulate the development of 
military artificial autonomy and prevent the uncontrollable proliferation of autono-
mous weapons.  
In Chapter 8 on Cyber: Arms Control Without Arms? Dr. Eneken Tikk questions arms 
control as the optimal approach to international cyber security issues. She argues 
that while the core ideas of arms control are direly relevant to international peace 
and security in the information age, information and communications technology 
(ICT) hardly measure as weapons. Admitting that certain ICT related capabilities are 
observable and measurable, thus susceptible to arms control measures, she empha-
sizes that despite their role in military modernization and operations, ICTs are pre-
dominantly a technology for social and economic progress. Consequently, one 
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should assume a careful and constructive approach to cyber arms control and due 
consideration of arms control value propositions in the context of ICTs. In addi-
tion, she calls for the attention to the development of both arms control theory and 
contemporary conceptions of security and stability. 
In Chapter 9 on Current Challenges regarding Arms Control and the Law of Outer Space Dr. 
Tamás Lattmann finally examines the legal framework applicable to weapons of 
mass destruction in outer space and celestial objects, outlines the most important 
respective organisations and explores the current and near future challenges related 
to arms control in outer space. He points out that step-by-step development and 
gradual confidence-building may be the most feasible ways to lead to global consen-
sus and assure a weapons-free, or at least regulated space over the Earth. 
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1 
Looking for Stability: American and Russian Nuclear 
Doctrines and Arms Control 
Mika Kerttunen1 
Abstract 
ontrary to their political statements, the Unites States and the Russian Feder-
ation have become more dependent on nuclear weapons. In addition to 
maintaining mutual deterrence and assured capacity to retaliate, both prepare 
to, if needed, launch a nuclear strike in a non-nuclear situation and employ nuclear 
weapons alongside of and as part of military combat operations. Both have also 
launched mid to long-term nuclear force modernization programs. Arms control 
and disarmament initiatives should exploit this political and doctrinal similarity and 
target not only levels of armament but, most importantly, disturbing and destabiliz-
ing doctrinal principles and practices. It is of importance to try to reduce the limited, 
regional and tactical role both countries have reinstated for nuclear weapons. If 
Russia and the U.S. do not continue to reduce their armament and seriously address 
their doctrinal concepts, the future of non-proliferation looks bleak. 
Introduction 
“[t]he United States could sustain stable deterrence with significantly 
fewer deployed strategic nuclear warheads, assuming parallel Russian 
reductions.” 
Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2010  
Despite its peace-assuring appearance, arms control is a cold game of political ma-
noeuvres. In liberal democracies the civil society, embodied in movements, associa-
tions and non-governmental organizations, can voice public concerns and lobby for 
the reduction and elimination of weapons. Yet, as an exercise of state sovereignty, 
government decisions to acquire or refrain from acquiring weapons, and joining or 
not joining arms control treaties are based on careful political, operational and eco-
nomic calculations. Touching upon national survival, nuclear arms control and dis-
armament sui generis becomes and remains rather a question of bilateral sensitivities 
than of global common good.  
When speaking of the necessity of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, both the 
United States and the Russian Federation stick to practises and force postures that 
are familiar from the Cold War. These two countries maintain mutual deterrence as 
1 Dr. Mika Kerttunen (LTC (ret.) Finnish Army) is adjunct professor in military strategy at the Finnish Na-
tional Defence University and Director of Studies at the Cyber Policy Institute in Tartu, Estonia.  
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the cornerstone of their bilateral relationship but allow other security issues to inter-
fere with their nuclear policies and doctrines. Deterring and fighting terrorist or 
rogue states and other uncertain actors, even with nuclear weapons, has become an 
important element in defining the U.S. nuclear posture. For Russia, nuclear weapon 
systems first came to mean a way to compensate for conventional weaknesses and 
then later a way to support them. Both countries speak of the possible first use of 
nuclear weapons and are blurring the previously clear line between nuclear and con-
ventional non-nuclear operations. 
This article is concerned with the implications of the U.S. and Russian nuclear doc-
trines and postures relating to arms control and disarmament. Seeking to understand 
the rationales that states have in acquiring nuclear weapons and maintaining nuclear 
military capabilities, the article opens with an analysis of three nuclear concepts: pro-
liferation, deterrence and strategic stability; as they help to comprehend state behav-
iour in nuclear affairs.  
After this conceptual framing, the analysis continues on to examine contemporary 
U.S. and Russian nuclear thinking embodied in national and operational doctrines 
and visible in the development and deployment of nuclear forces. Following 
Apunen’s (1972) and Brodin’s (1977) work on political doctrines, this study utilizes 
the notion of doctrine in two methodological manners, as a source-object and a 
goal-object. The American and Russian policy doctrines, i.e. political, officially ac-
cepted instruments that legitimize chosen policy options, provide administrative 
guidance for decision-making and inform domestic and international communities 
of intentions, measures and capabilities, and, witnessing their ambitions and action, 
these are taken at face value. Here it needs to be acknowledged that, despite the ad-
ministrative practice of differentiating policies, concepts, strategies and doctrines by name, 
they can all be counted as doctrinal documents. Secondly, when such explicit docu-
ments have not been issued or are insufficient for providing an accurate understand-
ing of national policy, this study outlines national policy – doctrine and strategy – as 
a combination of political statements on the role of nuclear weapons, descriptions 
on their potential use with implicit scenarios and modernization and development 
programs. Doctrines combine technologies into deployable and employable capa-
bilities and are the most explicit expressions of the envisaged role and use of nuclear 
weapons. 
Combining the conceptual-theoretic with the doctrinal-empirical, this article dis-
cusses the potential of arms control. In this setting of doctrines, technological de-
velopment and politico-military action, the prerequisite for strategic stability be-
tween the major nuclear antagonists, ‘Moscow’ and ‘Washington’, is identified in 
order to condition arms control; this is a factor that both inhibits and promotes 
arms control and disarmament. This recognition is widened into a Realist’s frame-
work for analysis and action on arms control and disarmament. The framework ad-
dresses the alarming qualitative aspects of the contemporary doctrines rather than 
the quantities of weapon systems. Instrumentally, an aim of this political and opera-
tional analysis is to complement ethical, legal and technical analysis of the possibili-
ties and limitations of specific arms control and disarmament initiatives.  
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The Rationale of Becoming and Being Nuclear  
Acknowledging a government’s role in nuclear weapons policy leads one to investi-
gate the state’s logic of leaning on military security in general and nuclear capabilities 
more specifically. Understanding the reasons for nuclear proliferation also helps to 
understand and approximate the possibilities of nuclear non-proliferation, arms con-
trol and disarmament.  
In 1982, Väyrynen proposed a comprehensive, three-level framework to explain 
military capability development. Väyrynen differentiated between international, 
structural explanations, and national, political and technical models, seeking mainly 
reactively to overcome external threats and internal technological-bureaucratic fac-
tors. Sagan (1996) presents security, domestic politics and norms as the key explana-
tory factors for states acquiring nuclear weapons. The security claim regards nuclear 
weapons as the ultimate guarantee of national security against military threats and 
particularly the use of weapons of mass destruction and foreign invasions. Waltz 
(2003, pp. 6–17, 33–37) regards the anarchic international structure to be the reason 
for states maximizing their relative power and in particular increasing their security. 
Nuclear weapons are considered to be the great equalizers, providing security for 
states on the one hand, and on the other, giving stability to the international system; 
they ‘induce caution in any state’. Waltz’s structural-realistic approach views prolifera-
tion permissively and claims that war among nuclear adversaries becomes less likely 
or more limited as no one will escalate in fear of their own intolerable losses – the 
key tenet in deterrence theory. Sagan’s model of domestic politics notes nuclear 
weapons as political tools used to advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic (sec-
torial) interests. Military Services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and technical com-
munities in particular, have vested interest in possessing or developing nuclear ca-
pabilities. The normative model regards nuclear weapons as symbols of modernity 
and identity. More radical approaches regard nuclear weapons (but also non-
proliferation) as representations of a post-colonial world order or established coun-
terproductive masculine practises (Cohn and Ruddick, 2004). Sokov (2009, pp. 73–
76) and Arbatov, Dvorkin and Oznobishchev (2010, p. 49) present instrumental
objectives that different states may alternatively assign to nuclear weapons. They 
note the maintenance of prestige and international status, existential and extended 
deterrence and deterring and countering a conventional attack; all of these assign-
ments where military-operational reasoning and purposes mix with political ones. 
National security concerns are usually offered to explain both horizontal and vertical 
proliferation. The former describe the geographical spread of nuclear weapons and 
the latter the technical improvement of nuclear devices, delivery platforms, com-
mand and control systems and respective nuclear doctrines. National security con-
cerns also lie at the core of any deterrence theory. 
Deterrence seeks to dissuade an adversary from a belligerent action that they are 
assumed to take. It operates with a complex mind-set of psychological and cognitive 
factors that seek to influence the adversary’s decision-making and ultimately make 
them behave opposite to their original intent; i.e. in a nuclear setting, to refrain from 
attacking the other (Buzan 1987, p. 163). Deterrence theory regards perceived costs 
as determinants of political behaviour. Moreover, actors assumed to be rational utili-
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ty maximisers, i.e. when the cost of compliance is lower than the cost of non-
compliance and the net sum of costs has essential value for them, would follow the 
path of lower costs.  
The two major forms of deterrence, deterrence by denial and deterrence by pun-
ishment, assume different costs. On the one hand, deterrence by denial seeks to 
deny the attacker the anticipated objectives and gains. Efforts would either be con-
sidered futile or the use of resources too costly. Deterrence by punishment, on the 
other hand, is based on assured retaliation and great losses that the adversary does 
not wish to suffer. Although academic literature and official doctrines often focus 
on retaliatory capacities, deterrence is not only about punishing, but also about cost 
(Snyder, 1961). If an attack occurs or retaliation takes place, deterrence as the de-
sired effect of strategy has failed (Gray, 1996, p. 31).  
Successful deterrence requires that the risks and costs of behaviour have been 
communicated. Communication is never perfect, however. Especially in nuclear 
affairs, where high secrecy prevails, one cannot have full appreciation of the adver-
sary’s thinking and material capabilities. Moreover, blind reliance on the assumption 
that an adversary has received messages or interpreted them as they were intended 
to be interpreted, or that a nuclear threat and a specific arsenal are decisive factors 
in political and strategic decision-making is questionable at best. As a U.S. joint doc-
trine on nuclear weapons explains, ‘Deterrence is only achieved when both capabil-
ity and will are explicitly defined, demonstrated and known by all parties’ (JP 3-12.1, 
1996, p. I-1). Deterrence theory assumes a universal understanding and valuation of 
costs and benefits.  
The problem of rationality is a question of life and death, and assuming such to exist 
is perhaps the gravest debility of deterrence theory. There is no universal rationality 
and seemingly irrational behaviour is ultimately rational for someone else. All as-
sumptions and predictions are inevitably culturally conditioned, which increases the 
chance of miscalculation (Gray, 2003, pp. 21–23; 31–33). Moreover, the adversary is 
assumed to ultimately follow a rational and clear line of logic of not escalating, while 
one’s own side is allowed to be irrational and use nuclear weapons despite the risk 
of escalation and the costs. Thus, it can be rational to calculate that the deterrent is 
only a bluff (Airaksinen, 2008, pp. 13–16).  
The question of rationality expands to a wider political and ethical dilemma when 
nuclear deterrence is extended to one’s military allies: is it worth it to risk, say, New 
York because Narva has been attacked, especially if Narva has been labelled a sub-
urb of St. Petersburg (Gingrich, 2016; Thompson, 2016)? Similar doubts concerning 
credibility arise with the doctrine of flexible response and the increased reliance on 
advanced conventional weapons systems. Treaties and political statements announce 
firm commitment and provide assurance, but only provisional guidance on the pa-
rameters of attacks, or threats of attacks, that would justify and actually trigger the 
use of nuclear weapons. Limited transparency on intentions, the red lines and capa-
bilities, however, is regarded not only sufficient but most importantly necessary for 
creating a deterring effect (Hagerty, 1995, pp. 87–91; JP 3–12, 2005, viii). Precisely 
because the logic of deterrence emphasises deterrence as a structural condition and 
an absolute value, empirical and political considerations of actual capacities, condi-
tions of use and determination start to undermine the very thought. The line be-
tween belief and disbelief cannot and, following the very logic of deterrence, should 
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not be defined, making the risk of escalation a key factor of credible deterrence for 
the advocates of deterrence (Ogilvie-White, 2011, pp. 45–47). Accordingly, any uni-
lateral political move, operational/doctrinal change and technological development 
can be regarded as destabilising.   
In the 1950s, the vertical proliferation of atomic bombs and their delivery platforms 
created a fear of a devastating surprise attack, leading to two international confer-
ences on ‘measures to safeguard against surprise attack’ in 1958. One was held in 
Washington, D.C. and attended by the five leading Western nations and another in 
Geneva that also included five socialist/communist countries. Accordingly, and in 
the aftermath of the strategic shock that the Sputnik caused, the 1958 U.S. Inter-
agency Working Group on Surprise Attack aligned strategic stability with freedom 
from surprise attack that depended ‘not only on an inspection of one’s potential 
enemy and limitations on his forces, but also very heavily on the vulnerability of 
one’s own retaliatory forces’. In these unavoidable circumstances, it became essen-
tial to reduce the vulnerability of such forces ‘to acceptable levels in order to safe-
guard their effectiveness as retaliatory forces’ (Interagency Working Group on Sur-
prise Attack (1958) in Gerson, 2013, p. 30).  
In a very twisted way, the instability, especially when accepting the risk of escalation, 
came to be to warrant security and vulnerabilities and mutual retaliatory capabilities 
as assurances of stability. Schelling (1966) turned this necessity into a virtue. One 
party’s vulnerability would ensure the other of its capacity to retaliate. Such an as-
surance would help to prevent nuclear war, and thus increase the stability of deter-
rence and the nuclear equation. The survivability of command and control and 
weapons systems denied ultimate victory and the vulnerability to an attack ensured 
the likelihood of retaliation. Gerson (2013, p. 35) credits Schelling not just with 
making stability an essential metric for evaluating nuclear forces, but with ensuring 
that the concept of stability became the new – and lasting – rationale for U.S.-Soviet 
nuclear arms control considerations. Simultaneously, arms control was distanced 
from idealist disarmament and became a realist’s tool. It started to focus on risk-
reduction by enacting restrictions on both sides’ nuclear arsenals in order to mini-
mize the fear of a surprise attack and by ensuring that both sides possessed retaliato-
ry capabilities.  
The demise of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact did not 
change how strategic stability was understood in international politics. The political, 
economic and military rise of the People’s Republic of China has only solidified the 
nuclear and strategic weapon system-centric setting. The U.S. – Russia, and U.S. – 
China relationships and the attitude of arms control continue to function as the 
main conditioning framework for both the established nuclear and the emerging 
security stability questions.  
In the ‘Soviet-U.S. Joint Statement on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms’ of 
June 1990, which was issued when one signatory was already crumbling, the parties 
agreed upon their mutual responsibility to enhance strategic stability. In particular, 
the reductions in several nuclear weapons systems designed to make a first strike 
less plausible were said to result in ‘greater stability and a lower risk of war’ (The 
White House, 1990). Similarly, the ‘U.S.-Russia Joint Statement: Cooperation on 
Strategic Stability’ of July 2000 underscored ‘that continued strengthening of global 
stability and international security is one of the most important tasks today’, estab-
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lishing a basis for (further) reduction of nuclear weapons arsenals and the preserva-
tion and strengthening of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). The ABM Treaty 
fully embodies the logic of strategic stability: only limited measures to secure vital 
command and retaliatory capabilities were accepted. Furthermore, the Statement 
noted the need to confront ‘new challenges to international security’ and called up-
on other nations to unite with Russo-American efforts to strengthen strategic stabil-
ity (The White House, 2000).  
Strategic stability, functioning as a pattern of thought fundamental to the theory and 
policy of deterrence, has become a cornerstone in superpower relations. The con-
cept is dualistic, dynamic and contextual, and to its critics it is arbitrary, malleable 
and politically charged. It operates with the desire of survival and the knowledge of 
vulnerability as well as change and continuity. It directs actors to take into account 
their own capacity and also that of their adversary. It recognizes the need to look at 
technical details and objective facts, but also acknowledges that these will change. 
The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR 2010) lists the maintenance of strategic deter-
rence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels as one of its goals. The NPR notes 
that bilateral dialogues with Russia and China on missile defence, space-related is-
sues, conventional precision-strike-capabilities and nuclear weapons issues promote 
more stable and transparent strategic relationships (Rose, 2014). Primakov et.al. 
(2010) emphasize equal security, mutual trust and international stability as the way to 
nuclear disarmament, and the 2015 Russian National Security Strategy (#100 and 102) 
speaks of the need to support strategic stability also to ensure the development of 
the Russian Federation. In 2016, President Putin justified the suspension of an 
agreement with the U.S. concerning the disposal of plutonium from decommis-
sioned warheads by referring to U.S. ‘hostile actions’ and ‘inability to deliver on the 
obligation’. This constituted a radical change in the environment and a threat to 
strategic stability – a stand echoing the sentiment of becoming vulnerable (RT, 
2016). Podvig (2012) criticises the notion of strategic stability and its [political] use. 
He regards the key elements and assumptions of the concept as poorly defined, 
leaving us without useful meaning and ‘virtually no practical value’. In fact, its pur-
suit is the single most serious obstacle to disarmament.  
To Deter and to Fight: U.S. and Russian Nuclear Postures 
Brodie pointed out already in 1946 that the atomic bomb was unique by nature and 
that it had revolutionized warfare. It was not feasible to wage war with these weap-
ons but, nevertheless, they were not useless. They could avert wars rather than win 
them (Brodie, 1946, pp. 76; 88–91; Freedman, 1989, pp. 43–44). Technical devel-
opment since the mid-1950s made it possible to build smaller nuclear devices and 
more precise counterforce weapons systems. Nuclear weapons, including ultimately 
nuclear land mines and the so-called neutron bombs, were designed to destroy ene-
my offensive formations that had broken through one’s own defensive lines, or al-
ternatively major enemy reserve formations still waiting to do so. Tactical nuclear 
weapons became additional stock in the arsenal. The very thought of nuclear war-
fare, let alone of a winnable war, turned Brodies’s absolute premise upside-down. 
Particularly Kahn believed that controlled, rational behaviour could continue even 
when and after nuclear weapons had been used (Freedman, 1989, pp. 134, 216–
217).  
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War-fighting theories introduced the concepts and strategies of countercity and 
counterforce. Countercity, a.k.a. counter-value strategy, targets cities, i.e. the popula-
tion and the industry in the fashion outlined by the Douhetian theory of air power 
of the 1920s and used against German cities in 1943–45. As these targets are large, 
even rudimentary precision is sufficient to inflict destruction considered painful or 
decisive. Cities and populations have still remained on the target list despite the de-
velopment of missile technology that turned counterforce strategy from promise 
into reality. Neither have made demands stemming from and grounded on the in-
ternational humanitarian law that would stop the threatening of cities, civilians and 
critical infrastructure. Counterforce strategy targets the adversary’s military or oth-
erwise critical objects. This requires accurate intelligence, penetration through de-
fences and far better accuracy than the counter-value strategy. On the other hand, 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which were originally meant as a retaliatory 
second-strike capacity (Brodie, 1959), have with their improved accuracy become 
capable of pre-emptive or offensive strikes (Kristensen, Norris and Oelrich, 2009, p. 
20).  
The dualistic nuclear debate between the absolute weapon that deters and the ulti-
mate weapon that destroys has continued. The debate that centred on (the possibil-
ity of) limited U.S.-Soviet nuclear war has transited to considerations on compensat-
ing insufficient explosive power or conventional forces with nuclear weapons.  
The United States 
American declaratory nuclear policy has gone through several distinct phases, but 
the operational policy has remained relatively consistent throughout and arguably 
after the Cold War. The distinct and partially parallel doctrines include the massive 
retaliation of the 1950s, the flexible response in the early 1960s, the mutually assured 
destruction in the 1960s, the limited nuclear war in the 1970s and the focus on 
counter-proliferation in the 1990s (NTI 2015US). These changes in declaratory poli-
cies, and to an extent in operational doctrines, reflect the political and military tech-
nological changes in potential adversary countries. As the Soviet nuclear capacity 
grew, the American policy and doctrine became more cautious and nuanced but also 
more integrated and target-sensitive. Similarly, as China and the so-called rogue 
states became politically more important to the U.S., these states returned or 
emerged, respectively, in the American nuclear scenarios and plans. 
The U.S.’s new millennium nuclear theory and posture is best described in the 2005 
Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (JP 3–12). Building on the 2001 Nuclear Posture Re-
view (NPR) and preluding the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Doctrine explains the 
purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons, discusses nuclear operations and elaborates on 
theatre-level nuclear operations. It explicitly acknowledges deterrence beyond the 
diametric Cold War setting, recognizes the enhanced war-fighting role of nuclear 
weapons and combines the employment of nuclear and conventional weapons.  
The 2005 Doctrine (JP 3–12 2005, p. I–5) explains how the 2001 Nuclear Posture Re-
view ‘in a major break from Cold War thinking’ had reflected ‘the capabilities re-
quired of nuclear forces in the new strategic environment’. The major change that 
the Review had set in motion was the shift in planning from a threat-based Cold 
War approach to a capability-based one (NPR, 2001). The Review had underscored 
the need for a new cooperative approach with Russia, but instead of relying on pro-
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tracted arms control negotiations, the U.S. was to take the lead and, for her own 
purposes, develop nuclear policy and capabilities. For example, the NPR, issued by 
the Bush administration, renounced the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and called for 
developing missile defence capability against ‘terrorist or rogue states’ (NPR, 2001) 
and, although adhering to the nuclear testing moratorium, did not seek the ratifica-
tion and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (NTI, 
2002). In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the neo-conservatives in Wash-
ington in particular read and interpreted the operating environment differently. It 
was considered that the U.S. needed to flexibility respond – even with nuclear 
weapons. 
The U.S. nuclear policy and nuclear forces were to assure friends and allies of the 
continued U.S. determination to defend them, to dissuade potential adversaries by 
being numerous, advanced and reliable, to deter potential adversaries by providing 
the means to respond appropriately to an attack on the U.S., its friends or allies, in-
cluding the capability to destroy the adversary’s valuable and necessary critical war-
making and war-supporting assets and capabilities, and to defeat by applying over-
whelming force to a broad range of targets in a chosen time and manner (JP 3-12, 
2005, pp. I-1–I-2, I-10–I11). 
The Doctrine outlined (JP 3-12, 2005, pp. I-3–I-5) the new triad of nuclear and non-
nuclear capabilities that the 2001 NPR had introduced. Instead of portraying the 
known trinity of land, sea and air-based or airborne weapon systems, the new policy 
broadened nuclear policy and planning to cover both nuclear and non-nuclear strike 
capabilities, incorporate active and passive defences and acknowledge the im-
portance of robust research, development and industrial infrastructure to develop, 
build and maintain offensive forces and defensive systems. In addition, the en-
hanced functions of command and control, intelligence and adaptive planning were 
to support the new triad of Washington’s nuclear policy.  
The 2001 NPR and the 2005 Doctrine regarded deterrence as important but, as-
signed nuclear weapons a regional and war-fighting role nonetheless. The Doctrine 
(JP 3-12, 2005, pp. III-1–III-2) exemplified conditions for geographic commanders 
requesting the President’s approval for the use of nuclear weapons, as follows: 
– An adversary using or intending to use WMD against the U.S., multinational, 
or alliance forces or civilian populations; 
– Imminent attack from adversary biological weapons that only effects from 
nuclear weapons can safely destroy; 
– Attacks on adversary installations including WMD, deep, hardened bunkers 
containing chemical or biological weapons or the command and control in-
frastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack against the 
United States or its friends and allies; 
– To counter potentially overwhelming adversary conventional forces, includ-
ing mobile and area targets (troop concentration); 
– For rapid and favourable war termination on U.S. terms; 
– To ensure success of U.S. and multinational operations; 
– To demonstrate U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter 
adversary use of WMD; and  
– To respond to adversary-supplied WMD use by surrogates against U.S. and 
multinational forces or civilian populations. 
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Even though the Doctrine and its examples do not dictate or limit the use of nucle-
ar weapons, the geographical role assigned to nuclear weapons clearly speaks of pre-
emptive strikes and strikes against non-nuclear entities or targets. For Kristensen 
(2005, pp. 1,4), the 2005 Doctrine signified a change in the role of nuclear weapons 
in American strategic and operational thinking: nuclear weapons might be used in 
less intense crises than previously envisioned and also in a pre-emptive manner. 
However, the 1996 Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations (JP 3-12.1, p. I-2) had 
outlined the potential use and desired results of the use of nuclear weapons in a 
manner that spoke for the instrumental use – especially that ‘units capable of deliv-
ering nuclear weapons should be integrated with other forces in a combined arms, 
joint approach’:  
– Decisively change the perception of enemy leaders about their ability to win;
– Demonstrate to enemy leaders that, should the conflict continue or escalate,
the certain loss outweighs the potential gain;
– Promptly resolve the conflict on terms favourable to the United States and
our allies;
– Preclude the enemy from achieving its objectives;
– Ensure the success of the effort by U.S. and/or multinational forces; and
– Counter enemy weapons of mass destruction.
Moreover, the arsenal available for regional nuclear operations included gravity 
bombs, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) as well as submarine-launched (SLBM) 
and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). This was essentially the full spectrum 
of the U.S. triad.  
The 2005 Doctrine continued (JP 3–12, 2005, pp. II-8–II-9) to explain how for 
many contingencies, existing and emerging conventional capabilities would meet 
anticipated requirements, but that for some, the use of nuclear weapons may be the 
most appropriate response. The integration of conventional and nuclear planning 
and attacks was regarded essential to ensure the efficient use of force and provide a 
broader range of strike options. Such integration was said to ensure optimal target-
ing, minimal collateral damage and to reduce the probability of escalation.  
Despite the early promises of the ‘peace and security of a world without nuclear 
weapons’ (Obama, 2009), President Obama’s presidency from 2008–2016 did not 
change much. Like its predecessor, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR, 2010, pp. 
15–17) speaks of the reduced role of nuclear weapons as well as of making the de-
terrence of nuclear attacks the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. The NPR, 
however, states (p. 16) that because of other countries either possessing nuclear 
weapons or not complying with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, the 
United States is ‘not prepared, at the present time, to adopt a universal policy that 
deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons’. The NTI (NTI 
2015US) explicitly comments on how ‘the Obama administration declined to specify 
that the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is to deter or respond to a nuclear 
attack’. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2012, pp. 3–5) analysis on the U.S. 
nuclear weapons’ targeting process notices how, despite the changes in the structure 
of the nuclear war plan and in the categories and number of targets, the fundamen-
tal objectives of U.S. nuclear deterrence policy have remained largely consistent 
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since 1991 and that the process for developing nuclear targeting and employment 
guidance has remained consistent. Quite obviously, there is no significant change in 
basic target categories since the mid-1970s. According to Kristensen (2010), the 
2009 OPLAN basic target categories include military forces, weapons of mass de-
struction infrastructure, military and national leadership and war-supporting infra-
structure, indicating the continuity of nuclear war theories. In fact, Arbatov, 
Dvorkin and Oznobishchev (2010, p. 47) point out how the 2010 NPR maintains 
the concept of first strike, despite the fact that the U.S.’s superior conventional mili-
tary power should eradicate such serious incentives. It should be noted here, that 
nuclear doctrines are not country-specific in the way operational and contingency 
plans are. The former speak of general principles and guidelines of intended use; the 
latter plans include, among other things, identified targets, defined effects and em-
ployable units and weapons systems.  
The following table shows the number of U.S. strategic nuclear platforms, i.e. long-
range missiles and heavy bombers capable of carrying nuclear warheads, by catego-
ry. The U.S. has reduced the size of its nuclear stockpile from 21,392 operational 
warheads in 1990 to 4,571 today. In addition, it is reported that the U.S. has 500 
B61 gravity bombs, categorized as non-strategic, ‘tactical’ weapons, of which 180–
200 are stored in European bases (NTI 2015US). An account of the Russian nuclear 
arsenal is presented in the following section on Russia. 
Category Amount 
Deployed ICBMs  
 
 
Non-deployed ICBMs 
Deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs 
449: 
LGM-30G Minuteman III (capacity 1-3 
MIRV Mk12/Mk12A per missile) 
246 
454 
Deployed SLBMs 
 
 
 
Non-deployed SLBMs 
Deployed and non-deployed launchers of SLBMs 
248: 
14 Ohio SSBN with up to 24 UGM-
133A Trident D-5, 4 single 533mm TT 
with Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT  
160 
336 
Deployed Heavy Bombers 
 
 
 
Non-deployed Heavy Bombers 
88: 
12 B-2A Spirit,  
76 B-52H Stratofortress 
with AGM-86B; AGM-129A 8 B-2A, 
12 B-52H 
Table 1. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Platforms. Data declared effective as of March 1, 
2015. (U.S. Department of Defense, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Com-
pliance. 2015. ‘New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive 
Arms. United States of America Data’; International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
2014-2016. The Military Balance. London) 
 
17 
The modernization plans helping the U.S. to maintain the new triad that the Bush 
administration had outlined, and the safe, secure and effective arsenal that the 
Obama administration (NPR, 2010, pp. 37-42; Reif, 2016) had promised, include 
among other things:  
– Delivery systems: modernization and replacement of Minuteman III inter-
continental ballistic missiles (projected length of deployment to the 2080s),
modernization of Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile (2040s), de-
velopment of long range standoff cruise missile (2080s), deployment of
twelve Columbia-class submarines (2031-2080s), modernization of B-2
(2050s) and B-52 (2040s), development of B-21 (2080s) strategic bombers;
– Replacement and life extension of warheads, especially W87, W88, W76-1
and B61;
– Modernized production complex: uranium processing facility (Oak Ridge),
and chemistry and metallurgy research.
– Command, control communication and early-warning system upgrades and
development;
– Nuclear force and workforce improvement.
In addition, both mobile and stationary ballistic missile defence capacity is being 
developed. Systems have already been deployed to Czech Republic, Romania, South 
Korea and on-board the U.S. Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke class de-
stroyers, which in turn has triggered strong opposition from Russia and China.  
The 2010 NPR continues to merge nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities. While 
thinking of the early 2000s incorporated advanced conventional weapon systems 
into nuclear-strategic planning, the thinking of the 2010s (NPR, 2010, p. 20) wants 
to deploy conventionally armed ballistic missiles as possible additions of ‘non-
nuclear prompt-global strike capabilities’. Despite remarks by Presidents Bush and 
Obama, the U.S. has also decided to maintain the current alert posture of its strate-
gic forces: the heavy bombers are off full-time alert, but nearly all ICBMs together 
with a ‘significant number of SSBNs at sea at any given time’ are on alert (NPR, 
2010, pp. 25, 27).  
The United States has signed but not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
thus being one of the few countries effectively stopping the CTBT from coming 
into force. There are no doctrinal hindrances for ratification, only domestic political 
ones. On the contrary, the Nuclear Posture Review recommended pursuing ratification. 
Modernization of the triad and the suggested life-extension programs of nuclear 
devices do not require testing either, as the U.S. is not developing new warheads 
(NPR, 2010, pp. 38–39). Nuclear devices can, in fact, be tested in adherence to the 
letter of the CTBT through simulations, sub-critical explosions and component tri-
als. 
The Russian Federation 
The Russian nuclear doctrine portrays a combination of established Cold War think-
ing and reactions to American advances in military technology and the changes in 
nuclear doctrine. In particular, the U.S. dominance over the Soviet-equipped Iraqi 
forces in 1991, the use of air power against Serbia in 1999, former Soviet states and 
Eastern bloc countries joining NATO, the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq as 
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well as ‘colour revolutions’ both in the Middle East and in Russia’s periphery have 
shaped the Russian world view and threat perceptions. Russian nuclear doctrine has 
developed in three distinct phases from the post-Soviet vagueness of the 1990s 
through the reactionary 2000s to the more consolidated doctrine of the 2010s. 
The first military doctrine of the Russian Federation in 1993 gave nuclear weapons a 
primordial role in a large-scale global conflict, that is, a major war between the U.S. 
with its allies and Russia. The doctrine abandoned the declaratory policy of no-first-
use that the Soviet Union had maintained, most likely for propagandistic purposes. 
Throughout the decade, Russian conventional forces were in decay, whereas at the 
same time, American forces were undergoing a successful transformation to rather 
easily deployable, effective and easily available modern information and communica-
tion technologies, which contributed to a debate in Russia on expanding the role of 
nuclear weapons to secure the military security and the continuity of the state 
(Sokov, 2009, pp. 76–78).  
Sokov (1999; 2009, p. 78) dates the origin of the new nuclear policy to a Russian 
Security Council meeting in April 1999. Although all the positions adopted were not 
announced, Security Council Secretary Putin’s account and ‘other sources’ indicate 
an enhancement of the role of nuclear weapons by the development of new nuclear 
weapons, adjustments to the strategic posture, and most likely, continued reliance 
on tactical nuclear weapons. The January 2000 Russian National Security Concept (NSC, 
2000, Ch. I) detected two mutually exclusive trends in world politics: multilateral 
management, which Russia supports; and unilateral solutions, which the developed 
Western countries are claimed to seek. The Concept examined the interests of the 
individual, society and the state in economic, domestic political, social, international, 
informational, military, border and environmental spheres where the ‘national inter-
ests of Russia in the military sphere boil down to the protection of its independence, 
sovereignty, state and territorial integrity, the prevention of military aggression 
against Russia and its allies, and in ensuring the conditions for peaceful and demo-
cratic development of the state’ (NSC, 2000, Ch. II). Accordingly, the Russian for-
eign policy was inter alia ‘ensuring progress in the sphere of nuclear arms control 
and maintaining strategic stability in the world’. Moreover, exercising deterrence to 
prevent aggressions was considered a vital task, and the Russian Federation was to 
possess nuclear forces capable of guaranteeing the infliction of the desired extent of 
damage against any aggressor state or coalition of states under any conditions and 
circumstances, including the use of nuclear weapons in repulsing armed aggression 
(NCS, 2000, Ch. IV). Thus the Russian National Security Concept of 2000 expand-
ed the use of nuclear weapons from deterring a large-scale attack to include deter-
ring wars that do not necessarily threaten Russia’s existence and, logically, to limited 
use of nuclear weapons - also in regional wars (NTI, 2004; 2015RU). For Sokov 
(2016), Russian engagement in Chechnya and the U.S.’s actions in the Kosovo war 
triggered this doctrinal change. As it had become obvious that Russian conventional 
forces and Soviet-origin military technology could not have matched the American 
ones, a more permissive nuclear doctrine was considered necessary to prevent 
Western intervention in Russian zones of influence and to signal the boundaries of 
acceptable behaviour to the west.  
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The post-2000 Russian national and military doctrines have maintained the overall 
direction of the 2000 Security Concept. The 2014 Military Doctrine (RMD, 2014, #12d) 
and the 2015 Russian National Security Strategy, officially referred to as an edict (NSS, 
2015, #15), regard that the deployment of the U.S. missile defence systems and 
non-nuclear strategic precision weapon systems, together with the American global 
strike concept and the ideas of deploying weapon systems to outer space, diminish 
opportunities to maintain global and regional stability. To ensure strategic deter-
rence and the prevention of nuclear and conventional conflicts from major to re-
gional wars, Russian nuclear deterrence capacity is to be maintained at a sufficient 
level (RMD, 2014, #16,20,21,27,32; NSS, 2015, #36).  
However, compared to the 2000 Security Concept, the 2014 Military Doctrine seems to 
take an important step back. Although it factually permits the first use of nuclear 
weapons, it (RMD, 2014, #27) narrows down the possible use of nuclear weapons 
to retaliatory response and to situations that threaten Russian statehood:  
“The Russian Federation retains the right to use nuclear weapons in 
response to the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass de-
struction against itself or its allies and also in case of an aggression 
against the Russian Federation by means of conventional weapons 
when this threatens the very existence of statehood.”  
Sokov (2009) and Arbatov, Dvorkin and Oznobishchev (2010, pp. 25, 42–43) point 
out that already the military doctrine of 2010 had, referring to the existence of the 
state instead of to national security, raised the threshold for using nuclear weapons, 
especially in non-nuclear scenarios. Maintaining a permissive but politically unneces-
sary and operationally obscure role of nuclear weapons in the doctrine would have 
kept undermining Russian political and normative arguments against the widened 
American nuclear policy. Such a move may also signify increased confidence in Rus-
sian conventional capacity. This interpretation undermines the often-presented and 
still-maintained claim of compensation. The question no longer is of compensating 
conventional incapacities but of complementing conventional capabilities. These 
doctrines, accompanied by national sensitivities and perceived regional vulnerability, 
encourage planning for the first use of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Russian polit-
ical and military references to nuclear weapons and the deployment of ballistic mis-
sile systems to the Kaliningrad Oblast can be seen as declaratory measures with the 
purpose of underlining Russian interests in the Baltic Sea region, but they can also 
be seen as signifying the operational role that nuclear weapons have, also in a non-
nuclear setting.  
Sokov’s 2016 analysis of major Russian military exercises involving nuclear scenarios 
hints of the operational and limited use of nuclear weapons. He detects the follow-
ing exercise targets for heavy and medium range bombers that include European 
and Baltic sites [although the deployment of a carrier group to the Baltic Sea is op-
erationally unnecessary and not likely ever to happen (in contrast to e.g. the Norwe-
gian Sea)]: 
– Airbases, command, communications and support centres (in European
NATO countries, especially Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, and, in at
least one case, in Japan).
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– Undisclosed targets in the continental U.S. (most likely B-2 airbases, and 
command and control centres.  
– Naval targets (aircraft carrier groups in the Pacific Ocean and the Baltic Sea; 
and one in the Indian Ocean and one in the Black Sea-Mediterranean.)  
– In 2003, heavy bombers simulated strikes against U.S. overseas bases (Diego 
Garcia and in 2007 against Guam).  
 
The generic ‘target list’ should not surprise anyone as it follows the logic and prac-
tice of counter-force strategy established five decades ago; an American version 
would contain similar categories of targets. However, one should not draw linear 
lines between doctrines, deployments and exercises and willingness, let alone intent 
to attack. Actual decision-making on peace or war is – luckily – based on other fac-
tors and considerations than on the capacity to wage war.  
Sokov (2016) explains the Russian concept and task of deterring ‘regional conflicts’ 
as a way to create a de-escalatory effect that builds on the perceived asymmetry of 
the opponents. For the U.S. (and its allies and partners), such a conflict especially in 
the Russian near abroad would be of secondary importance, relating to democracy 
and other values, but not relating to national security, sovereignty and survival to the 
same extent as it would be relative for Russia. Russia inflicting tailored damage even 
with nuclear weapons (sic) would de-escalate the conflict – a thought that returns to 
the glory days of limited nuclear war theories and undermines the risk of escalation 
to a full-fledged nuclear war. To paraphrase Marxist-Leninist thinking, the objective 
realities of the particular conditions of use would, thus, not cause threats to use and 
even the first use of nuclear weapons to escalate. However, following the pure logic 
of nuclear deterrence, splitting deterrence into geographical parts or contingent 
conditions, reduces the risk of escalation - the very cornerstone of deterrence. Here 
both the American tendency of blurring the line between strategic and tactical and 
nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems, and Russian regional doctrine are guilty-
as-charged of departing from systemic risk aversion to contingent considerations to 
use nuclear weapons.  
The following table accounts for the number of deployed Russian strategic nuclear 
platforms, long-range missiles and heavy bombers capable of carrying nuclear war-
heads. In addition, it is reported that Russia has up to 2,000 warheads categorized as 
non-strategic, ‘tactical’ weapons. These include gravity and depth bombs and devic-
es mounted on cruise missiles, anti-air missiles and torpedoes as well as short-range 
ballistic missiles. Here it should also be noted that compared to land-based, strategic 
rocket forces, navy and sea-based deterrent has had a marginal role in the Soviet 
Union and later in the Russia Federation (NTI 2015RU).  
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Category Amount
Deployed ICBMs 
- with multiple warheads 
- with single warhead 
356: 
54 RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) 
24 RS-24 Yars (SS- 27M2) 
40 RS-18 (SS-19 Stileto) 
160 RS-12M (SS-25 Sickle) 
60 RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27M1) 
18 RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS- 27M1) 
Deployed SLBMs 11: 
3 Kalmar (Delta III) with 16 R-29R Volna (SS-N-18 Stingray) 
6 Delfin (Delta IV) with 16 R-29RMU Sineva (SS-N-23 Ski ) 
1 Akula (Typhoon) 
1 Borey with capacity for 16 Bulava (SS-N-X-32) 
Deployed Heavy Bombers 78: 
16 Tu-160 Blackjack each with up to 12 Kh-55 SM (AS-
15A/B Kent) 
31 Tu-95MS6 (Bear H-6) each with up to 6 Kh-55/SM (AS-
15A/B Kent) 
31 Tu-95MS16 (Bear H-16) each with up to 16 Kh-55 (AS-
15A Kent) 
Table 2. Russian Strategic Nuclear Platforms (International Institute for Strategic 
Studies. 2014-2016. The Military Balance. London) 
Russian plans to modernize their nuclear arsenal are not explicitly publicized. What 
has been announced and estimated indicates an encompassing modernization pro-
gram covering all three legs of the nuclear triad; missiles and platforms and com-
mand and control system. By 2024, all Soviet-era ICBMs, especially RS-20 (SS-18 
Satan) and RS-18 (SS-19 Stileto), are estimated to have been replaced, partly due to 
ageing and partly to improve the missiles’ and warheads’ capacity to penetrate mis-
sile defence. The new ICBM package would include the road-mobile RS-24 Yars and 
the RS-26 Rubezh; the Sarmat, a silo-based heavy ICBM, and the train-mobile 
Barguzin. The Navy should be receiving additional Borey-class submarines, expanding 
its Bulava-30 SLBM-equipped fleet to eight submarines, most likely by the mid-
2020s. A new strategic bomber ‘PAK-DA’ is planned to be designed to replace the 
Tu-95 and Tu-160 fleet. (Arbatov, Dvorkin and Oznobishchev, 2010, p. 26; NTI 
2015RU) Russia has been suspected of testing a ground-launched cruise missile as 
well as expanding the range of the short-range Iskander (SS-21 Stone) ballistic missile 
above 500 kilometres, which, if correct, violates the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nu-
clear Forces Treaty. 
An Arms Control Association report (Philipp and Davenport, 2016, pp. 24–25) as-
sesses that Russia maintains 75 and up to 96 [sic] per cent of its nuclear weapons on 
a high-alert status. This assessment is mainly based on a 2009 statement of Colonel 
General Solovtsov, the commander of Russia’s ICBM force, but also on Russian 
political behaviour. Namely, Russia has either voted against (in 2012 and in 2014) a 
resolution on reducing the readiness of nuclear forces or abstained from voting 
(2010). Russia has explained her vote by saying that the resolution did not look at 
the ‘specifics of national arsenals’ when calling for reductions in alert levels (Russian 
Federation, 2012 cited in Philipp and Davenport, 2016, p. 25.) As background in-
formation, it may be stated here that the United States, together with France and the 
United Kingdom, voted against a 2007 draft resolution calling for further practical 
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steps to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems, with a view 
to ensuring that all nuclear weapons were removed from high alert status; Russia 
abstained from this vote (UNGA, 2007). 
Conclusion: The Limits and Potential of Arms Control and Disarmament 
Firstly, U.S. and Russian nuclear thinking subscribe to the possession and potential 
use of nuclear weapons. Both countries believe that nuclear weapons help to deter 
at least major wars from breaking out. They also reserve the right to use nuclear 
weapons first: the U.S. would use them against a rogue actor in a pre-emptive man-
ner, whereas Russia would use them if conventional aggression jeopardizes its state-
hood.  
Despite an early promise of nuclear disarmament, the Obama administration main-
tained the elementary role that nuclear weapons have in U.S. national security. The 
Putin administration follows suit. Although the notion of national security is widely 
and loosely associated with almost any security or military threat, in the context of 
nuclear weapons it firmly refers to vital interest, existential threats and the survival 
of statehood and the population. This role has not changed and is not changing in 
the U.S. or in Russia. As President Obama also said in Prague: ‘Make no mistake: As 
long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effec-
tive arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies’. In this 
millennium, both countries have re-assigned nuclear weapons with regional and bat-
tlefield tasks, broadening their role from deterrence and the hard core of national 
security.  
The shift from the Soviet and early 1990s Russian doctrine of deterrence, i.e. mas-
sive response and caution to Russian new millennium doctrines of deterrence, i.e. 
massive response albeit limited and first use also in regional conflicts, is striking but 
not surprising. Regardless of how much weight one puts on the compensation claim 
discussed earlier, Russia has emerged from a position of weakness and uncertainty 
to a position of power and parity. Despite its rogue state-specific agenda, the U.S. 
cannot spring ahead of Russia in widening the role of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, 
U.S. steps to establish arguably limited, target-specific ballistic missile defence can-
not in principle be accepted by Russia.  
Despite their adherence to nuclear weapons and their on-going disputes over issues 
such as missile defence, Ukraine, Syria and cyber activities, Russia and the United 
States have respected the strategic arms control treaties. Since the Treaty on Measures 
for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the so-called New 
START, entered into force in 2011, the two have reduced their strategic arsenals. As 
of September 2016, the Treaty provisions allow the U.S. to deploy 1,367, and Russia 
1,796 strategic warheads. According to the 2016 exchange of data, the Russian Fed-
eration and the United States possessed the following amounts of strategic nuclear 
weapons: 
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Category The Russian Federation The United States 
Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs 
and heavy bombers 
508 681
Warheads on deployed bal-
listic missiles and nuclear 
warheads counted for de-
ployed heavy bombers 
1796 1367
Deployed and non-deployed 
launchers (ballistic missiles 
and heavy bombers) 
847 848
Table 3. Biannual exchange of data required by the Strategic Arms Reduction Trea-
ty. Data declared current as of September 1, 2016. (U.S. Department of Defence, 
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. ‘New START Treaty Aggre-
gate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms’). 
The New START treaty obliges both countries to reduce the number of deployed 
and non-deployed launchers to 800 by February 2018. However, the Treaty does 
not mention multiple warheads (per missile), thus taking a considerable step back 
from the 1993 START II agreement, which, had it entered into force, would have 
banned multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV). START II was 
signed and ratified, but the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 caused 
Russia to stop its efforts to bring START II into force. The New START does not 
address the amount of the overall nuclear stockpiles either. Obviously, nuclear 
weapons declared non-strategic, but still yielding similar physical and radiological 
effects, continue to be excluded also from this treaty and, in fact, from any serious 
negotiations.  
The implicit but clear adoption of pre-emption, the development of missile defence 
systems and the dilution of the thin but clear line between nuclear and conventional 
weapons in U.S. strategic and nuclear documents of the early 2000s fundamentally 
undermine strategic stability that is based on mutual vulnerabilities and assured re-
taliation. First strike policy and the doctrinal intention of using nuclear weapons in 
conventional conflicts indicate that other countries’ nuclear posture and, most im-
portantly, their use of nuclear weapons, are no longer decisive planning prerequisites 
for U.S. and Russian nuclear elites and engagement. Schmitt’s (2003, p. 513–518) 
analysis of the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy stresses how pre-emptive approach 
was regarded as a remedy to the shortfalls of containment and deterrence in a new 
threat environment of transnational terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. Schmitt also lists criticism against the doctrine of pre-emption, in that it 
would actually encourage adversaries to use weapons of mass destruction, lest they 
be lost during a first strike, that it might legitimize pre-emption by other states, and 
that it would threaten the Westphalian world order and its fundamental principles, 
sovereignty and territorial inviolability. Subscription to potential first, limited and 
regional use of nuclear weapons underlines also the merged political and military-
operational rationale of nuclear weapons and being nuclear. Regional and limited 
tasks and tactical employment of nuclear weapons increase the practical and political 
utility of nuclear weapons and inhibit nuclear disarmament and pragmatic arms con-
trol measures. 
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The policy of no first use (NFU) would not necessarily reduce the risk of uninten-
tional use or the likelihood of intentional use. On the contrary, no first use can, at 
best, be regarded as political lip service and, at worst, as destabilizing. Though wide-
ly supported within the disarmament community, deterrence advocates consider the 
no first use policy harmful, as following the need to maintain the risk of escalation, 
refraining from first use is considered to undermine deterrence. Moreover, NFU can 
encourage activities under assumed nuclear red-lines and umbrellas. The U.S. has 
systematically refrained from NFU and, as mentioned, although the Soviet Union 
declared it would not use nuclear weapons first, the Russian Federation abandoned 
this stance in 1993, leaving China as the only nuclear weapon state to subscribe to 
this policy.  
Secondly, contrary to Cold War nuclear doctrines of continuity, contemporary U.S. 
and Russian nuclear doctrines are reactions to change: the American reactions aim 
to control the changes in the world order, whereas the Russian reactions focus on 
resisting (further) changes in her self-defined sphere of interest, including Russia 
herself. Moreover, references to threats such as biological weapons, terrorists, North 
Korea or NATO, as well as the development of new ballistic missiles, submarines 
and aircraft make both Russia and the U.S. great again. They revitalize the status of 
being nuclear. By defining and re-defining the enemy, they not only provide guid-
ance to and legitimize technical and doctrinal measures, but also draw the bounda-
ries of the nation (Schmitt, 2007).  
Adherence to deterrence and stability and the habit of considering unilateral moves 
to be destabilizing decelerates arms control and disarmament. In particular, by main-
taining and qualitatively improving their nuclear arsenals, Russia and the U.S. un-
dermine the spirit and the letter of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT). They do not progress towards disarmament, but rather expect 
states without nuclear weapons not to obtain them. In fact, the NPT has become 
‘the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime’ (Obama, 2015), but not a 
building block of disarmament. Reductions in nuclear arsenals stem from operation-
al-technical considerations, financial calculations and mutual political agreements, 
not from the obligation to disarm under Article VI of the NPT.  
The U.S. and Russian doctrines do not, however, prevent arms control. In fact, both 
countries express the readiness to reduce their arsenals. The main conditions for 
doing so are mutual obligations and the maintenance of strategic stability. Strategic 
stability, as a model of thinking, conditions, limits and sets needs for arms control. 
Washington and Moscow keep to their arsenals as a means of maintaining stability 
but are wary of any adversary technological or doctrinal advancement that could 
shake that stability.  
Reading of the U.S. and Russian nuclear policies and doctrines identifies how the 
notion of strategic stability is used to legitimize the existence of nuclear armaments 
in general, and how strategic stability can be exploited to reduce specifically their 
gravity and quantity. As deterrence is more of an abstraction than a well-defined or 
pre-defined level of arsenals, there is no a priori obstacle for joint arms control en-
deavours that at the same time maintain strategic stability, or the stability of deter-
rence. Parity and balance of forces and capabilities can be maintained regardless of 
their level. Accordingly, a bilateral nuclear arms race is illogical and unnecessary at 
best and counterproductive at worst, because moves to improve security needs tend 
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to lead others to perceive increased insecurity and to acquire balancing capabilities, 
as the well-known concept of the security dilemma explains (Herz, 1951).  
The dual policy of maintaining strategic stability and taking decisive and concerted 
action in nuclear and missile non-proliferation can foster arms control that secures 
mutual deterrence, alleviates military security threats, and respects the concerns of 
non-nuclear nations. As the Russian 2015 National Security Strategy (#104) states: to 
preserve strategic stability, the Russian Federation is inter alia ‘prepared for further 
discussion of a reduction of nuclear potentials based on bilateral accords and in 
multilateral formats and also contributes to the creation of fitting conditions permit-
ting a reduction in nuclear arms without detriment to international security and stra-
tegic stability’. Washington should take this statement at face value, even if only to 
test Moscow’s readiness to live up to its promise. Moscow could do the same with 
the U.S. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review’s conditional commitment to reductions. 
Taking deterrence-stability as a point of departure is rather a piecemeal, apologetic 
turn than a utopian objective [to follow Popper (1994, p. xlii), and Koskenniemi 
(2005)], but neither nuclear weapons nor the doctrine of deterrence can be wished 
away. This pragmatic approach builds on the following key assumptions and conclu-
sions of this analysis: 
– No major nuclear or non-nuclear arms control move is possible without re-
specting the doctrine of stability;
– No arms control agreement that does not respect the necessity of mutual
stability can enter into force;
– Stability without explicit and frequent attention to arms control cannot be
maintained over an extended period of time; and
– Technology, weapon systems and doctrines constantly look for openings to
create favourable conditions, which other states can interpret as threatening
and destabilizing.
Thirdly, nuclear weapons are here to stay for the foreseeable future. It is also very 
likely that any arms control and disarmament steps taken will be modest rather than 
ambitious. For a realist, the instrumental value of arms control is that it helps to 
maintain stability in technological, doctrinal and political developments and moves 
that can challenge the obtained stability. An idealist needs to dive deeper, and a care-
ful reading of doctrines and other political statements can be of use. Despite the 
dire doctrines, arms control and disarmament are not destined to fail. On the con-
trary, as doctrines are but characteristic products of their contingent time, arms con-
trol and disarmament can and must revisit the key nuclear beliefs, assumptions and 
principles, and, time and again, reinvent the approaches. What worked yesterday 
may not work today or in the future. 
Stemming from a realistic reading of the contemporary Russian and American nu-
clear thinking, the following framework for analysis and action seeks to identify the 
rationality, methods and tangible objectives of the politics of arms control and dis-
armament. The first question an analyst or an activist needs to ask concerns the 
fundamental approach and purpose of a policy or an initiative: limitation, reduction, 
conditioning or banning and of what, the use, quality or amounts of particular 
weapons systems. Especially, as in the 2000s, both the U.S. and Russia have an-
nounced more permissive nuclear doctrines and diluted the previously clear distinc-
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tion between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons arms control, efforts should not be 
limited to weapon systems and their deployment, but should address questionable 
policies and destabilizing doctrines. We may also ask about the stakeholders’ inter-
est: what particular national interests affect the policies or processes; is it to preserve 
or change stability or balance; and is the real interest promoting or preventing the 
processes, the latter preserving an utility that nationally is considered essential? We 
also need to determine whether it is more beneficial to focus on existing technolo-
gies and ways of employment or on developing technologies and anticipated, harm-
ful, ways of their employment. Finally, we should ask about the desired product of 
any arms control or disarmament policy or process: are we satisfied with voluntary 
norms, statements or measures, or are we to seek legally binding, explicitly verifiable 
and even universal agreements and treaties? 
Furthermore, reading the American and Russian nuclear doctrines identifies permis-
sive operational practices that are more alarming than the existence or levels of their 
nuclear weapons. Although a nuclear-free world is considered an ideal, the threat of 
nuclear escalation involving and between the super powers needs most urgent atten-
tion. In the case of nuclear weapons, even a relatively small number of weapons can 
create absolute destruction. Moreover, while the U.S. and Russia and other states 
with nuclear weapons have learned to manage and live with vast arsenals, even theo-
retical considerations on the limited and regional use of nuclear weapons and the 
combined nuclear/non-nuclear arsenals are dangerous new terrain. Thus, the fol-
lowing arms control measures would help in reducing the likelihood of intended use 
of nuclear weapons and the risk of intended or unintended nuclear escalation of 
conflicts: 
– Abandonment of regional and limited nuclear doctrines, where nuclear 
weapons are regarded as and thought to be used as any other weapon;  
– Taking nuclear weapons off high-alert levels and onto lower levels of alert 
and readiness; 
– Banning multiple warheads in line with START II Treaty provisions; 
– Clearly separating nuclear and non-nuclear weapons systems; 
– Creating a treaty-based reduction of non-strategic, so-called tactical nuclear 
weapons; and  
– Taking nuclear non-proliferation seriously also politically and not only as a 
technical measure to prevent the illegal spread of technologies, material and 
competence. 
 
The hyper-realist domestic politics prevailing in both Moscow and Washington do 
not rule out mutually beneficial deals in arms control. Still, it is likely that it is not 
the current, but rather the next generation U.S. and Russian leaders that will have 
the chance to earn peace prizes: 
[Russia needs to] “enhance the combat capability of strategic nuclear 
forces, primarily by strengthening missile complexes that will be guar-
anteed to penetrate existing and future missile defence systems.” 
Vladimir Putin, 22 December 2016. 
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“The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear 
capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding 
nukes.” 
Donald J. Trump, 22 December 2016. 
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Concepts and Abbreviations 
 
Sources: Arms Control Association; Federation of American Scientists; Treaty Texts; U.S. 
Department of Defence; U.S. Department of State. 
 
First strike 
A decisive, surprise nuclear strike 
launched with an intention to destroy the 
target or defeat the enemy.  
 
Second strike 
A retaliatory nuclear strike launched in 
response to a first strike. 
 
Launch-on-warning 
A doctrine/strategy to launch a retaliatory 
strike on warning of an incoming nuclear 
strike, that is before that strike hits their 
targets and potentially eliminates the ca-
pacity retaliate.  
 
Counter-city/counter-value 
A doctrine/strategy and force to target 
enemy population and society. 
 
Counter-force 
A doctrine/strategy and force to target 
enemy military objects, especially nuclear 
and other high-value units and for-
mations, command and control centres, 
air and naval bases and military-industrial 
infrastructure. 
 
Ballistic missile 
A missile launched to and flying most of 
the time on a ballistic flight path (subor-
bital trajectory). Ballistic trajectory is the 
straight line between the site of launch 
and the target but its vertical curve and 
height of it is determined by the launch 
speed (thrust and impulse) of the missile. 
Ballistic missiles travel to outer space and 
closer to the target the missiles or their 
multiple warheads return at high velocity 
to atmosphere.  
 
Cruise missile 
A missile travelling through atmosphere 
to its target on a guided, chosen flight 
path. Because of their guidance and navi-
gation systems cruise missiles have high 
precision and probability to hit even a 
small target. 
 
Tactical nuclear weapons 
Nuclear weapons intended to be used in 
battlefield or against single, usually, but 
not exclusively a militarily valuable target.   
 
Strategic nuclear weapons 
Nuclear weapons intended to be used 
against larger and high political or military 
value targets as a part of strategic plan, 
i.e. not of immediate battlefield utility. 
 
Short-range 
Ballistic missile range less than 500 kilo-
metres; the U.S. Department of Defence 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(JP 1-02) defines short range as ballistic 
missile range between up to 600 nautical 
miles (1100 km). 
 
Intermediate range 
Following the scope of the INF Treaty 
ballistic missile range between 500 to 
5500 kilometres; the U.S. Department of 
Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (JP 1-02) defines medium range as 
ballistic missile range between 600 to 
1500 nautical miles (1100–2800 km). 
 
Long-range 
Ballistic missile range over 5500 kilome-
tres 
 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
(ICBM) 
Silo or mobile ground platform launched 
long-range missile with single or multiple 
warheads, nuclear or non-nuclear. 
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Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile 
(SLBM) 
Long-range ballistic missile launched 
from a submarine with single or multiple 
warheads, nuclear or non-nuclear. 
Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile 
(SLCM) 
Cruise missile with nuclear or non-
nuclear warhead launched from a subma-
rine. 
Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) 
Cruise missile with nuclear or non-
nuclear warhead launched from an air-
plane. 
Multiple Independently Targeted Re-
Entry Vehicle (MIRV) 
Ballistic missile payload (section) contain-
ing multiple warheads and possible de-
coys that are released in outer space and 
return to atmosphere on a descending 
trajectory before hitting the multiple tar-
gets on the ground or at sea.  
Surface-to-Surface Missile (SS/SSM) 
Ballistic missiles fired on ground (SS) or 
at sea (SSN) against targets on ground or 
at sea as opposite to Surface-to-Air 
(SA/SAM) anti-air(craft) and Air-to-
Surface/Air-to-Ground (ASM/AGM 
/ATGM) missiles.  
Ballistic Missile Defence/Anti Ballis-
tic Missile Defence (BMD/ABM De-
fence) 
Defence system comprising radar sta-
tions, command and control centres, sat-
ellite and other secure connections and 
surface-to-air interceptors (missiles) that 
are able to detect and destroy ballistic 
missiles in various stages of the trajectory.  
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM 
Treaty) 
The Treaty Between The United States of 
America and The Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on The Limitation of Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Systems was signed in May 1972. 
The Treaty permitted each may have only 
two ABM deployment areas, one to pro-
tect its capital and another to protect an 
ICBM launch area. This agreed restriction 
prevented the build-up of a nationwide 
ABM defense or become the basis for 
developing one, which left each country 
vulnerable to the others retaliatory missile 
forces. The U.S. and the Soviet Union 
also signed to limit qualitative improve-
ment of their ABM technology, in partic-
ular not to develop, test, or deploy ABM 
launchers capable of launching more than 
one interceptor missile at a time or modi-
fy existing launchers to give them this 
capability. In December 2001, the United 
States indicated its intent to withdraw 
from the ABM Treaty, and its withdrawal 
became effective 6 months later. Presi-
dent George W. Bush stated in his re-
marks that that at the time of signing in 
1972 the world was vastly different and 
that the ABM Treaty had come to hinder 
“our government’s ability to develop 
ways to protect our people from future 
terrorist or rogue-state missile attacks”.  
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty 
(CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions on 
Earth whether for military or for peaceful 
purposes. The basic obligations as stipu-
lated in Article I are “1. Each State Party 
undertakes not to carry out any nuclear 
weapon test explosion or any other nu-
clear explosion, and to prohibit and pre-
vent any such nuclear explosion at any 
place under its jurisdiction or control” 
and “2. Each State Party undertakes, fur-
thermore, to refrain from causing, en-
couraging, or in any way participating in 
the carrying out of any nuclear weapon 
test explosion or any other nuclear explo-
sion.” The CTBT was opened for signa-
ture in 1996. Currently 183 countries are 
members of which 166 have ratified the 
Treaty. Of the 44 specified country ratifi-
cations needed the Treaty to enter force 
eight are still needed, namely China, 
North Korea, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, 
Pakistan, and the United States. 
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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) 
Signed in July 1968 the NPT entered 
force in March 1970. The Treaty has 
three main pillars: non-proliferation, dis-
armament and peaceful use of nuclear 
energy. The designated nuclear-weapon state 
parties to the Treaty, China, France, Rus-
sia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, undertook “not to transfer to any 
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices or control 
over such weapons or explosive devices 
directly, or indirectly; and not in any way 
to assist, encourage, or induce any non-
nuclear weapon State to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices, or con-
trol over such weapons or explosive de-
vices” (Article I). 
 
On the other hand, each non-nuclear-weapon 
state party to the Treaty undertook “not 
to receive the transfer from any transfer-
or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices or of con-
trol over such weapons or explosive de-
vices directly, or indirectly; not to manu-
facture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive de-
vices; and not to seek or receive any assis-
tance in the manufacture of nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive de-
vices” (Article II). 
 
The NPT does not limit states to “devel-
op research, production and use of nucle-
ar energy for peaceful purposes without 
discrimination and in conformity with 
articles I and II of this Treaty.” Moreo-
ver, all the Parties to the Treaty under-
took “to facilitate, and have the right to 
participate in, the fullest possible ex-
change of equipment, materials and sci-
entific and technological information for 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” (Ar-
ticle IV).  
 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty under-
took “to pursue negotiations in good 
faith on effective measures relating to 
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an 
early date and to nuclear disarmament, 
and on a Treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective 
international control” (Article VI). 
 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT) 
The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks 
were initiated in 1967 as a combined ob-
jective to limit ballistic missile and anti-
ballistic missile defence build-up. The 
formal negotiations commenced in 1969 
and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation 
of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I) and the 
ABM Treaty were signed in May 1972. 
SALT I limited the number of strategic 
ballistic missile launchers at existing lev-
els. It also limited land-based ICBMs that 
were in range from the northeastern bor-
der of the continental United States to 
the northwestern border of the continen-
tal USSR and the number of SLBM capa-
ble submarines that NATO and the Unit-
ed States could operate to 50 with a max-
imum of 800 SLBM launchers between 
them. It also required both parties to 
limit their ABM system to two as agreed 
in the ABM Treaty. SALT II was in prin-
ciple agreed in 1974 but was never rati-
fied. It suggested strategic nuclear deliv-
ery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy 
bombers) to 2400 for each side; a limit of 
1320 limit on MIRV systems; a ban on 
new land-based ICBM launchers; and 
limits on deployment of new types of 
strategic offensive arms. 
 
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty 
The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed in 
1987, eliminated all Soviet and American 
longer-range intermediate nuclear force 
missiles with ranges between 1,000 and 
5,500 kilometers, as well as shorter-range 
intermediate nuclear force missiles with 
ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometers. 
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Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START) 
The Treaty Between the United States of Amer-
ica and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms was signed on in July 1991. 
START reduced and limited each party’s 
number of deployable launchers to 1600 
and deployable warheads to 6000. After 
the collapse of the Soviet Union it was 
agreed in 1992 that Russia, Belarus, Ka-
zakhstan and Ukraine became parties to 
the START I Treaty as legal successors to 
the Soviet Union, the three latter later 
joining the NPT as non-nuclear states 
and abandoning their nuclear weapons.  
START II 
The Treaty Between the United States of Amer-
ica and the Russian Federation on the Further 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms was signed in January 1993 and 
ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1996 and by 
the Russian Duma in April 2000. START 
II reduced the number of deployable 
nuclear weapons initially by two-thirds 
and finally to 3000–3500 warheads. The 
START II also banned heavy interconti-
nental ballistic missiles and multiple-war-
head ICBMs. Since the U.S. withdrew 
from the ABM Treaty in 2002 Russia 
ended its efforts to bring the signed and 
ratified START II into force. 
START III 
The Treaty would have established by the 
end of 2007 a ceiling of 2,000-2,500 stra-
tegic nuclear weapons for each of the 
parties. The treaty negotiations were nev-
er concluded.  
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty 
(SORT) 
The Treaty Between the United States of Amer-
ica and the Russian Federation On Strategic 
Offensive Reductions (“The Moscow Trea-
ty”) was signed in May 2002 and entered 
force in June 2003. The Treaty reduced 
and limited strategic nuclear warheads by 
the end of 2012 to the maximum of 
1700-2200 for each Party. In addition the 
U.S. and Russia agreed that START I 
remains in force in accordance with its 
terms.  SORT does not address strategic 
nuclear warhead destruction or tactical 
nuclear weapons limits, which were sug-
gested for inclusion in START III. 
New START  
The treaty on Measures for the Further Re-
duction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms was signed in April 2010 and en-
tered force in February 2011. New 
START replaced the Treaty of Moscow 
(SORT) expiring in December 2012. The 
New START limits the number of de-
ployed strategic nuclear warheads to 
1550. It will also limit the number of de-
ployed and non-deployed inter-conti-
nental ballistic missile launchers, subma-
rine-launched ballistic missile launchers, 
and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear 
armaments to 800. The number of de-
ployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bomb-
ers equipped for nuclear armaments is 
limited to 700. 
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The US Missile Defense Systems, Europe and Russia  
Götz Neuneck2  
Abstract 
fforts to erect a workable defense against attacking long-range ballistic mis-
siles were pursued from the beginning of the missile age in the 1950s. Dur-
ing the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union developed and partially 
fielded strategic anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM), but these deployments were 
intentionally limited in 1974 by the ABM Treaty. The U.S. withdrew from the Treaty 
in 2002 which made the development of national ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
and its proliferation and regional deployment possible. Under US President Obama, 
particularly, regional missile defense in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, in re-
sponse to the proliferation of theater-range ballistic missiles, has returned to the 
international agenda, causing much controversy about the offense/defense relation-
ship between the nuclear weapon states and about regional stability. In particular, 
the planned European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which, according to 
NATO, is directed against an Iranian missile threat, caused much Russian opposi-
tion. The criticism is that the US wants to build a global missile defense, which un-
dermines ‘strategic stability’ in relation to survivability, crisis stability and arms race 
stability, causing thereby a new arms race. The US effort to develop different BMD 
programs is accompanied by an ongoing debate about their technical effectiveness, 
their scope, their deterrent effects and their impact on arms control and regional 
stability. The first section gives a short historical introduction to the development of 
various BMD programs and their potential implications. The second section out-
lines the current status of the global and regional missile programs from a European 
point of view and the Russian objections to them. The third section analyses the 
EPAA and its consequences for European Security and Arms Control. The article 
concludes with a discussion of proposals for future cooperation and confidence-
building.  
Introduction: A Short History of BMD - From Global Aspirations to 
Regional Reality 
The US and Russia have pursued efforts to build defenses against long-range ballis-
tic missiles, especially those equipped with nuclear warheads, since the 1950s (Neu-
neck, 2010). To shoot down a missile in flight with a very high speed ‘anti-missile’ is 
2 Acting Co-Director at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, 
Physicist. Current working areas are: Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament, Ballistic Missile Defense, 
Space/Cyber Security, Nonproliferation of Military Technologies.
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an enormous technical challenge. BMD was first born out of the monstrous threat 
of nuclear weapons first delivered by airplanes (air defense), then against attacking 
ballistic missiles. As ballistic missiles are able –within minutes –to deliver payloads 
of mass destruction over considerable distances, they represent an enormous strate-
gic threat, especially if equipped with nuclear warheads. During the Cold War, the 
US and the Soviet Union developed and partially fielded strategic anti-ballistic mis-
sile (ABM) interceptors (Sentinel, Galosh) armed with nuclear warheads but, due to 
technical problems and the overwhelming number of nuclear warheads, these de-
ployments were limited to one interceptor site per country with 100 interceptors by 
the time the 1972 and 1974 Protocol ABM Treaty was signed. Additional prohibi-
tions against the location of radar sites except at territorial peripheries, the introduc-
tion of new interception technologies (i.e. lasers in space) and the demarcation be-
tween strategic and tactical BMD systems were also fixed. All of these years, the 
feasibility of BMD and its impact on strategic stability were called into question by 
critics. Given the huge arsenals, an effective BMD system was neither feasible nor 
useful during the 1970s and 1980s. The bilateral ABM Treaty also prohibited the 
deployment and testing of comprehensive ABM systems (sea-based, air-based and 
space-based) for the entire territory of the USA and the Soviet Union/Russia, but 
placed no restrictions on tactical BMDs against shorter range ballistic missiles.  
In 1983, President Reagan revitalized the debate with his ‘Strategic Defense Initia-
tive’ (SDI) proposal which put the utopian idea of an astrodome of exotic weapons, 
such as high-energy lasers, on the international agenda and challenged, by its very 
nature, the idea of nuclear deterrence. But within five years, many exotic elements of 
this ambitious program, such as ‘Directed Energy Weapons’ (i.e. lasers) or the x-ray 
laser were cancelled and the funding was scaled back, especially when the Cold War 
ended in the early 1990s. Under George H. W. Bush’s presidency, SDI was trans-
formed into GPALS, the ‘Global Protection against Limited Strikes’. With the end 
of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the risk of a deliberate nucle-
ar attack by Russia was drastically reduced. The focus of the BMD debate shifted 
from the Russian threat to ‘rogue’ or ‘irrational’ states using more conventional 
technologies as a BMD technology. This involves hitting an enemy missile or war-
head with a ‘kill vehicle’ to destroy the attacking system with a collision or an explo-
sion in close proximity to the attacking warhead. In 1994, the Republican Party, in 
particular, called (in ‘Contract with America’) for deploying a ‘cost-effective, opera-
tional anti-ballistic missile defense system’ as early as possible. Nevertheless, tech-
nical feasibility, considering costs at the margin and the implications for arms con-
trol have always been decisive criteria for not deploying strategic BMD programs.   
President Bill Clinton and the Democrats dropped their opposition to strategic 
BMD in exchange for maintaining the arms control agenda. In 1996, the Clinton 
administration introduced ‘National Missile Defense’ (NMD) to protect US territory 
–an issue of their policy –and set the course for deployment using more conven-
tional technologies. In January 1999, the administration announced that the de-
ployment decision would be based on four criteria: the ballistic missile threat, the 
costs, the readiness of interception technology and the arms control implications. 
NMD’s purpose was to defend all 50 US States, i.e. including Hawaii and Alaska, 
against a limited ICBM strike. Under intense pressure from Republicans in Congress 
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in 1999 President Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act (Public Law 106-
38) which says:
“It is the policy of the United States to deploy, as soon as is technologically 
possible, an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending 
the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack 
(whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).” 
After that, an analysis of NMD testing produced mixed results and on September 1, 
2000 President Clinton concluded that he would leave the deployment decision of 
NMD to his successor. Until that time, ‘national’ and ‘theater’ BMD systems were 
separate programs, but in 2002 the new George W. Bush administration saw the 
different elements as part of a global ‘Ballistic Missile Defense System’ (BMDS). 
This caused much concern in Russia and China. At the center of BMDS is the 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the US homeland 
against an attack from countries, such as North Korea or Iran. The US pullback 
from the ABM Treaty in 2002 made the development of the national Ballistic Mis-
sile Defense (BMD) and its regional deployment possible. Also in 2002, the Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) was renamed ‘to develop, test and field an integrated, lay-
ered, ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) to defend the United States, its de-
ployed forces, allies and friends against all ranges of enemy ballistic missiles in all 
phases of flight’ (MDA Homepage, Mission 2017). Especially after 9/11, the na-
tionally oriented GMD system became the centerpiece of the Bush administration’s 
policy to protect the United States against long-range missiles.  
Currently, both Russia and the United States maintain strategic missile defenses. The 
Russian Federation still appears to have deployed 68 ‘Gazelle’ interceptors close to 
Moscow in their ABM-3 system to protect the capital. The last version of the A-135 
system became operational in 1995. (Sputnik International, 2012) It is unclear 
whether the ABM-3 system is operational and equipped with nuclear or convention-
al tipped warheads.  
The Obama administration inherited four main BMD programs based on ballistic 
missile interceptors: The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) consists of 30 
ground-based interceptors (GBIs), deployed in Alaska (26) and in California (4), the 
naval Aegis BMD ships, the land-based Theater High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) and the Patriot PAC-3 tactical BMD system.   
According to MDA figures, the US has spent over $180 billion on BMD programs 
since the mid-1980s, but there is neither a functional territorial defense program in 
the US nor can the very limited number of strategic interceptors match a real world 
threat. By contrast, some countries, such as North Korea, are accelerating their of-
fensive missile programs. In addition, some other nuclear armed states, such as Rus-
sia, China and India, are working to develop their own strategic interceptors for fu-
ture development. The evolving BM programs of North Korea and Iran are the 
main justification for the various BMD efforts in the US. Despite all of these pro-
grams and approaches, the US has no effective BMD system against long-range bal-
listic missiles, which would be operational against a realistic threat today. As made 
38 
clear by many independent studies, missile defense is obviously much more politi-
cally motivated than based on sound technical analysis. (Sessler et. al. 2000, Neu-
neck et al. 2015, Kelleher et al. 2015, UCS 2016) 
The ‘Evolving’ Missile Threat 
Beyond the five traditional nuclear weapons states, which have developed and de-
ployed missiles with long-ranges (ICBMs, SLBMs), de facto nuclear-armed states, 
such as Pakistan, India and Israel, are working on BMs with intermediate ranges 
(3,000-5,500 km). Officially, the main focus of the US BMD efforts is the evolving 
missile threat from North Korea and Iran. These two countries still rely heavily on 
imported missile technology and foreign missile expertise. The Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) has an active nuclear weapons program and conducted 
nuclear explosive devices tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, twice in 2016, and one in 2017. 
The DPRK deploys short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and successfully 
launched long-range rockets in 2012, 2016 and 2017. North Korea is also believed 
to be working on an ICBM that could reach US territory in several years. Iran has an 
ambitious BM program and can produce Medium-range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM), 
such as Shahab-3 and Sejjil-2 (1,000-2,000 km). After more than 10 years of exten-
sive diplomatic efforts, it was possible to negotiate an agreement with Iran to stop 
further nuclear weapon-relevant developments: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1 from July 2015 created an effective 
mechanism to block Tehran from building nuclear weapons for 10 years. Iran has 
the biggest variety of deployed Short-range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM) in the Middle 
East and is conducting MRBM tests of several variants of the imported Shahab/No-
Dong type. It is also working on its space capabilities, which could also be exploited 
for military purposes. According to experts, Iran is a decade or more away from 
developing and testing an ICBM. Iran’s BM program is not part of the JCPOA, but 
under UN Resolution 2231 (2015) ‘Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity 
related to BMs designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons’. Nevertheless, 
in 1998, the Rumsfeld Commission stated that ‘the newer ballistic missile-equipped 
nations would be able to inflict major destruction on the US within about five years 
of a decision to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq)’. It is note-
worthy that this direct threat to the US has never materialized, nearly two decades 
later, demonstrating that it is much harder for Third World countries to build IC-
BMs.   
A trajectory of a BM can be described in three phases. During the boost phase, the 
missile is highly visible and is powered by its rocket motors. The midcourse phase is 
the longest phase, during which the remaining stage and the warhead are drifting 
through space. In the terminal phase, the warhead is re-entering the atmosphere and 
finally reaches its target. Consequently, a BMD system has to deal with different 
requirements and is very time-critical in the different phases. 
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Type Range [km] 
Flight Ti-
me [min]
Burnout Ve-
locity 
[km/s] 
Stages Countries 
Lo
ng
-ra
ng
e 
M
iss
ile
s ICBM 5,500 – 14,000 ~ 24 - 40 ~ 6,9 2-3 
USA, Russia, 
China, (DPRK), 
(India) 
IRBM 3,000 – 5,500 ~ 14 - 24 ~ 5,0 1-3 China, India 
MRBM 1,000 – 3,000 ~ 8 - 14 ~ 2,8 1-2 
Israel, India, Chi-
na Pakistan, Sau-
di-Arabia, Iran, 
DPRK 
SRBM < 1,000 ~ 5 - 8 ~ 1,5 1 31 countries 
SLBM 300 – 12,000 ~ 5 - 40 ~ 1,5 – 6,9 1-3 
USA, Russia, 
China, UK, Fran-
ce, (DPRK), (In-
dia) 
Table 1: Categorization of ballistic missiles and their characteristics after the INF 
Treaty (...): Missiles in Development 
The Current BMD Programs and Rationales: A Closer Look 
The current U.S. GMD BMD program consists of different key components: for-
ward-based radars (FBX), satellite-based, infrared sensors for early-warning, conti-
nental ground-based interceptors (GBI), which will release a kill vehicle against an 
incoming warhead, a ground-based Command and Control System and a sea-based 
Tracking Radar (SBX). In 2002, the Bush-II Administration decided to deploy 54 
silo-based interceptors (GBI) at three locations, 30 (expanding to 44) in the US 
(Vandenberg, California and Fort Greely, Alaska), and 10 interceptors under the 
‘European Missile Defense’ (EMD) in Europe. The administration fielded the first 
GBIs in the US in 2004, without robust testing results (‘fly-before-you-buy’-policy), 
and maintains that, since then, it has had an ‘operational capability’ or ‘a rudimen-
tary protection’ of the continental United States, causing much debate about the 
reliability of GMD.  
The Bush-II-Administration rushed rapidly into the deployment of the GBIs for 
political reasons and did not follow the Pentagon’s standard acquisition rules. Of the 
17 pre-deployment and the integrated flight tests only 8 were successful (Grego, 
Lewis & Wright, 2016, p. 3). Different Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
reports repeatedly criticized a lack of transparency by the MDA, cost overruns and 
high-risk acquisition practices (GAO, 2016). In 2016, the GAO’s assessment was 
that MDA has not ‘demonstrated through flight testing that it can defend the U.S. 
homeland against the current missile defense threat’. (GAO, 2016a, p. 6) In addi-
tion, some BMD components, such as the ‘Precision Tracking and Space Surveil-
lance’ (PTSS) and the ‘Multiple Kill Vehicle Program’ (MKV) were cancelled. The 
MKV program was meant to be an answer to the ‘countermeasure problem’ (Sessler 
et al., 2000): An attacker can try to multiply the missile payload during flight by us-
ing light decoys, balloons and debris or warhead mockups, besides the real warhead, 
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to confuse the defense. Distinguishing objects in a ‘threat cloud’ is a key task of sen-
sors for tracking missiles and their warheads. The tracking radar has the task of dis-
criminating between the ‘fake warhead’ and the real one to guide the kill vehicle to 
the nuclear warhead. The current GMD testing program uses limited testing condi-
tions (i.e. sun lighting, smooth weather etc.) and has not yet test against an ICBM-
range target. The current testing also does not include sophisticated countermeas-
ures. An UCS study from 2016 concluded that ‘the Pentagon’s own testing officials 
have said the system has not demonstrated an operational capability to defend the 
US public from a missile attack’ (UCS, 2016, p. 2). The 2012 National Academy of 
Sciences’ study (NRC, 2012) called the GMD system ‘deficient’ with respect to 
some principles for cost-effective missile defense and recommended a complete 
overhaul of the GBIs, sensors and the concept of operations. (UCS, 2016, p. 11) 
Today, the MDA has deployed 30 GBIs in Alaska (24) and at California’s Vanden-
berg Air Force Base (6) and is preparing to field 14 more. The Obama Administra-
tion did not improve the oversight problem, but in March 2013, then-Secretary of 
Defense, Chuck Hagel, announced that 14 additional interceptors would be fielded 
by the end of 2017 in response to the North Korean ballistic missile program. 15 
years after announcing the GMD system, the aggregated costs are $40 billion with-
out demonstrating that GMD has ‘a real world defense capability’ against more so-
phisticated threats. The 2016 UCS study concluded that ‘inadequate congressional 
oversight, presidential administrations that push for a rushed deployment and few 
impediments to starting poorly vetted projects have led to the GMD program’s cur-
rent state of disarray’ (UCS, 2016, p. 18). 
Despite the sobering test results, advocates in the US Congress for an expansion of 
the national GMD are now pushing to build a ‘third NMD site’ on the East Coast 
of the US. In May 2016, the Pentagon said that it had completed a draft study of 
three possible locations on the Eastern US coast for a new BMD interceptor site, 
but that it still had no plans to actually build such a site. The estimated costs for 
such a new site might be $3-4 billion. Other proponents in the US Congress are 
proposing old ideas, such as the deployment of GBIs in Eastern Europe or the re-
turn of space-based interceptors (Reif, 2016). The version of the FY 2017 National 
Defense Authorization Act passed by the House of Representatives requires the 
Pentagon to begin design, research and development and testing for a space-based 
missile defense system. The version of the bill passed by the Senate says the de-
partment ‘may’ commence work on such a system but does not require it. The 
Obama administration argued that there are no requirements for a space-based in-
tercept system and cited concerns about the technical feasibility and long-term af-
fordability of BMD interceptors in space. (Reif, 2016)  
In addition, the efforts–predominantly by Republicans in the US Senate and the 
House of Representatives–to revise the 1999 National Missile Defense Act were 
successful. They succeeded in removing the word ‘limited’ in the act and in intro-
ducing the phrase ‘an effective, robust layered missile defense’. So, Congress re-
wrote the long-standing US BMD policy by stating it is now ‘the policy of the Unit-
ed States to maintain and improve an effective, robust layered missile defense sys-
tem capable of defending the territory of the United States and its allies against the 
developing and increasingly complex ballistic missile threat’ (Reif, 2017). Despite 
objections from the Pentagon, analysts and civil society, President Obama signed 
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that law on December 23, 2016. This language opens the door for the accelerated 
expansion of different BMD systems against countries beyond Iran and North Ko-
rea (Reif, 2017). Such a statement sends a signal to Russia and China that the US is 
not committed to finding any solution for balanced strategic stability, thus under-
mining any future disarmament steps.  
Midcourse Defense 
Name Task Technology Components Status 
Ground-
base Mid-
course 
Defense 
(GMD) 
Protection 
of the U.S. 
homeland 
against lim-
ited attacks 
Hit-to-Kill Technol-
ogy to intercept stra-
tegic ballistic missiles 
IRBM, ICBM 
Ground-based 
interceptors GBI  
Initially de-
ployed since  
2004 
Aegis 
BMD 
Hit-to-Kill Technol-
ogy to intercept 
short- and medium 
range ballistic mis-
siles SRBM, MRBM, 
IRBM  
Aegis BMD ships; 
aegis Ashore 
Deployed, 
Testing 
Terminal Phase Defense 
Name Targets Technology Contractor Status 
THAAD SRBM, 
MRBM 
(IRBM) 
Hit-to-Kill, mobile 
ground-based inter-
ceptors 
Lockheed Martin 
u.a. 
Testing and 
deployment in 
Guam (2013); 
Deployment 
planned in 
South-Korea 
Patriot  
PAC-3 
Aircraft, 
Cruise Mis-
siles, SRBM 
Hit-to-Kill + war-
head, mobile ground-
based interceptors 
Raytheon, Lock-
heed Martin 
Deployed 
Aegis 
Terminal 
Defense 
SRBM Warhead with prox-
imity fuse, sea-based 
Interceptors 
Lockheed Martin, 
Raytheon, ATK, 
Boeing, among 
others 
Deployed, test-
ing 
Table 2: The U.S. BMD programs and their key characteristics 
Current US Lower- and Upper-tier BMD Systems 
Only two current US BMD systems have been envisioned specifically to address the 
medium-range ballistic missiles threat: the US naval system Aegis- BMD system and 
the US ground-based interceptor system THAAD (Theater High Altitude Area De-
fense). Both BMD-systems are dedicated to area and regional protection against 
sophisticated aerial threats up to intermediate-range missiles. 
The Aegis BMD system is the naval component of the BMDS, which consists of Ae-
gis ships equipped with Standard Missile (SM) interceptors and onboard tracking 
radars (O'Rourke, 2016). The US Navy sees BMD as a core mission. In addition to 
that, the land-based ‘Aegis Ashore’ locations in Europe are adapting the ship-based 
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Aegis system to land locations, especially as part of the EPAA concept. The Aegis 
Weapon System (AWS) is geared toward defending against SRBMs, MRBMs and 
intermediate-range missiles above the atmosphere. Several SM interceptors are al-
ready deployed or are in development. The SM-2 Block IV and SM-6 Dual I/II in-
terceptor can intercept SRBMs in the atmosphere, whereas the SM-3 Block IA, IB 
and the forthcoming Block IIA can defeat targets above the atmosphere. The SM-3 
has a three-stage booster with a homing kill-vehicle on top. The MDA is also run-
ning another BMD program, the Sea-Based Terminal Defense (SBT) Program, which 
creates a low-altitude second layer of BMD for Navy ships and nearby areas. SBT 
interceptors, such as the SM-6, operate within the atmosphere and defeat the target 
with high-explosive fragmentation warheads. Intercepting SRBMs, such as Scud 
missiles, which do not leave the atmosphere, is planned. The SM-6 is an air defense 
interceptor which can also have a surface attack capability. 1,800 missiles will be 
procured by 2024 (Lewis, 2016c).  
Japan and the US are co-developing the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor variant to de-
feat longer-range BMs. This faster version (~ 4.5 km/s) can cover much larger areas 
and is operationally more flexible than the SM-3 IB. The deployment is scheduled 
for 2018. The MDA claims that Aegis BMD ships can detect and track BMs of all 
ranges, including ICBMs if early warning and tracking data is available from space- 
or ground based sensors (MDA, 2016). An Aegis cruiser or destroyer is equipped 
with a SPY-1 radar and vertical launch tubes (VLS) for a maximum carrying capacity 
of 90-122 weapons, which can host different offensive and defensive missiles. The 
first Aegis deployment was in 2004. Japan has purchased four Kongo class destroy-
ers with upgraded BMD capabilities. As of July 2016, 33 US Aegis BMD ships (five 
cruisers and 28 destroyers) were in service.  
Flight tests are conducted at the Pacific Test Range in Hawaii. MDA says that it has 
conducted 40 SM-3 intercept tests with 33 successful intercepts. The MDA states 
that of 40 flight tests, 37 were successful. The number of interceptors and BMD 
ships will increase over time. Today, the US Navy has only four ships with ‘ad-
vanced’ BMD capability, which can perform air and missile defense at the same 
time. The MDA projects that there will be 39 BMD capable ships by 2020 and 80 
Aegis BMD ships with 7.000+ VLS tubes by 2040 (Lewis, 2015). 
The land-based Theater High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) is a globally 
transportable missile defense system designed to defend against incoming threats, 
such as SRBMs and MRBMs at the end of their midcourse and their terminal stage 
inside and outside of the atmosphere. A THAAD battery consists of a launcher with 
eight interceptors, an X-band radar (AN/TPY-2) and a fire control system. A bat-
tery consists of a maximum of nine launchers which are air-deliverable. THAAD 
has been ‘successfully’ tested 13 times since 2006, including 11 intercepts of SRBM 
targets. The first test against an IRBM is planned for 2017. The THAAD system 
provides the upper tier of a ‘layered defense’ to protect ‘high value strategic or tacti-
cal sites’, such as airfields or populations centers. The production of interceptors 
began in 2011 and, up until 2015, several hundred interceptors had been delivered. 
Five of the seven planned THAAD batteries have been delivered to the US Army. 
The first two batteries were deployed in Fort Bliss, Texas. One THAAD battery was 
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deployed to Guam in 2013 to defend against a North Korean threat. In July 2016, 
the US and South Korea decided to deploy another THAAD battery to protect 
parts of the South Korean peninsula against the North Korean threat. This decision 
caused much controversy in South Korea. China articulated strong objections, espe-
cially against the THAAD radar, which can, in a specific mode, monitor Chinese 
ICBM launches.  
The operational ‘lower tier’ Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) is designed to de-
fend against S/MRBMs in the terminal stage at low altitudes with a blast fragmenta-
tion interceptor. It is not necessarily part of EPAA and is or will be deployed in sev-
eral field missions and can protect point targets, such as troop accumulations. Earli-
er Patriot versions but also PAC-3 were purchased by other countries and have been 
deployed to different regions. PAC-3 destroyed 2 Iraqi SRBMs, but also shot down 
a US fighter jet in 2013.  
Summary 
Many questions about the feasibility of the current technology and the potential ef-
fectiveness of strategic ballistic missile defenses remain open, but the Obama Ad-
ministration still invested around $10 billion annually for BMD, much of which was 
for strategic defense. Advocates and critics of missile defenses agree that neither the 
Russian nor the US BMD system currently deployed would provide an effective and 
reliable defense against a sophisticated nuclear ballistic missile attack. There is also a 
consensus among many analysts that the existing US strategic defense system does 
not provide a reliable defense against even a simple ICBM attack from an emerging 
nuclear weapons state. The remaining three US BMD programs are non-strategic, 
designed to defend against S/MRBM/IRBMs: the sea-based Aegis BMD system; 
the Army’s THAAD program; and the Patriot PAC-3 program. These tactical and 
theater BMD systems, as well as the Russian S-300/400/500 series program, will 
not substantially affect the strategic military balance between Russia and the United 
States due to their limited capabilities. During the debates on the ABM Treaty, both 
sides especially valued the contribution of missile defenses against tactical and thea-
ter BM systems, leaving such defenses outside the limits of the treaty and negotiat-
ing a demarcation protocol to distinguish tactical and strategic BMD in 1997. This 
valuation has only risen as the S/MRBMs arsenals of independent third-party states 
has expanded. The need to reassure allies and partner states in the face of new bal-
listic missile threats was an important driver for the United States’ missile defense 
policy, even as the Obama administration cut the rate of growth in missile defense 
spending. The Airborne laser (ABL) and the Precision Tracking Space System 
(PTSS, previously SBIRS-Low) were cancelled in April 2013.  
The EPAA and the Implications for European Security    
Especially after 9/11, a ‘Global Missile Defense’ became the centerpiece of the 
Bush administration’s policy to protect the United States, but also its allies, US forc-
es and friendly countries against long-range missiles. For Europe, the original idea 
was to place an interceptor site with 10 two stage GBIs in Poland and a fixed, po-
tent, ‘European Midcourse Radar’ in the Czech Republic. This configuration was 
mainly designed to intercept Iranian missiles heading to the US, but under some 
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conditions these interceptors could also shoot down Russian ICBMs. Some parts of 
Southern Europe would also not be covered by the GBI footprint. President Putin 
criticized these plans at the Munich Security conference in 2007, arguing that this 
would lead to ‘an inevitable arms race’. On September 17, 2009, the newly elected 
President Obama announced the cancellation of the Bush deployment plan in Eu-
rope, replacing it with a more mobile and flexible BMD architecture, which protects 
the whole of Europe, especially against Iranian ballistic missiles. This ‘European 
Phased Adaptive Approach’ (EPAA) plan calls for deploying the US Navy’s SM-3 
interceptors on board Aegis ships and, later, on two land-based ‘Aegis Ashore’ 
EPAA sites in Romania and Poland. This regional BMD architecture includes a 
land-based radar in Turkey and an evolving Command and Control (C2) network, 
also known as NATO’s ALTBMD system. Then-Prime Minister V. Putin and Rus-
sian President Medvedev welcomed President Obama’s decision. NATO Secretary, 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, stated in his first speech as new Secretary General that the 
Alliance would ‘explore the potential of linking US, NATO and Russian missile de-
fense systems at an appropriate time’. But the US decision increasingly caused frus-
tration to the Polish and Czech governments. At the end of 2009, the BMD subject 
was still blocking the START follow-up talks.  
In February 2010, the Pentagon released the Ballistic Missile Defense Review 
(BMDR) Report. This first-ever comprehensive BMD review mandated by the US 
Congress (DoD, 2010) outlines the official US BMD strategy, policy and future pro-
gram planning. In his foreword, the then-Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, un-
derlined the two main missions of the US missile defense policy under President 
Obama. The top priority was (1) to defend ‘against near-term regional threats’ and 
(2) ‘to defend the homeland against attack by a small number of long-range ballistic 
missiles’ (DoD. 2010, p. i). Concerning the long-range threat, the report names 
North Korea and Iran (DoD. 2010, p. ii). The main focus of the BMDR-Report was 
clearly on the growing regional threats ‘from short-range, medium-range, and inter-
mediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs) in regions where the 
United States deploys forces and maintains security relationships’ (DoD. 2010, p.iii).   
The Basis of the EPAA: American or European? 
The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) originally consisted of four phas-
es, sequenced to provide increasing protection against a BM threat (O`Rourke, 2016, 
p.6). The first EPAA phase started with the deployment of a tactical Patriot BMD 
system and four Aegis BMD ships in the Mediterranean by the end of 2011. Phase 
two involved the construction of an ‘Aegis Ashore’ site in Deveselu Air Base, Roma-
nia, with SM-3 IB interceptors in 2015. The site was operationally activated on May 
12, 2016. In Phase three, the building of another Aegis Ashore site in Redzikowo, Po-
land in the 2018 mainframe, with new SM-3 Block IIA interceptors is planned. The 
faster SM-3 Block IIA interceptor has a higher seeker sensitivity and a better divert 
capability compared with the slower SM-3 IB interceptor. Its initial deployment is 
planned by the end of 2018 (Lewis, 2016d).  
If Aegis BMD ships are deployed near the Eastern US coast, they could have signif-
icant defense capabilities against Russian ICBMs (Butt & Postol, 2011). Such a re-
location of Aegis ships needs a few days but could not be achieved clandestinely, 
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given Russia’s additional warnings. The fourth phase, originally planned for 2020, 
would have deployed faster SM-3 Block IIB interceptors with an anti-ICBM mission 
to defend the US against Iranian ICBMs, but was cancelled in 2013 due to technical 
problems and a slower evolution of the Iranian threat. A GAO study from 2013 has 
already stated that ‘the original impetus came from comparing policy alternatives, 
not from technical analysis’ (Grego, Lewis & Wright, 2016, p. 17). This would have 
created an extra layer to defend the US homeland.  
Phase Date Systems 
Deployment Area 
(Aegis) 
Targeted Threat 
I 2011 
Patriot, four Aegis Cruis-
ers based in Rota/Spain  
Aegis SM-3 Block IA 
Mediterranean Sea SRBM / MRBM 
II 2015 + Aegis SM-3 Block IB Land-based in Poland , Mediterranean Sea SRBM / MRBM 
III 2018 + Aegis SM-3 Block IIA 
Land-based in Romania, 
Poland  SRBM / MRBM / IRBM /  
IV* 2020 + Aegis SM-3 Block IIB 
Possibly only two Aegis 
Ashore site in Poland 
and Romania 
SRBM / MRBM / 
IRBM / ICBM 
Table 4: Planned deployment phases for the future NATO BMD (Neuneck et al, 
2015, p. 178) 
* Phase IV was cancelled in March 2013.
Some European NATO member states contributed key elements to the EPAA ar-
chitecture. Four countries are hosting EPAA bases: since 2011, Turkey has been 
hosting the US AN/TPY-1A radar in Kürecik near Diyarbakir. Romania (2015) and 
Poland (2018) are each hosting a land-based SM-3 BMD interceptor site. Spain runs 
the Rota harbor, which is the base for the four multi-mission US Aegis destroyers. 
In Ramstein, Germany hosts the EPAA C2 center and holds available Patriot mis-
siles to defend the asset. In September 2011, the Netherlands announced an up-
grade to four air-defense frigates with extended long-range BMD early warning ra-
dar. The UK announced it was investing in a land-based BMD radar to enhance 
NATO’s BMD capability. France, Italy and the UK are developing the SAMP-
T/Aster family of short-range BMD interceptors. These BMD systems as well as 
Patriot PAC-3 and the canceled MEADS program are only capable of covering lim-
ited areas (point defense). So far, however, the design of the European BMD system 
architecture and its key components remain largely a US project based on US tech-
nology and funding. In his article, G. Lindstrom notes that EPAA ‘increasingly 
serves as an expression of NATO’s pursuit of collective defense’ (Lindstrom, 2015, 
p. 114). To become a fully operational BMD system, additional key functions have
to be elaborated within the Alliance: given the short time period of intercept plan-
ning, monitoring and tracking and, consequently, the management, including kill 
assessment, and the whole interception process is crucial and time-critical. The Ae-
gis SPY-1 radar alone is ineffective for this purpose as has been pointed out by the 
Pentagon’s Defense Board and the US National Academy of Science studies (DSB. 
2011; NSC, 2012). NATO’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) activities, although in 
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their infancy, also play an important part in the NATO Integrated Air and Missile 
Defense System (NIAMDS), which protects the Alliance territory, population and 
armed forces against air and missile threats. From a purely military point of view, 
Russia sees this as an emerging military threat. 
Date Key decisions 
19.-20. November 2010 The NATO Summit in Lisbon decided that ballistic missile defense is a European project and approved EPAA. 
21. May 2012
At the NATO Summit in Chicago, NATO Secretary General 
announced that the first elements of NATO BMD are opera-
tional (‘Interim Capability’) 
22. December 2013 The new Aegis Ashore Test Facility at the Pacific Missile Test Range is declared operational 
31. January 2014 The first of four Aegis destroyers, the USS Donald Cook, leaves Norfolk for the Spanish Harbor Rota 
14. March 2014 The Aegis destroyer, the USS Donald Cook, leaves Rota for its first mission 
12. May 2016 The first EPAA Aegis Ashore at the Deveselu Air Base, Roma-nia, with SM-3 IB interceptors, was declared as operational. 
Table 5: The development of NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense plans (Neuneck 
2015, 178) 
The Unsuccessful Strive for NATO-Russia Cooperation 
At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO decided officially ‘to develop a 
missile defense capability to protect all NATO European populations, territory and 
forces,’ adding a new core mission for the Alliance. Russia was invited to participate 
in BMD within the NATO-Russia Council framework, but NATO worked contin-
uously to build-up its BMD infrastructure. Different proposals for a joint BMD ar-
chitecture were made. Russia proposed shared defense responsibilities for different 
geographical sectors. The so-called sectoral approach means that each party (NATO 
or Russia) would have been responsible for providing BMD to a specific area. Un-
der this plan, Russia would also have been responsible for the Baltic States 
(Makarov. 2012, pp. 11-23). The key issues here are that Early Warning cannot be 
divided into different sectors and that both sides would be dependent on each other 
without having a clearly defined threat assessment. NATO also proposed establish-
ing a joint Missile Defense Data Fusion Centre and a Planning Operations Centre. 
The independent EASI project, in which Russian and American experts, sponsored 
by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, were involved, worked out a compromise of two 
separate, but coordinated BMD systems (Dvorkin, 2015, p. 132). Two elements 
were proposed: Independent ship-based interceptors from NATO/Russia and two 
BMD centers for Early Warning and Coordination. A Satellite and Radar Data Inte-
gration Center and a BMD Planning and Operational Center, staffed by both Rus-
sian and NATO officers, would have been responsible for the coordination of both 
the early warning and the defense. The patrol area was geographically restricted: 
Russian ships would have been deployed in the Baltic Sea, the Barents Sea, the 
Black Sea and in the Norwegian Sea (EASI, 2012). On the level of tactical missile 
defense (TMD), NATO and Russia held several joint computer-assisted exercises 
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between 2003 and 2008 to develop a common understanding and practices for a 
future Joint BMD Centre. Despite great efforts from science, military experts and 
civil society, a common understanding for robust cooperation did not materialize. 
The obstacles to an enduring BMD cooperation were based on the inability to agree 
on the missile threat, different views on the geographical and operational responsi-
bilities to defend specific zones and mistrust over the future development of the 
European BM defense, in combination with NATO being unwilling to give legally 
binding guarantees that the EPAA would not be directed in the future against Rus-
sia’s Strategic Forces (Dvorkin, 2015, p. 121). With the annexation of Crimea and 
the unresolved conflict over the Eastern Ukraine, any talks on joint BMD efforts 
came to a halt.  
On November 23, 2011, as a possible military reaction against NATO’s BMD de-
ployment, Russian President Medvedev announced a set of countermeasures, such 
as activating an early-warning radar in Kaliningrad or deploying offensive capabili-
ties (Iskander SRBMs) or withdrawing from the N-START Treaty.   
NATO’s Inflexibility 
At the Chicago NATO summit in May 2012, the Alliance declared an ‘interim mis-
sile defense capability’ and NATO´s defense ministers approved an action plan for 
the next steps towards an Alliance-wide BMD capability. The May 2012 NATO De-
terrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) also emphasized that ‘Missile de-
fense can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substi-
tute for them.’ No details or any operational rationale were worked out. In early 
May 2012, during an international BMD conference in Moscow, senior Russian offi-
cials specified their concerns. At the conference, Russian officials claimed that inter-
ceptor speeds higher than 5.5 km/sec and sea-based interceptors higher than 4.5 
km/sec would be able to intercept Russian strategic missiles (Zadra, 2014, p. 53). 
First, the Russian military sees an inextricable link between strategic defenses and 
offenses. The new NATO BMD structure was perceived by the Kremlin as the basis 
of a strategic defense system, which would undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear de-
terrent. For a long time, strategists have argued that the deployment of defenses by 
one side would reduce the effectiveness of the other side’s second-strike weapons. 
This perception directly touches the debate on a follow-on New Strategic Arms Re-
duction Treaty. The Russian military sees the US BMD architecture as ‘global’. Fur-
thermore, Russia claims that other emerging US capabilities, such as conventional, 
precision-guided strategic missiles (Prompt Global Strike) and space dominance, are 
able to undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent.  
In September 2014, at the NATO summit in Wales, the Alliance repeated in its 
statement that ‘Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in de-
terrence; it cannot substitute for them’, without explaining the operational relation-
ship of both concepts by specifying what ‘appropriate’ means (NATO, 2014, Nr. 49 
& 52). The 28 leaders also commented: ‘Should international efforts reduce the 
threats posed by BM proliferation, NATO missile defence can and will adapt ac-
cordingly’ (NATO, 2014, Nr. 55). In May 2016, NATO Secretary General Jens Stol-
tenberg reiterated that ‘our missile defense programme represents a long-term in-
vestment against a long-term threat. Our goal is to achieve full coverage and protec-
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tion for NATO’s European Allies against ballistic missile attacks from outside the 
Euro-Atlantic area’. He described the system as ‘defensive’ and emphasized that ‘nor 
does the system represent any threat to Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent ‘based on 
‘physics and geography’ (Stoltenberg, 2016). Although, this is correct under the cur-
rent configuration, the architecture can change significantly in the future by adding 
new platforms and faster interceptors.  
At the NATO Summit in Warsaw, the 28 leaders declared the ‘Initial Operational 
Capability’ of NATO’s BMD, which means that the four Aegis ships based in Spain, 
the radar in Turkey and the interceptor site in Romania can work together under 
NATO Command and Control (C2 ). (NATO, 2016, Nr. 56-58).  
When President Obama announced the EPAA in September 2009, a principle goal 
was to enable NATO to defend against the emerging long-term ballistic missile 
threat from Iran. In his Prague speech in 2009, President Obama stated that ‘if the 
Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driv-
ing force for missile defense will be removed’. With the successful conclusion of the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in July 2015, the prospects of a nuclear-armed 
Iran declined rapidly. Also, Iranian ICBM flight tests, predicted by 2015, never ma-
terialized. For example, a report of the US-Russian-German Deep Cuts Commission 
from 2015 called for the postponement of the EPAA phase deployment in Poland 
(Deep Cuts Commission, 2016, p. 29), but nothing happened at the Warsaw sum-
mit. NATO has continued with its EPAA implementation, which Washington has 
repeatedly declared is not directed against Russia. NATO’s inflexible stance is un-
necessarily exacerbating tensions with Moscow, creating additional anti-Western 
momentum in Russia. A study on regional missile defense states that ‘there has been 
remarkably little public debate on the critical issues raised by the renewed and 
reimagined emphasis on missile defense in the United States and across the globe’ 
(Kelleher, 2015, p. 13). Among the public, BMD is seen as a protective tool of secu-
rity policy.   
Future Possible Aegis Deployments 
Three key parameters are decisive for reaching strategic missiles heading to the US: 
speed, the number of interceptors which can reach Russian missiles heading to the 
US, and the effectiveness of the kill vehicle. A simulation model developed in Ham-
burg, which includes real missile data as well as location, gravitation, earth rotation 
and drag forces, calculates the trajectories of attacking missiles and interceptor to 
determine the reachability of attacking missiles. The calculations showed that an 
‘early intercept’ of Russian ICBMs by EPAA assets would only be possible with in-
terceptors faster than 5 km/sec. (Neuneck, 2015, X). It follows that the current and 
planned number of SM-3 interceptors would not undermine the Russian deterrent. 
Simulations also show that five ships with SM-3 Block IB interceptors or two Aegis 
Ashore sites can cover the NATO area against MRBMs from the South. It should 
also be clear that if the interceptors become faster, this would also increase the de-
fended area. If new and faster interceptors are introduced, a cooperation agreement 
with Russia should be on the agenda. This must include the locations and the opera-
tional areas of the BMD capable ships, the speed and number of the interceptors, as 
well as the capabilities of the deployed radars.  
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As of the end of 2016, the US Navy currently had 33 BMD-capable Aegis ships (5 
cruisers and 28 destroyers). 16 are assigned to the US Navy Atlantic fleet. The MDA 
and the US Navy are working to increase the 33 ships to 39 by the end of 2020. 
BMD-capable ships are operating in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to 
provide regional missile defense, mainly against North Korea and Iran (O´Rourke, 
2016, p. i). Of the 33 BMD-capable Aegis ships, only four have ‘advanced BMD 
capability’, which can perform against aircraft and ballistic missiles simultaneously. 
The Navy’s requirement is to have 40 ships available for 2026: four for EPAA, nine 
to be based in Japan and 27 for carrier battle groups (O´Rourke, 2016, pp. 14-15).  
The Aegis sea-based BMD system, deployed on Ticonderoga-class cruisers and the 
guided missile destroyers enjoy broad political support in Washington. Currently, 
the US Navy has in service three types of ‘Standard Missile’ interceptors: 75 SM-2 
Block IV (to defend against aircraft and cruise missiles), which will be replaced by 
SM-3s; 200 SM-3 Block 1 A/B (to defend against ballistic missiles). In principle, 
each destroyer can carry 90-96 Vertical Launch System (VLS) tubes (Mk 41 launch 
containers) and each cruiser 122 VLS. Under the plans of the Obama administra-
tion, the number of Block IIA interceptors would increase rapidly in the 2020s 
(Lewis, 2016d). For the four EPAA Aegis destroyers, there are no concrete numbers 
available, but it is believed that 182 SM-3 Block IIA interceptors will be purchased 
for EPAA (Lewis, 2016d). According to an analysis by G. Lewis, starting with 2017, 
the number of advanced Aegis BMD ships will increase rapidly by 3-4 per year. By 
the mid- to late-2030s, 400-600+ SM-3 Block IIA interceptors might likely be de-
ployed, mostly on ships (Lewis, 2016). Adding 44-100 GBI interceptors, this num-
ber is roughly comparable to the number of survivable Russian ICBM/SLBM war-
heads and much larger than the number of Chinese warheads. This creates unre-
solved challenges for nuclear deterrence and strategic stability between these coun-
tries. There is a concrete danger that ship-based BMD might become a spoiler for 
nuclear disarmament. 
Today, Russia has numerous options for maintaining its second-strike capabilities: 
developing new warheads and countermeasures; deploying faster ICBMs; investing 
in future submarines or mobile ICBMs; or deploying more missiles to silos in the 
Eastern part of Russia, which cannot be reached by interceptors from NATO terri-
tory. President Putin has already announced that the modernization of the Russian 
strategic missiles includes adding penetration aids and maneuverable warheads. For 
the moment, there are no prospects of signing a new ABM-like treaty between the 
US and Russia. It is worth noting, however, that the United States is likely to have 
significantly fewer strategic missile defense interceptors at the expiration date of the 
New START Treaty than the 100 strategic interceptors allowed each side under the 
ABM Treaty, as amended by the 1974 Protocol. The US will have no more than 44 
strategic interceptors before 2017. Russia’s plans are less certain, but the 68 strategic 
interceptors currently deployed around Moscow are more likely to be replaced in 
equal or lesser numbers than augmented.   
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The End of the INF Treaty Could Fuel a New Arms Race 
A key challenge for future NATO-Russia relations is the open compliance debate 
on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty from 1987 between the US 
and the USSR/Russia. This treaty eliminated their nuclear-equipped INF and short-
er-range missiles in a range between 500 km and 5,500 kilometers. By June 1991, the 
US and the Soviet Union had destroyed two weapon categories: ballistic and cruise 
missiles, their launchers and support structures of this range. A Special Verification 
Commission (SVC) was created to serve as a platform for discussing and resolving 
implementation and compliance issues. After the dissolution of the USSR, the US, 
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine became members of SVC. In 2014, the 
Obama Administration accused Moscow of being ‘in violation of its obligations un-
der the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise 
missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or 
produce launchers of such missiles’ (Gordon, 2017). In 2016, American officials 
claimed that ‘Russia was producing more missiles than are needed to sustain a flight-
test program’ (Gordon, 2016, X). In February 2017, the New York Times reported 
that Russia now has two battalions of new SSC-X-8 cruise missiles, which have been 
secretly deployed in the country. Publically, there is no detailed information availa-
ble. Whether these GLCMs are equipped with conventional or nuclear warheads as 
well the range of these systems is unclear. Since 2014, Moscow has denied such 
claims and has added three allegations about non-compliance by the US: (1) Russia 
argues that the deployment of Mk 41 launchers for the Aegis interceptors are not 
INF-compliant because the launchers have been used for testing the Tomahawk 
SLCMs and could be used for the deployment of GLCMs, especially at the BMD 
sites ‘Aegis Ashore’ in Romania and Poland. (2) Russia claims that the US is using 
banned INF missiles as target missiles for its BMD tests and (3) Russia believes that 
the US can use heavy unmanned aerial vehicles with intermediate range as cruise 
missiles. Nevertheless, the Putin and the Obama administrations reaffirmed their 
commitments to the Treaty. At the last SVC meeting in Geneva in November 2016, 
no substantive progress was made. There is a general lack of confidence on both 
sides about resolving this issue with adequate CBMs, which would include visits or 
on-site inspections of disputed BMD and GLCM installations (Deep Cuts Report 
2006, 26). Furthermore, it is important that NATO and Russia are discussing ‘con-
fidence-building measures to remove first-strike concerns.’ This includes addressing 
precision-guided long-range strike systems and strategic and theater missile defense 
systems (Thielmann & Zagorski, 2017, p. 9). If this were not to succeed, a new arms 
race would be looming, which would have considerable influence on NATO’s MD 
policy.   
In addition, Russia and the US are modernizing their sea- and air-launched cruise 
missile capabilities, which are similar to the cruise missiles banned by the INF treaty. 
The US plans to develop a nuclear-armed long range (LRSO) cruise missile for 
launching from strategic bombers. The US Navy and Air Force are planning to de-
velop a 1,000 km range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff (JASSM) Cruise Missile. Russia 
used the SLCM Kalibr (range 2,500 km) with conventional warheads, launched from 
submarines and warships in the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean, extensively 
against targets in Syria. Russia is also equipping its heavy bombers with new nuclear-
armed Kh-102 ALCMs. Despite these developments, relinquishing or destabilizing 
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new nuclear-equipped ALCMS by both Russia and the US would strengthen the 
INF Treaty. Therefore, the United States and Russia should address and discuss the 
destabilizing effects of nuclear- and conventionally equipped Cruise missiles, their 
horizontal and vertical proliferation and possible CBMs. International regimes, such 
as the MTCR and The Hague Code of Conduct could be reinforced significantly. 
(Deep Cuts Commission, 2016, p. 9) 
Some Conclusions 
The current configuration of the US integrated BMD system is not globally- but 
regionally- oriented. Many questions about the feasibility of the current technology 
and the potential effectiveness of strategic ballistic missile defenses remain open. 
Neither the Russian nor the US strategic BMD system currently deployed would 
provide an effective and reliable defense against a sophisticated nuclear ballistic mis-
sile attack. If an attacker were to invest in simple countermeasures, even the current-
ly tested regional BMD systems would run into severe problems. Due to the lack of 
reliability of the current BMD systems, there is a tendency to invest more in this 
challenging field to achieve ‘an effective, robust layered missile defense’ by deploy-
ing more BMD sites and ships. In response nuclear proponents will redouble their 
efforts to introduce more nuclear deliverable warheads, which might end all future 
disarmament activities. This would fuel more investments in BMD R&D, triggering 
a regional arms race. The relationship between BMD and deterrence, as well as the 
meaning of strategic and regional stability, are neither discussed nor refined.  
There are no signs that key opponents with ambitious ballistic missile programs are 
dissuaded from acquiring and developing BMs. North Korea is redoubling its ef-
forts to develop and test long-range BMs. Combined with a functional nuclear war-
head, this could become a concrete threat to the region and, in the long-term, also 
for the United States, thereby accelerating their BMD activities. If supported politi-
cally, the JCPOA between Iran and the P5+1 from July 2015 creates an effective 
mechanism to block Tehran from building nuclear weapons for 10 years. Iran’s mis-
sile program has not been stopped. The international community should invest in 
more regional arms control arrangements, which include ballistic missiles, especially 
in the Middle East and in Asia.  
The EPAA in Europe does not, in its current configuration (phases 1-3), pose a 
threat to the Russian strategic deterrent potential. If the number and capabilities 
(especially speed) of interceptors and interceptor platforms increase significantly, an 
offense-defense arms race might be the result. Nevertheless, many operational ques-
tions are open: What is the future threat assessment? What is the relation between 
deterrence and defense? Does the real threat justify the cost? Are confidence-
building measures or politically binding guarantees in the BMD field feasible and 
possible? How robust is the current system against countermeasures?  
Even after the downturn of Russian and NATO relations, future cooperation ar-
rangements between the US, NATO and Russia in important technical fields, such 
as early warning, tactical missile defense (TMD), simulation exercises and the estab-
lishment of data exchange and study centers are feasible, if the political will is there. 
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Without a resolution of the INF compliance issue, the perspectives for the INF-
treaty and any future nuclear arms reduction between the USA and Russia are un-
likely. On the contrary, acceleration of BMD deployments might not only lead to a 
spoiler for further disarmament, but could also fuel a redeployment of SRBMs and 
INF systems in Europe, thus justifying more efforts for the EPAA in Europe.  
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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of  Nuclear Weapons  
– Treaty Regime on the Brink of  Collapse
Katariina Simonen3 
Abstract  
he Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into 
force in 1970. A three-fold bargain was made: non-proliferation, internation-
al cooperation in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear dis-
armament leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Today, at the beginning 
of 2017, the nuclear disarmament promise remains greatly unfulfilled. Frustrated, 
the majority of states, civil society and other stakeholders have aligned themselves 
behind the so-called Humanitarian Impact Initiative. Three massive humanitarian 
conferences have produced uncontestable data, which renders the doctrine of deter-
rence essentially a suicidal concept. The year 2017 also marks a start for a diplomatic 
process leading to a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Nuclear 
weapon states and their umbrellas oppose these developments. These states should 
remember that the NPT is not invulnerable and, since the NPT is part of a wider 
network of arms control initiatives, its collapse (or success) has an effect on the en-
tire network. The NPT’s survival as well as that of the larger control network de-
pends on the political will to make nuclear weapons a thing of the past.  
Introduction  
Since the atomic bombs were dropped on the cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 
August 1945, states have raced for this most efficient weapon in the human history. 
At the same time, efforts to get rid of these weapons or, at least to control their 
spread, have multiplied. One such control effort is the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (IAEA, 1970), which entered into force 5 March 
1970. The aim of this presentation is to familiarize the reader with the NPT, its his-
tory and its present, bearing in mind the NPT’s relevance for the European context. 
At this very moment, the NPT regime is facing difficulties due to different factors, 
one of which is the failure of the initial bargain underlying the deal.  
What is important to acknowledge from the start is that the NPT is a part of a larger 
context made of different disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives, and its suc-
cess or failure is closely intertwined to developments under these initiatives. A con-
textual reading is, hence, a start for any understanding of the treaty regime. To 
achieve such contextual understanding, a variety of different arms control initiatives 
3 Katariina Simonen, LL.D., is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki 
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is introduced shortly in the presentation, when in appropriate connection to the 
NPT and its implementation. Also, other than conventional developments, many of 
which are Europe-related, such as the US modernization of tactical nuclear weapons 
in Europe or the development of the European missile defence, have a bearing on 
the general climate of dialogue, whether negative or positive, which will directly im-
pact on the future of the NPT. These developments are discussed in detail in differ-
ent chapters of the present book.  
For understanding the NPT, its drafting history is telling of the changing priorities 
and intentions of states under the whole of the drafting period. These shifts in pri-
ority had an obvious effect not only on the contents of the individual articles, but 
also on the treaty as a whole. The eleven (XI) treaty articles are summarized in the 
presentation, with the attention focused on Art. VI, which contains the unfulfilled 
promise made by nuclear weapon states (hereafter, NWS) to non-nuclear weapons 
states (hereafter, NNWS). Basic principles of treaty interpretation are also included, 
in order to highlight the significance of parties’ intentions and later practice when 
evaluating the present condition of the NPT.  
The analysis of the present condition compiles of list of developments harmful to 
the NPT, such as the current state of world nuclear forces and their modernization, 
the extensive role of nuclear deterrence in security strategies, proliferation risks and 
discriminatory control efforts and practices. However, in order not to present the 
NPT only in a negative light, a brief account of success stories, such as the estab-
lishment of several de-nuclearized zones, will also be presented. Every five-year in-
terval, NPT’s Review Conferences are organized to check-up on the implementation 
of the treaty, their success or failure indicating directly the atmosphere in multilat-
eral diplomacy. The final, and perhaps the most interesting development, the Hu-
manitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons Initiative will be the object of the last sub-
stantial section of this presentation, which ends with concise, but hopefully thought-
provoking conclusions. 
This article is unfortunately a scratch on the surface of topics, which would merit a 
much more detailed presentation. For instance, the non-negligible work of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency (hereafter, the IAEA) in the ambit of non-
proliferation, its safeguards and Additional Protocol, would deserve their very own 
analysis, as would many other topics shortly mentioned in this presentation. How-
ever, I hope this article serves as a path opener for future scholars into the exciting 
and important world of disarmament and arms control.  
Historical Steps  
In 1946, the United States presented to the United Nations (UN) a plan known as 
the Baruch plan, which proposed that the United States turn over control of all its 
enriched uranium, including that in any nuclear weapons it had, to a new UN body 
(over which the US and the other permanent members of the Security Council 
would have a veto) and that all countries in the world should be prohibited from 
possessing their own nuclear weapons (Bunn & Rhinelander, 2008). The Soviet Un-
ion opposed the plan, since the US would not have surrendered its weapons to any 
international agency before inspectors were on duty in the Soviet Union and in oth-
er countries with nuclear potential. The failure of the plan led to further efforts in 
59 
order to find common solutions to curb such proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
There was a general tendency to accept a statistical danger in proliferation, i.e. the 
probability of nuclear war increasing as the number of nuclear powers increases 
(Iklè, 1960, p. 391). Regardless, the constant problem of inescapable distinction be-
tween countries having nuclear weapons and countries not having such weapons 
prevailed. Realism forced states to admit that agreement on disarmament would take 
time; also, if non-proliferation would not be addressed, proliferation of nuclear 
weapons would render more difficult the attainment of general disarmament agree-
ment (Shaker, 1976, p. 5).  
The next step at controlling nuclear weapons came in 1953 when President Eisen-
hower proposed providing assistance to other countries in the peaceful uses of 
atomic energy (so-called Atoms for Peace Initiative). As a result, the US Atomic 
Energy Act was amended to authorize nuclear assistance to others, and the IAEA 
was created to provide both assistance and inspectors for peaceful nuclear activities 
(Bunn, 1993, p.1). As a result, the US, followed by the Soviet Union, France and 
others, began providing research reactors that used weapons-usable, highly enriched 
uranium (though usually in lesser amounts than needed for a weapon) to non-
nuclear-weapon states around the world. These transfers and training that accompa-
nied the reactors helped scientists in many countries to learn about nuclear fission 
and its potential uses (Ibid.). 
Nuclear transfers were not limited only to peaceful uses. In the mid-1950s, the Ei-
senhower administration began to deploy nuclear artillery in Europe for use by 
NATO ground forces and the US and allied forces in Europe while retaining con-
trol of these weapons (Sokolski, 2001, p. 40). Warsaw Pact members and the world’s 
neutral powers protested that the US authority over these weapons was not com-
plete, and the Soviet Union proposed a ban on the employment of nuclear weapons 
of any sort in Central Europe. Concerns over US nuclear transfers were heightened 
further in 1958 when the Congress amended the US Atomic Energy Act so that the 
transfer of weapons materials, design information and parts to nations that had 
‘made substantial progress in the development of nuclear weapons’ was permitted 
(Ibid.). At the same time, disarmament negotiations at the UN level had reached an 
impasse. Also, the US and the Soviet Union had threatened or considered using nu-
clear weapons on at least eight separate occasions since 1953: the US had threatened 
to use or consider using nuclear weapons to end the Korean War in 1953, to save 
the French in Vietnam in 1954, to save the Republic of China in 1954, 1955 and 
1958 and to prevent any invasion of Kuwait in 1958. Also, atomic howitzers were 
deployed by the US forces landing in Lebanon in 1958. The Soviets threatened the 
use of nuclear weapons to end the Suez crisis in 1956 (Ibid.). 
It was against this backdrop that the Irish Foreign Minister Frank Aiken proposed 
several UN level initiatives to curb the dangerous trend of proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and ensuing risks of accidental and catalytic wars. These views were in sync 
in a report published in an American Academy of Arts and Sciences report, The Nth 
Country Problem: A World Wide Survey of Nuclear Weapons Capabilities, whose central 
thesis was that the problem of achieving international arms control will become 
vastly more difficult when the three powers having nuclear weapons are joined by a 
fourth, and then a fifth, and possibly more (Davidson, et al., 1960, p. 108). The 
study also emphasized that ultimately the progress against nuclear proliferation was 
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only possible in the context of larger disarmament arrangements such as a compre-
hensive test ban and a military production cut-off backed by an effective interna-
tional inspection system. 
Negotiations over the NPT got started with the unanimous adoption by the UN 
General Assembly in 1961 of the so-called ‘Irish Resolution’ [GA RES 1665 (XVI)], 
which was based on the guiding concept of non-proliferation, later to be embodied 
in the treaty, as follows: 
“1. Calls upon all States, and in particular upon the States at present 
possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavors to secure the 
conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under 
which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquish-
ing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information 
necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weap-
ons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weap-
ons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control 
of such weapons.” 
The US submitted a draft treaty based on the Irish resolution to the Soviet Union 
when a new 18-nation Disarmament Conference opened in Geneva in 1962. The 
Soviet response required the prohibition of arrangements that the US already had 
with its NATO allies (such as West Germany) for deployment, in their countries, of 
US nuclear weapons under the control of US soldiers. This Soviet proposal and the 
US plans for a multilateral force (MLF) of naval vessels with nuclear weapons, ves-
sels manned by sailors from participating NATO countries and under NATO 
command, became major obstacles to agreement (Shaker, 1976, p. 29).  
The Irish Resolution was followed four years later by the UN General Assembly 
Resolution [GA RES 2028 (XX)], with five principles to guide the negotiations over 
the NPT, as follows:  
“(a) The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit 
nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, 
nuclear weapons in any form. 
(b) The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual re-
sponsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. 
(c) The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general 
and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarma-
ment. 
(d) There should be acceptable and workable previsions to ensure the 
effectiveness of the treaty. 
(e) Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any 
group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the to-
tal absence of nuclear weapons in their territories”. 
These two resolutions played a key role in substantial negotiations over the contents 
of the NPT and have been discussed at length by Shaker (1976 and 1980).  
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After the 1962 Cuban missile crisis tensions between the two super-powers had 
somewhat relaxed, which led the following year to the adoption, between the US 
and the Soviet Union, of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmos-
phere, in Outer Space and Under Water (The Partial Nuclear Test Ban -Treaty, 
PTBT). The ground was more fertile for serious negotiations, and compromising: 
the US gave up the MLF whereas the Soviets gave up the prohibition against US 
deployment of nuclear weapons in West Germany (and other allies) under sole US 
control. NNWS were asked to accept draft language prohibiting them from having 
nuclear weapons and accepting the IAEA inspections to that effect, in addition to 
which assistance in peaceful uses of nuclear energy was promised to them by NWS 
(Bunn, 2003, p. 3). In turn, NWS promised to agree to conduct future negotiations 
to halt the nuclear arms race and reduce their nuclear weapons with the goal of 
achieving nuclear disarmament. 
India, which, by then, had actively participated in the NPT negotiations as a NNWS, 
refused to join the negotiations, as it wanted to retain the nuclear weapon-option, as 
its -then- adversary China had already produced these weapons (Ibid.). Pakistan fol-
lowed suit because India would not join. Israel also refused to join. China and 
France had not participated in the NPT negotiations but had acquired their own 
nuclear weapons before the completion of the negotiations. The NPT draft permit-
ted them to join the treaty with the same rights and duties as other NWS (the US, 
the UK and the Soviet Union).   
These negotiations finally led to the adoption of the draft NPT and its opening for 
signature on 1 July 1968. The NPT entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the 
Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 190 parties have joined the Treaty, in-
cluding five NWS, the US, the UK, France, China and Russia (UNODA website, 
www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/). The NPT treaty is the only global 
legally binding instrument committing five NWS to nuclear disarmament and for all 
states parties to pursue a treaty on general and complete disarmament. However, 
India, Israel and Pakistan, which are NWS, are not parties to the NPT. Also, the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter, DPRK), which is also a NWS, 
withdrew from the treaty in 2003. 
Structure of the NPT and Interpretation 
Summarizing the NPT 
The corpus text of the NPT consists of eleven (XI) articles. Articles I and II contain 
three different sets of obligations. First, NWS undertake not to transfer to any recip-
ient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over 
such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly. In turn, NNWS undertake 
not to receive the transfer from any transferer whatsoever of nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devic-
es directly, or indirectly. Second, and here comes the asymmetrical part, only NNWS 
undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nucle-
ar explosive devices. Third, NWS undertake not in any way to assist, encourage, or 
induce any NNWS to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. NNWS un-
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dertake not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices.  
Article III contains provisions on international safeguards to guarantee the objec-
tives of the NPT. On the one hand, NNWS are to accept safeguards, which are to 
be negotiated in a treaty to be concluded with the IAEA, for the purpose of verify-
ing NNWS฿ obligations assumed under the NPT. This obligation does not extend to 
NWS, unless required by a supplier state. For instance, Canada has required since 
the mid 1960’s appropriate safeguards to ensure that its exports of uranium are be-
ing used for peaceful purposes only. The NWS agree not to provide source or spe-
cial fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for 
the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to NNWS, unless 
otherwise explicitly agreed on through safeguards agreements.  
Articles IV–V to the treaty decree on the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nucle-
ar energy (Art. IV), and on peaceful applications of nuclear explosions (Art. V). 
Freedom to exploit the atom for peaceful purposes was considered by NNWS as 
the most tangible counterpart to their renunciation to acquire nuclear weapons 
(Shaker, 1976, p. 274). The right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was 
considered inherent in a state’s sovereign right to independent economic develop-
ment and an essential attribute of national sovereignty and independence. The exer-
cise of this right is subject to conditions of non-discrimination and conformity with 
Articles I and II of the NPT. 
Article VI is worth citing in its entirety, as it sets a specific obligation of result re-
garding not only negotiations on general disarmament but also on the achievement 
of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, as follows: 
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations 
in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on 
a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effec-
tive international control.” 
Article VII stipulates on the right of parties to conclude regional treaties on the abo-
lition of nuclear weapons, whereas Article VIII decrees on amendments and regular 
reviews of the NPT at five year intervals in order to review the operation of the 
NPT with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions 
of the treaty are being realized. Article IX contains provisions regarding the entry 
into force of the treaty, on later accession to it and on its registration. 
Article X, in turn, includes provisions on withdrawal from the treaty, if a state party 
considers that ‘extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, 
have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country’. This right of withdrawal has 
been exercised to date only by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
in January 2003.  
Article X (2) decrees on the validity of the NPT for initial 25 years. This stipulation 
was amended in 1995 when the treaty was extended indefinitely by a unanimous 
decision of state parties to the treaty. 
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Article XI includes final provisions on authentic languages of the treaty as well as its 
deposit in the archives of the Depositary Governments (Russia, the UK, the US).    
Interpreting the NPT  
The basic rule for treaty interpretation is good faith, bona fide, enshrined in Article 
31(1) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which states that a 
treaty provision ‘shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose’ (VCLT, 1969). The purpose constitutes an element of predom-
inant weight in interpretation (Simma, et al., 2002, p. 15). The purpose of different 
articles can be understood by means of an inquiry into the substantial negotiations’ 
history, diverse views held by states and compromises achieved regarding the pur-
pose and interpretation of each article and the treaty on the whole (Shaker, 1980).   
Curiously enough, the intentions of the delegates varied considerably during differ-
ent periods preceding the adoption of the NPT. In the late 1950s, fears of horizon-
tal proliferation (i.e. the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations) and ensuing 
accidental or intentional risks to sparking (or catalyzing) nuclear wars between the 
superpowers or smaller states are reflected in the early stages of negotiations (Sokol-
ski, 2001, p. 40). These concerns were to be reflected in the future treaty’s articles I–
III. A decade later, the debate had shifted to vertical proliferation (the quantitative
and qualitative improvement of the superpowers’ strategic arsenals) and ensuing 
risks of unauthorized or accidental nuclear wars and other nations going nuclear 
(Sokolski, 2001, p. 40). These concerns, in turn, were to have an effect on articles 
IV–VI and X of the treaty. Sokolski admits that these two views are at odds, making 
the interpretation on the basis of intensions complicated: ‘To make sense of the 
NPT, however, one must choose which of these two premises should be controlling 
in interpreting the treaty’s text and which is, in fact sounder’ (Ibid. 47). 
Paragraphs 2–3 of Article 31 of the VCLT introduce further means of interpreta-
tion: the context which comprises in addition to the treaty’s preamble and annexes, 
any agreement of the parties made in connection with the conclusion of the treaty, 
the parties’ later agreements or practice regarding the interpretation or application of 
the treaty and any relevant rules of general international law applicable in relations 
between the parties. Article 32 of the VCLT lists supplementary means of interpre-
tation, such as the preparatory works and the circumstances in which the treaty was 
concluded. 
As will be discussed immediately below in Section 3.4, the practice of a number of 
states consolidating the reliance on nuclear weapons (and, hence, non-disarmament) 
brings forth the question of informal modification of the NPT through such prac-
tice. A few remarks on practice of the parties capable of modifying the convention 
seem necessary. International Law Commission’s Draft Articles to the VCLT in-
cluded preliminary rules of informal modification, but these were not retained in the 
convention. Nonetheless, they are often referred to in the specification of criteria 
applicable to this type of modification: ‘A consistent practice, embracing all the par-
ties and establishing their common consent to the application of the treaty in a 
manner different from that laid down in certain of its provisions, may have the ef-
fect of modifying a treaty’ (Yearbook of the International Law Commission II, 
1964, p.198; Yearbook of the International Law Commission II, 1966, p.236). The 
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1966 Draft Articles left out the earlier formulations about state practice ‘embracing 
all the parties’. In the Commentaries to the 1966 Draft Articles, it was specified that 
not all parties need to take part in the practice but there must be a common under-
standing or agreement among them as a whole about the modification (Amneus, 
2008, p. 124). 
Practice of the Parties  
The NPT forms a three-part bargain: nuclear non-proliferation, international coop-
eration in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy across the entire nuclear fuel 
cycle under safeguards in conformity with the Treaty and nuclear disarmament lead-
ing to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The pillar of disarmament by NWS 
has, to date, not advanced in practice at all. 
According to SIPRI’s annual nuclear forces data (2016), none of the nuclear weap-
on-possessing states are prepared to give up their nuclear arsenals for the foreseea-
ble future. At the start of 2016, nine states – the United States, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea – possessed ap-
proximately 4120 operationally deployed nuclear weapons, with a total of approxi-
mately 15395 nuclear weapons compared with 15850 in early 2015 (SIPRI, 2016). 
The decrease in the overall number of nuclear weapons is mainly due to Russia and 
the USA reducing – slowly – their inventories of strategic nuclear weapons. World 
nuclear forces 2016 are presented in the below table, as follows:  
Country Year of first nuclear test Deployed warheads* Other warheads Total 2016
USA 1945 1,930 5,070 7,000
Russia 1949 1,790 5,500 7,290
UK 1952 120 95 215
France 1960 280 20 300 
China 1964 260 260
India 1974 100–120 100–120
Pakistan 1998 110–130 110–130 
Israel 80 80 
North Korea 2006 10 10 
Total 4,120 11,275 15,395 
Table 1. World nuclear forces, SIPRI, 2016 
* ‘Deployed’ means warheads placed on missiles or located on bases with
operational forces. All estimates are approximate and are as of January 2016. 
Totals do not include figures for North Korea (SIPRI, 2016) 
Second, NWS have also extensive and expensive modernization programs under 
way. The US modernization program for tactical nukes in Europe is discussed in 
Professor Nikitinތs article. For instance, the US plans to spend $ 348 billion during 
2015–24 on maintaining and comprehensively updating its nuclear forces (SIPRI, 
2016). Russia’s nuclear posture and forces are discussed by Dr. Kerttunen. Other 
NWS have smaller arsenals, but have all either begun to deploy new nuclear weap-
ons delivery systems or announced their intention to do so (Ibid.). The UK decided 
in July 2016 on the update of the Trident (House of Commons Hansard, 2016). 
France is in the process of updating both its sea and air-based nuclear forces pursu-
                                                                                           
65 
ant to a new Military Programming Law passed in December 2013 (Le ministère de 
la défense, 2013). China appears to be gradually increasing its nuclear forces as it 
modernizes the arsenal. India and Pakistan are both expanding their nuclear weapon 
stockpiles and missile delivery capabilities. China and India have long claimed to 
have a No First Use policy (Dhanapala, 2016). Obama administration’s talk about 
the adoption of No First Use Policy (NFU) did not materialize. North Korea is es-
timated to have enough fissile material for approximately 6–8 nuclear warheads. It is 
quite obvious that nuclear weapons continue to play a key role (if not the key role) 
in nuclear weapon-possessing states’ defence doctrines (Miller, 1990).  
Third, the adherence of other than NWS to nuclear weapons and deterrence ex-
tends further through alliances, extended deterrence schemes and (positive) nuclear 
guarantees. For instance, NWS’s reluctance to accelerate the pace and scope of nu-
clear disarmament has been strengthened by NNWS states such as Australia, Japan, 
New Zealand, South Korea and members of the NATO that rely on US nuclear 
guarantees and nuclear deterrence. Needless to say that such developments, which 
consolidate the role of nuclear weapons as part of a country’s defence, is in contra-
diction with the NPT’s disarmament objective enshrined in Article VI and Princi-
ples and Objectives of Non-proliferation and Disarmament discussed below in Sec-
tion 3.5. 
As far as peaceful uses of nuclear energy are concerned, Iklé points to the futility of 
multilateral efforts in managing non-proliferation, naming in particular the Atoms 
for Peace program launched by President Eisenhower in 1953 (Iklé, 2006, p. 54). 
Dangers are due to close parallels between the peaceful and military nuclear tech-
nologies (Shaker, 1976, p. 274). The program was meant to enlist international sup-
port for curbing the spread of nuclear weapons by offering peaceful benefits of 
atomic energy to the world at large. Yet, countries receiving technological assistance 
exclusively for peaceful uses managed to divert the assistance to their nuclear weap-
ons programs. India is a case in point when in May 1974 it exploded a ‘peaceful’ 
nuclear device that employed ‘civilian’ US, Canadian and Western European repro-
cessing and heavy water technology and hardware (NTI, 2016). Once the worldwide 
transfer of nuclear reactors was legitimized, diverse countries sold nuclear reactors 
to a variety of less-developed countries all over the globe, enabling the recipients to 
acquire nuclear materials and know-how, with a related multiplier effect, i.e. China 
has helped Pakistan to build nuclear bombs, and the developer of Pakistan’s bomb, 
A. Khan, has helped North Korea, Libya, Iran and possibly others with their nuclear 
weapons programs. Iraq’s hidden weapons program was found after the 1990–91 
Persian Gulf War. Proliferation concerns are very real as more and more countries 
are demanding nuclear power reactors on the basis of the NPT’s inalienable right to 
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This 
will enlarge the number of countries capable of starting an illicit bomb-making pro-
gram (Iklé, 2006, p. 57). Additionally, that North Korea and Iran both obtained en-
richment technology from Pakistan is telling of dangers to the NPT regime from 
nonparties that are not bound by the NPT’s prohibition against assisting non-
nuclear-weapon states in acquiring nuclear weapons.  
As far as international control efforts over nuclear export standards are concerned, 
these also leave much to desire in terms of legitimacy, inclusivity and openness. 
Shortly after the ink was dry on the NPT, officials from the US and other supplier 
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states met secretly to determine how to work outside of the NPT to restrict the 
transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to the world’s trouble spots. This Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) established in 1974 then became a model for restricting 
sensitive missile, chemical and biological agent materials and technology under the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia Group (AG). These 
groupings are discriminatory, have little transparency and accountability. India is 
again a case in point as it was exempted in 2008 by the NSG from having full-scope 
international safeguards in order before being eligible for civilian nuclear trade. 
Likewise, the current push, by the US, for Indiaތs membership in the NSG is anoth-
er somewhat troubling example working against the NPT’s goals.  
Also, the proven cases of non-compliance (Libya, Iran, Iraq) and DPRK’s with-
drawal have not strengthened the NPT regime. Insidious undermining of the legal 
regime underpinning nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is increased, too, 
when nuclear weapon-armed states are being accorded such privileges by the NWS 
(INDO-US co-op. agreement) that were previously granted only to NNWS parties 
to the NPT (Dhanapala, 2016, pp. 137,154). The ‘democratic bomb’ strategy – i.e. 
approval of nuclear weapons in the hands of countries with assuredly democratic 
government, and disapproval when possessed by other regimes – is contradictory 
and cannot succeed: when the central problem is the weapons themselves, any dis-
tinction between ‘good proliferators’ and ‘bad proliferators’ is unsustainable (Dhan-
apala, 2016, p. 158; Perkovich, 2006). In addition to India, also Israel and Pakistan 
are known nuclear weapon possessors outside the NPT. India is estimated to pos-
sess between 100–120 nuclear warheads; Israel is estimated to possess 80 nuclear 
warheads, with fissile material for up to 200; Pakistan is estimated to possess be-
tween 110–130 nuclear warheads (Arms Control Association, 2016). North Koreaތs 
capabilities were estimated above to comprise approximately 6–8 plutonium based 
warheads as of 2016 (Ibid.). 
The above compiled list of failures or near-failures is fortunately not the full truth. 
There are successes, too, under the NPT, such as the creation of nuclear weapon 
free zones to Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco, effective as of 
22 April 1968), to South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga, valid as of 11 December 
1986), to Southeast Asia (Treaty of Bangkok, entered into force on 27 March 1997), 
to Africa (Pelindaba Treaty, valid as of 15 July 2009) and the conclusion, regardless 
of strong opposition by the UK, France and the US, of the Central Asia Nuclear 
Weapon-Free Zone (also called the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, which entered into 
force on 21 March 2009). Mongolia’s self-declared nuclear-weapon-free status has 
been recognized internationally through the adoption of the UNGA Resolution 
55/33S. There are also other treaties dealing with the denuclearization of certain 
areas: the Antarctic Treaty (entered into force on 23 June 1961), the Outer Space 
Treaty (entered into force on 10 October 1967), the Moon Agreement (entered into 
force on 11 July 1984) and the Seabed Treaty (entered into force on 18 May 1972). 
The text and the status of all these treaties are available at the United Nations Office 
for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) Treaty Database (https://www.un.org/disar-
mament/wmd/nuclear/nwfz/). Other successes include such states that have re-
nounced the nuclear option, having possessed nuclear weapons or a nuclear weap-
ons program: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine returned Soviet nuclear weapons to 
Russia and joined the NPT as NNWS in 1991; South Africa dismantled its secret 
program and its small number of nuclear warheads, joining the NPT in 1991; Iraq 
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had an active nuclear weapons program which was dismantled under the supervision 
of UN inspectors after the Persian Gulf War in 1991; Libya voluntarily renounced 
its secret nuclear weapons efforts in 2003; Argentina, Brazil, South Korea and Tai-
wan also shelved their nuclear weapons programs (Arms Control Association, 
2016). Iran’s proliferation activities have been brought under close IAEA scrutiny 
through the adoption in July 2015 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA) between Iran and six world powers. 
Extension and Review Conferences in a Nutshell 
Jayantha Dhanaphala’s and Tariq Rauf’s timely report on Reflections on the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Dhanapala and Rauf, 2016) provides a detailed 
account of Review Conferences since the historical extension of the NPT in 1995. 
Jayantha Dhanapala, (then) the President of the 1995 Review and Extension Con-
ference, is currently the President of the 1995 Nobel Peace Laureate Pugwash Con-
ferences on Science and World Affairs and Tariq Rauf is the Director of Disarma-
ment, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Programme at SIPRI.  
According to Article X (2) ‘Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Trea-
ty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in 
force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. 
This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty’. The 1995 
Review Conference, which convened in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995, 
met to decide how long the Treaty should be extended and to review the perfor-
mance of the Treaty for the period 1990–1995 in accordance with Article VIII.  
Preceding the 1995 Review Conference, previous four Review Conferences had 
been extremely contentious (Dhanapala, 2016, p. 8). The first Review Conference 
(1975) managed to adopt a Final Document, whereas Review Conferences in 1980 
and 1990 did not. A Final Document was also adopted at the 1985 Review Confer-
ence, because of an unusual formulation which recorded a disagreement between 
some countries and the overwhelming majority on the issue of a Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) (Ibid.). In addition to the CTBT, contentious is-
sues included, amongst others, disarmament, legally-binding security assurances and 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
The 1995 Review and Extension Conference was historical in managing an out-
come, which permitted the indefinite extension decision of the Treaty without a 
vote. The outcome was a package deal, which included three parallel decisions – 
indefinite extension (legally binding) of the NPT and two other (politically binding) 
decisions: on Strengthening the Review Process and on Principles and Objectives 
for Nuclear non-Proliferation and Disarmament (P&Os) (Final Document, 2015). 
The latter decision’s programme of action for ‘Nuclear Disarmament’ included the 
negotiation of a CTBT by the end of 1996, the ‘immediate commencement and ear-
ly conclusion’ of negotiations of a fissile material convention, the ‘determined pur-
suit’ by the NWS of ‘systematic and progressive efforts’ to ‘reduce’ nuclear weapons 
globally, with the ultimate goals of nuclear disarmament and general and complete 
disarmament. In addition, a separate Resolution on Middle East was adopted as part 
of the overall package.  
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Today, the P&Os have remained greatly unachieved, to the growing frustration of 
NNWS. The doctrinal developments in the USތ and Russiaތs nuclear postures, in 
clear contradiction with disarmament, are discussed in Dr. Kerttunenތs article 
whereas the details of the near history of successes and failures in the US-Russia 
arms control regimes (incl. the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty START II, the Stra-
tegic Offensive Reductions Treaty SORT and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ABM) 
are touched upon in articles by Professors Neuneck and Nikitin. The eventual pend-
ing failures regarding the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) are the 
topic for Dr. Vuorioތs article, whereas the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe (CFE) is discussed by Dr. Koivula. As far as the CTBT is concerned, the 
treaty was duly negotiated and signed by President Clinton in 1996, but the Senate 
failed to ratify it in 1999. Many NWS and NNWS have not ratified the CTBT, 
which means that the treaty has not come into in force (CTBTO, 2016). Regarding 
the 1995 Review Conference’s P&O on fissile material, there was consensus as to 
the need for an early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively 
verifiable treaty banning the production of such material for nuclear weapons and 
other nuclear explosive devices, but there was no consensus over the status of 
stocks of previously produced materials (Dhanapala, 2016, p.133). Also, the Gene-
va-based Conference on Disarmament has remained deadlocked, unable to move on 
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, negative security assurances, the prevention of arms 
race in outer space or the elimination of nuclear weapons (Ibid. 160).  
The Middle East Resolution and its concretization took place fifteen years later, at 
the 2010 Review Conference. In the Final Document (2010), concrete steps were 
agreed upon for the realization of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction (MENWFZ/WMDFZ) (Final Document, 2010). 
To this effect, it was agreed that the UN Secretary General, together with the co-
sponsors of the 1995 Middle East Resolution (Russia, the UK, the US) convene a 
conference in 2012 on the establishment of the above zone to the Middle East, and, 
to this effect, appoint a facilitator to support the organization of the 2012 confer-
ence. Finland’s Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Jaakko Laajava, was appointed to this 
task. The facilitator was, however, unable to fulfill his function due to the political 
complexities relating to the position of Israel, which meant that, to the frustration of 
many Middle Eastern states, the envisaged 2012 conference never took place (Pug-
wash, 2015).  
Growing frustration and dissatisfaction with the practice or implementation of the 
strengthened review process in terms of failing to move the NWS on nuclear dis-
armament is leading to calls to radically change provisions of the 1995 extension 
decision. It has become apparent that the 2000 Review Conference’s ‘unequivocal 
undertaking’ by NWS to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons (so-
called ‘Thirteen Steps’) lacks political will, which is an obvious precondition for any 
concrete disarmament measure (Johnson, 2000). In fact, the next 2005 NPT Review 
Conference ended in disarray, and no Final Declaration could be adopted. The ap-
proach to the 2005 NPT Review Conference did not take place in a climate favora-
ble for multilateral action, as the NWS had begun to retreat from the ‘Thirteen 
Steps’, the Bush Administration’s Nuclear Posture review of 2002 envisaged the 
actual use of nuclear weapons, the US and her allies invaded Iraq in 2003 whereas 
the DPRK and Iran continued to be regarded with concern (Dhanapala, 2016, p. 
147).  
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The 2010 NPT Review Conference took, again, place in an international atmosphere 
which was more conducive to multilateralism in general and to nuclear disarmament 
in particular than the 2005 atmosphere. As a consequence, states parties agreed to a 
Final Document that reiterated their commitment to nuclear disarmament. None-
theless, the central bargain of the NPT remained unfulfilled (Ibid.184). Instead, the 
2015 NPT Review Conference failed to agree on a Final Document. The setback 
reflected negatively especially on nuclear disarmament and on efforts to rid the 
Middle East of nuclear weapons. The NPT disarmament stalemate concerned the 
humanitarian impact/consequences of nuclear weapons (HINW); and the push to 
get the review conference to agree to launch a process leading to a legally binding 
treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons (Rauf, 2016, p. 199). This initiative will 
be discussed in the next section 3.6. The MENWFZ/WMDFZ was discussed in the 
Main Committee II but no agreement could be reached on the implementation of 
the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East nor on the convening of a conference on a 
MENWFZ/WMDFZ as had been agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The 
UK, the US and Canada rejected the conference president’s compromise draft final 
document (Ibid. 206).  
From all this, Rauf concludes that ‘while the NPT will survive, the credibility of the 
regime has been severely damaged by the inflexibility of states parties, and danger-
ous new tendencies and developments are on the rise. These include an unchecked 
resurgence in the saliency of nuclear weapons in European security, setbacks for 
reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons, increasing discord both between and 
among the NNWS and NWS, deteriorating confidence in the NPT among the Arab 
states parties, and an overall loss of credibility for the nuclear disarmament pillar of 
the NPT’ (Ibid. 209). 
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons 
Until quite recently, practically all international efforts to curb the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and move towards nuclear disarmament have taken place within 
the parameters of maintaining nuclear deterrence and the notion that the nuclear 
weapons-based strategic stability should be retained. The past few years, however, 
have seen an increased focus on and political interest in addressing the humanitarian 
impact of and the risks associated with nuclear weapons as a complement to the tra-
ditional military security-centered discourse. In fact, it is since 2010 that a series of 
international conferences on this issue have taken place, and an increasing amount 
of states, civil society organizations, international organizations, the Red Cross and 
the Red Crescent movement as well as the academia have come together to chal-
lenge the acceptability and legitimacy of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. 
This has been done through focusing on the humanitarian impact, with up-to-date 
research on the scope and the scale of the consequences of nuclear weapons deto-
nation, either in cases where nuclear deterrence fails or through accidents involving 
nuclear weapons (Kmentt, 2016, p. 683; Helfand, 2013). 
The recent specific focus on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear weapons may 
be traced back to a speech on 20 April 2010, in which Jakob Kellenberger, the for-
mer president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recalled the 
ICRC experience as the first international humanitarian organization present in the 
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immediate aftermath of the 1945 bombing of Hiroshima, highlighting the inade-
quate capacities to address humanitarian emergencies that would result from any use 
of nuclear weapons and the human and societal destruction that would ensue (Kel-
lenberg, 2010). In light of the humanitarian consequences, Kellenberger also 
stressed that ‘the ICRC finds it difficult to envisage how any use of nuclear weapons 
could be compatible with the rules of international humanitarian law’ (Ibid.).  
Before discussing the humanitarian impact further, it is useful to take a short look 
back to the year 1996, when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave its advisory 
opinion in the Case Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons issued on the basis 
of a request to that effect by the UN General Assembly (ICJ, 1996). According to 
paragraph 105, point 2 E of the judgment 
“By seven votes to seven, by the President's casting vote, it follows 
from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nu-
clear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of internation-
al law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and 
rules of humanitarian law; However, in view of the current state of in-
ternational law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court 
cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of 
self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.” 
Obviously, this aspect was the most controversial one of the judgement, and it has 
received ample attention in legal literature. For instance, with the exception of two 
judges, all judges commented on the statement in one way or another. However, as 
the (then) President Bedjaoui stated in his separate statement, the court's inability to 
determine absolute illegality in the extreme circumstance ‘can in no manner be in-
terpreted to mean that it is leaving the door ajar to recognition of the legality of the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons’ (ICJ, 1996). Also, it is useful to note that some 
commentators have erroneously assumed that this indecision over the exceptional 
circumstance is the same as a declaration of legality in such circumstances. The ICJ, 
however, clearly refuted this when (para. 94) it did not support the view of certain 
nuclear-weapon states that the use of ‘clean,’ low-yield tactical nuclear weapons ac-
curately targeted on military targets would be legal in such extreme circumstance 
(Ware, 1998). 
It is also to be noted that in paragraph 105 2F, the Court found unanimously that  
“There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a 
conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in al1 its as-
pects under strict and effective international control.” 
These two points, the lack of clear prohibition of nuclear weapons under interna-
tional law on the one hand, and, on the other, the non-respect by NWS of the obli-
gation to pursue and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarma-
ment, constitute the clear backbones of the Humanitarian Impact –Initiative. With 
the 2010 NPT Review Conference, governments officially explained their deep con-
cern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons 
and reaffirmed the need for all states at all times to comply with applicable interna-
tional law, including international humanitarian law. These humanitarian concerns 
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were explicitly mentioned in the Final Document, and became a de facto mandate for 
states to pursue the humanitarian initiative to implement the NPT itself (Kmentt, 
2015, p. 684). 
Following these concerns, a growing number of governments, the Red Cross/Red 
Crescent movement and a considerable number of non-governmental institutions 
have participated in efforts to highlight the catastrophic humanitarian consequences 
of nuclear weapons and calling on all states to intensify their efforts to outlaw these 
weapons (Reaching Critical Will, 2017). These efforts have led, to date, to the con-
vening of three massive conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weap-
ons. First conference was held in Oslo on 4–5 March 2013 with the participation of 
127 states, civil society organizations and diverse UN agencies. The meeting had a 
relatively narrow focus on the immediate and wider humanitarian and developmen-
tal consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation as well as humanitarian prepared-
ness and response. The Oslo Conference underscored that it is one thing to talk 
about nuclear weapons in the context of abstract security policy concepts and quite 
another to look in concrete terms at the evidence of what would actually happen to 
people and human society in the event of a nuclear detonation (Chair’s Summary 
Oslo, 2013).  
The second one was held in Nayarit (Mexico) on 13–14 February 2014 with the par-
ticipation of 146 states, 119 civil society organizations, the Red Cross and diverse 
UN agencies. Nayarit put a strong emphasis on the testimonies of the Hibakusha, 
the survivors of the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, while further high-
lighting the devastating short- and long-term consequences on human health, the 
climate, food security and social order, as well as the inadequacy of response capa-
bilities (Kmentt, 2015, p. 691; Chair’s Summary Nayarit, 2014). In addition, an im-
portant addendum was introduced by Mexico regarding the risks associated with 
nuclear weapons: some of the vulnerabilities of nuclear command and control infra-
structures and well as risky practices surrounding nuclear weapons and the history 
of near-accidents served as an eye-opener to the public (Kmentt, 2015, p. 692 with 
references; Lewis, et al., 2014). At the end of the conference, Mexico added a politi-
cal dimension to the Chair’s conclusion, by stating: 
“We need to take into account that, in the past, weapons have been 
eliminated after they have been outlawed. We believe this is the path 
to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. 
In our view, this is consistent with our obligations under international 
law, including those derived from the NPT as well as from Common 
Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions. The broad-based and compre-
hensive discussions on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons 
should lead to the commitment of States and civil society to reach 
new international standards and norms, through a legally binding in-
strument. 
It is the view of the Chair that the Nayarit Conference has shown that 
time has come to initiate a diplomatic process conducive to this goal. 
Our belief is that this process should comprise a specific timeframe, 
the definition of the most appropriate fora, and a clear and substan-
tive framework, making the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons 
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the essence of disarmament efforts. It is time to take action. The 70th 
anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks is the appropriate 
milestone to achieve our goal. Nayarit is a point of no return.” 
(Chair’s Summary Nayarit, 2014). 
The third conference was held the same year in Austria, on 8–9 December 2014 
(Chair’s Summary Vienna, 2014) with the participation of 158 countries, civil socie-
ty, Red Cross and Red Crescent movements and diverse UN agencies. Austria made 
a special effort not to alienate the NWS and ‘umbrella’ states (i.e. states dependent 
on US security guarantee such as NATO members), which were suspicions regard-
ing the conference’s purpose of initiating a diplomatic process leading to a land-slide 
effect and convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, just like had hap-
pened with two recent conventions, i.e. the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their De-
struction (entered into force 1 March 1999) and the Convention on Cluster Muni-
tions (entered into force 1 August 2010). Hence, the conference aimed at recapitu-
lating the key findings of the two previous conferences, in addition to which the 
conference highlighted the health, environmental, social and cultural impact of past 
nuclear weapons testing campaigns as well as transboundary dimensions of nuclear 
weapon detonations (Chair’s summary Vienna, 2014). 
The humanitarian initiative bore finally fruit on 27 October 2016, when the First 
Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution L.41 to convene ne-
gotiations in 2017 on a ‘legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, 
leading towards their total elimination’. The voting result was 123 nations in favor, 
38 against, with 16 abstentions (ICAN, 2016). In the ambit of this article it is unfor-
tunately not possible to go further into details regarding different phases of the hu-
manitarian initiative and negotiations’ tracks. These are discussed at length by 
Kmentt in the International Review of the Red Cross (Kmentt, 2015).  
Saving the NPT Regime? 
The disarmament bargain made under the NPT is not realistically achievable to date, 
if it ever were. The frustration of a grand majority of states and other stakeholders 
to the slow pace of disarmament is clear. It is legitimate to ask, why should NNWS 
be bound by the NPT when the NWS are not? The Humanitarian Impact Initiative 
attempts to find a way to advance disarmament through wide diplomatic process 
leading to the adoption of a nuclear weapons convention or similar instrument, with 
the ensuing illegality of nuclear weapons. From arms control point of view, experi-
ences of earlier such initiatives are positive, with the adoption of two conventions, 
one on cluster munitions and the other on landmines. The lessons learnt of these 
two previous processes might, in fact, provide valuable points regarding how to 
avoid exacerbating the divide between the NWS and their umbrella states on the 
one hand, and the grand majority of states on the other. In this connection, it is use-
ful to remember that the NPT regime is not only burdened by the slow pace of dis-
armament. In addition to the NWS – NNWS –divide, there are also other potential 
proliferation and nuclear safety and nuclear security challenges caused by the in-
creasing spread of peaceful nuclear energy in many regions of the world, the speed 
of technological developments and artificial intelligence, risks embedded in the 
command and control of nuclear weapons due to human error and negligence and 
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proliferation risks to third, irregular parties. The risk of a nuclear catastrophe – in a 
regional war, terrorist attack, by accident or miscalculation – is greater than it was 
during the Cold War.  
Nuclear weapons are a global challenge. However, the US and Russia relationship is 
a reliable thermometer for perspectives on disarmament and non-proliferation, 
these states holding the grand majority of world nuclear weapons today (considera-
ble number of which being in a state of high alert). Many existing treaty regimes 
relevant for curbing nuclear weapons are directly dependent on the developments in 
the US–Russia relationship. Positive developments bear on the climate of confi-
dence and multilateralism, strengthening the already existing regimes and, perhaps, 
contributing to new areas of regulation, such as regulation on missiles. The opposite 
is obviously true as well. And it is well known that tensions are heightened between 
Russia and the West at present.  
A few concluding remarks directly relevant to the European security may now be 
summarized:  
First, the heightened tensions between Russia and the West translate into height-
ened military activity and military incidents, especially in the Baltic Sea area (Global 
Zero, 2015). 
Second, while the main responsibility of saving the NPT regime lies with the great 
powers, also non-nuclear European states could do more. Most European states are 
umbrella states, in whose defence nuclear weapons/US nuclear guarantee play an 
important role (Rauf, 2016, p. 200). This practice is not conducive to disarmament, 
taking place at the cost of the NPT’s initial bargain. What’s more, European umbrel-
la states are on an almost natural collision course with the developments under the 
humanitarian initiative. Indeed, if a land-slide diplomatic process is started this year, 
as called forth in the GA Res. L.41, and leading to a convention on the prohibition 
of nuclear weapons, it is more than likely that a grand majority of states end up pro-
claiming nuclear weapons not only illegitimate but illegal as well. It is doubtful 
whether European states can afford to side on the side of illegality in the eyes of the 
very system which they themselves have created. 
Third, Europe has a considerable amount of nuclear weapons on its soil and at its 
borders (Kristensen, et al., 2015). Europe cannot protect itself from nuclear weap-
ons detonation. For instance, the transboundary dimension of nuclear weapons det-
onations was highlighted at Vienna conference (2014) in a presentation that calcu-
lated the impact of a nuclear explosion of 200 kilotons at NATO’s military base in 
Aviano. Using historical weather patterns, a simulation of the explosion of a single 
200-kiloton nuclear weapon was shown to lead to radioactive fallout being dispersed 
within a few days over large parts of Europe (McKinzie, 2015).  
Based on the above, is it not high time for some intellectual honestly in Europe? Is 
it not high time to accept the challenge posed by the humanitarian impact and ana-
lyze the legitimacy and truthfulness of the security paradigm based on deterrence 
and nuclear weapons in the light of research presented during the three humanitari-
an impact conferences in Oslo, Mexico and Austria? It is clear from that research 
that the mid- and longer-term atmospheric, climate and food-security consequences 
of even ‘limited nuclear war’ would be considerably more serious than previously 
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understood and most likely global in their effects, in addition to the immediate hu-
manitarian emergency. The notion of credible nuclear first strike and counter-strike 
capabilities becomes largely irrelevant in such a context. ‘Winning’ a nuclear conflict 
in the ‘classical’ understanding of victory in a military conflict is an impossibility. 
Deterrence based on nuclear weapons thus rests not only on the readiness to inflict 
mass destruction and death on a global scale, but also on the readiness to commit, 
with full awareness, to an essentially suicidal course of action (Kmentt 2015).  
It is convenient to end this presentation with two quotes from President Mikhail 
Gorbachev's address in the International Conference devoted to the 30th anniversary 
of the Reykjavik meeting of the leaders of the USSR and the US:  
“Politicians who think that problems or disputes can be resolved 
through the use of military force (even as a ‘last resort’) must be re-
jected by the society; they must leave the stage.” 
“I am urging veteran leaders and diplomats, scientists, experts, and 
the global civil society to state in the strongest and unequivocal terms: 
Nuclear weapons must be prohibited. Even more: War must be pro-
hibited” (Gorbachev, 2016).  
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4 
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Definitions, Arsenals, 
Cuts, Prospects 
Alexander I. Nikitin4 
Abstract 
efinitions of non-strategic weapons (including tactical and middle and 
shorter-range nuclear weapons) quite significantly differ in the US-Russian 
arms control community, in Indian-Pakistani regional balance, in Israel, in 
the UK and France and in China. This article discusses various criteria that are used 
for the differentiation of non-strategic from strategic weapons, including criteria of 
delivery distance of carriers, megatonnage (yield) of warheads, ability to destroy dif-
ferent types of targets, etc. The article considers political consequences of unneces-
sary high levels of secrecy and non-transparency that prevailed up until today, even 
for revealing data on already dismantled Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW). The 
author suggests that the US and Russia can finally start debating TNW by exchang-
ing exact data on how many and which types of tactical nukes have been dismantled 
and destroyed in the early 1990s, when parallel unilateral programs of relocation of 
tactical nukes were undertaken (US TNW from Europe back to the US territory, 
and Soviet TNW from 14 new independent states to Russian territory). Such a data 
exchange can set in motion further discussion of limitations on non-strategic nucle-
ar weapons. Finally, the article considers the geopolitical principle suggested by Rus-
sia claiming that all nuclear weapons of any country should be situated on its own 
territory, not on the territory of any other non-nuclear member state to the NPT. 
Several steps are suggested that may be considered as Russian balancing responses 
to a potential withdrawal of American TNW from five European countries. Alterna-
tively, Russian potential response to modernization of American TNW in Europe is 
also discussed. 
On Terms, Criteria and Typology 
Tactical Nuclear Weapons is an umbrella notion and not exactly a separate class in 
itself. It is sub-divided from the dyad of ‘strategic/non-strategic weapons’ as being a 
part of non-strategic. Terms and notions of ‘non-strategic nuclear weapons’, ‘under-
strategic’ or ‘sub-strategic’ are used as synonyms. A more comprehensive typology 
4 Professor of the Moscow State Institute of Internatonal Relations (MGIMO, Moscow), Director of the 
Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, Principal researcher of the Institute for World Economy and International 
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stretches the ’dyad’ to a ‘pentagram’: strategic – intermediate (or middle) range – 
shorter-range – tactical (consisting of operational-tactical and tactical weapons as 
such). 
Typology of nuclear weapons could be based either on their functional purpose, or 
on technical characteristics of warheads and carriers or on difference in value of tar-
geted/destroyed objects within the potential adversary’s value system. Already with-
in initial stages of the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and 
later within the Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), as 
well as within the framework of the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-
I), the following ‘thresholds’ were elaborated and agreed upon: nuclear weapons on 
carriers with range up to 500 kilometers have been defined as tactical weapons; 
weapons with a radius from 500 to 1000 km as shorter-range weapons; 1000 to 5500 
km as intermediate weapons (in Western terminology, or middle-range weapons in 
Soviet/Russian terminology); and, finally, weapons on carriers able to reach and 
destroy targets on distances above 5500 km as strategic weapons. At the same time, 
the relativity of such a typology is obvious: it was connected to geopolitics of Amer-
ican-Soviet continent-to-continent potential nuclear strikes exchange over the North 
Pole. In regional nuclear balances of other nuclear states that border each other or 
are located on smaller distances (India and Pakistan, Israel and the Arab states, 
North and South Korea), the subdivision of strategic and tactical forces does not fit 
into inter-continental scale. Within a range of 500 km that seems to be ‘tactical’ 
from the point of view of Soviet-American distances, other countries may possess 
or attack both tactical and strategic objects and weapons. For example, the threat of 
use of nuclear weapons by the DPRK aimed at destroying 15 million people living 
in Seoul just 40 kilometers to the south from North Korean border, is undoubtedly 
of strategic, not of tactical significance within a scale of regional balance of forces. 
Another example: Russia considers the French ASMPA missiles (Air-Sol Moyenne 
Portée Améliorée missiles) to be ‘tactical’ weapons and counts them accordingly, while 
France counts them as ‘strategic.’ 
Difficulties and differences in typology are also caused by the fact that distance-wise 
criteria of short-range and long-range weapons are defined according to types and 
capabilities of carriers, not according to warhead characteristics. At the same time, 
warheads on many carriers are interchangeable. Majority of non-strategic nuclear 
weapons carriers are of dual-purpose use (could be used with both nuclear and conven-
tional warheads), which complicates verification procedures. A known difficulty, for 
example, is caused by potential change of conventional warheads on sea-based 
cruise missiles aboard navy ships onto nuclear warheads. Images from orbital satel-
lites do not allow to differentiate for certain the character of the warhead aboard 
navy ships at sea, while the absence of maritime arms limitation treaties and of 
agreed verification procedures do not allow to apply other forms of control. As 
Tom Sauer formulates it, prolonged negotiations on preparations of START-3 Trea-
ty may seem to be an easy ride compared to the next stage of elaborating verifica-
tion procedures for non-strategic weapons (Sauer, 2011). 
The yield of modern nuclear weapons could vary from many megatons down to 
several hundred tons of TNT (conventional explosive) equivalent. And this is not 
necessarily that more powerful warheads are mounted onto strategic carriers of 
longer-range, while less powerful are mounted onto tactical carriers. The so-called 
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earth-penetrating warheads (EPW) aimed at the destruction of specific, often not 
very large objects (silos, underground bunkers, etc.) could have a limited yield, and 
produce a limited radioactive cloud while converting the main part of their energy 
into a mechanical shift of underground masses, but, at the same time, they could be 
sent from strategic distances (for example, from submarines or navy-based carriers 
located far from the targeted theater). 
In the USA and in many NATO member states weapons were initially subdivided 
onto theater-range (strategic) and field-range (tactical). Short-range was defined as 
under 800 km. Weapons with range above 800 km were considered as strategic, 
more specifically distances 800–2400 km were marked as mid-range, 2400–6400 km 
as intermediate-range, and above 6400 km as inter-continental. Later US planners 
started to apply ‘ceilings’ and ‘thresholds’ in accordance with the INF and START-I 
treaties (Kristensen, 2012). It is also notable that American-Russian Agreement on 
differentiation of tactical and strategic Anti-ballistic missile defense (the so called 
1997 ABM Demarcation Agreement) was based upon somewhat different criteria: it 
was permitted to elaborate and deploy tactical (or ‘theater’) missile defense systems, 
but it was prohibited to introduce intercepting systems aimed against strategic ballis-
tic missiles moving at a speed above 5 km/sec. and with a range above 3500 kilome-
ters. 
In previous decades the People’s Republic of China had introduced criteria, accord-
ing to which missiles are subdivided onto short-range (up to 1000 km), middle-range 
(1000–3000 km), long-range (3000–8000 km) and inter-continental-range (above 
8000 km) (SIPRI, 2001, p. 476). It is obvious, that the difference with the Soviet-
American criteria of ‘inter-continental’ (8000 km instead of 5500 km) was caused by 
geopolitical factors relating to potential trajectories of intercontinental strike ex-
changes. Currently, the longest-range Chinese nuclear-capable missiles are liquid-
fueled DF-5A and much more modern solid-fueled DF-31A, both of which can 
reach targets located as far as 11000 kilometers. That covers the US Western coast, 
Russia, the Middle East and most of Europe (SIPRI, 2014, p. 340). 
As a result, the differentiation of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons by range of 
carriers does not possess universal applicability and has been changing with time. 
The criteria have been tightened to concrete geopolitical distances and negotiated 
ceilings (if covered by any negotiations and treaties at all). In this connection in Rus-
sian/American balance sometimes a very simple functional definition is applied, 
based upon method of exclusion: non-strategic systems are any nuclear weapons 
systems that are not covered by the existing START treaty (with understanding that 
the INF Treaty covered significant part of the remaining categories and caused their 
elimination, so existing non-strategic arsenals of the two superpowers include types 
of weapons not covered by the START and the INF). 
Finally, there is an approach according to which the differentiation between strategic 
and non-strategic systems may reflect the nature of their target (targeted object) that 
is aimed to be destroyed by this system. Here, the critical question is whether the 
target is of strategic or tactical importance in the adversary’s value system. Thus, the 
criteria for differentiation may have no relation to weapons’ technical characteristics 
at all. 
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It should be reminded, that in the acting edition of the Military Doctrine of the Rus-
sian Federation it is postulated that ‘nuclear weapons would remain an important 
factor of prevention of emergence of nuclear armed conflicts and conventional 
armed conflicts (large scale war, regional war)’ (Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies 2008, 
p.148). The doctrine also confirms that Russia ‘keeps the right to use nuclear weap-
ons in response to use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction 
against the country or its allies, as well as in case of aggression against Russian Fed-
eration with conventional weapons, if the very existence of the state is endangered’ 
(Ibid). At the same time, the Russian doctrine does not define any specificity of 
functions or of threshold of application for tactical nuclear weapons, in contrast to 
strategic weapons.  
Thus, taking into consideration all multiple approaches to the typology and the cri-
teria of differentiation, there could be a practical distinction between Russian-
American nuclear balance and other regional nuclear balances. In the nuclear talks 
between USA and Russia such treaty-based criteria could be applied, where all nu-
clear weapons systems not covered by the START-III treaty (and, implicitly, whose 
carriers are under 5500 km range) should be considered non-strategic, while weap-
ons and carriers designated for use within 500 km radius are tactical. As for nuclear 
arsenals of other states, criteria based on differentiating systems by nature of main 
assigned targets (tactical – operational – strategic) could be applied within every 
concrete regional geopolitical balance, without assigning fixed ceilings by yield or 
range. 
Estimations of Existing Arsenals of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons 
Nuclear states never exchanged official information on quantitative parameters of 
their arsenals of TNW. Such parameters remain secret in cases of the USA, Russia 
and most other nuclear states. What is available are some officially presented aggre-
gated numbers that partially include some TNW parameters among other types of 
weapons. Also, there are unofficial estimations by experts in wide variety. 
The overall size of combined nuclear arsenals of nine nuclear weapon states by the 
end of 2016 has been estimated by SIPRI experts as 15395 warheads (including 
those deployed, stored and in a process of dismantlement) out of which 4120 have 
been estimated as deployed (SIPRI, 2016, p. 610). 
The latest estimation of the US non-strategic nuclear weapons issued by SIPRI experts is 
that today the US has only one type of non-strategic weapon in stockpile: the B61 
gravity bombs in three modifications (B61-3, B61-4 and B61-10) in overall quantity 
of 500 units. 
Just five years ago, the US Congressional Research Service estimated the US non-
strategic arsenal as being above 1100 units (CRS Report, 2011, p. 1), and SIPRI ex-
perts gave estimates of 760 units, including B-61s and nuclear warheads for ‘Toma-
hawk’ sea-based cruise missiles (SIPRI, 2011, p. 327). Since then, a program of 
planned cuts of sea-based cruise missiles took place, and the current correlation is, 
as follows: more than 180 B61 bombs are deployed in six bases in five European 
countries, and the remaining about 300 units are stored on US territory for potential 
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use in allied operations outside Europe, including the Middle East and North-East 
Asia. 
The five European countries on whose territory the American non-strategic weap-
ons are located are Italy (Aviano and Ghedi bases), Belgium (Kleine Brogel base), 
Germany (Büchel base), the Netherlands (Volkel base) and Turkey (Incirlik base).  
American sub-strategic nuclear arsenal amounts to (by quantity of warheads) 10% 
compared to the US strategic nuclear arsenal. There were cuts in the amount of 
bombs in Europe in the early 2000s, from more than 400 to about 180 units at pre-
sent. At the same time, NATO stresses in its doctrine that as long as nuclear weap-
ons exist in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance and will support a com-
bination of nuclear and conventional forces (NATO Strategic Concept, p. 14). 
France has allocated 12 percent of its annual defense budgets for five consecutive 
years (2014–2019) for maintaining and modernizing its nuclear forces (SIPRI, 2016, 
p. 632). That amounts to 22 billion Euros. France does not have in its arsenal any
land-based missiles. Two major components of the arsenal are represented by sub-
marine-based sea-land ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and aircraft-based weapons, includ-
ing navy-based aircrafts aboard the aircraft carrier. Among these aircraft-based 
cruise missiles there are ASMPA units marked as ‘medium-range air-to-surface’ and 
belonging to the non-strategic category. By existing estimations, there are up to 80 
nuclear warheads of variable yields (20-300 Kt) produced for such mid-range mis-
siles. As noticed above, while the French consider ASMPA missiles to be of strate-
gic importance, Russian military planners consider them to be a non-strategic weap-
on aimed for tactical or operational-tactical use. 
The United Kingdom limited its nuclear carriers to a navy component only and pos-
sesses 48 Trident II D5 SLBMs, enough to equip up to 3 nuclear submarines that 
are operational at any given time. The UK does not own these warheads, but leases 
them from the joint arsenal shared with the US Navy. Up to 215 warheads are cur-
rently in stockpile. Each UK submarine on patrol carries no more than 8 operational 
missiles and 40 nuclear warheads. Having such a limited quantity of nuclear carriers 
and warheads, the UK does not presently maintain any weapons that could be quali-
fied as tactical. 
Russia does not provide any general official data on non-strategic weapons, but by 
the estimation of SIPRI experts it possesses about 2000 non-strategic warheads in 
formats of aviation bombs, air-based cruise missiles, nuclear torpedoes, long-range 
sea-based cruise missiles and artillery missiles (SIPRI, 2015; 2016). International es-
timations of the Russian arsenal vary quite significantly. The US Congressional Re-
search Service provided estimates between 2000 and 6000 units (CRS, 2011, p. 1). 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, in his statement before the US Congress, esti-
mated the arsenal to be 2000–4000 units (Miller, 2011). According to Russian offi-
cial data already before the year 2000, all TNWs of the navy and of the sea-based 
aviation have been moved to centralized storages, and 30% of those weapons were 
eliminated. Also 50% of the TNWs of the Air Forces were destroyed, as well as 
50% of the artillery warheads used in Air Defense systems. Artillery assigned war-
heads were also partially eliminated, as well as mines and tactical missiles in Infantry 
Forces. At the United Nations in May of 2010, the Russian delegation announced 
that the overall arsenal of the Russian non-strategic forces has been reduced by 
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75%. Previous official announcement quoted 60% cuts, so by modern times less 
than one-fourth of former arsenal remains. There is an on-going process of certain 
modernization of weapons and carriers used in Russian Air Forces and in the Navy. 
Modern Iskander-M (SS26 in Western typology) is on a planned basis substituting 
old SS-21 (SIPRI, 2016, p. 626). Rumors that Iskander type missiles are permanently 
deployed in Kaliningrad region proved to be inaccurate (short deployments exercis-
es took place, but on a temporary basis). The USA accused Russia of developing 
and testing a new type of land-based cruise missile with a range prohibited by the 
INF Treaty, but Russia officially denies the accusation. 
China (PRC) has a relatively limited and technically old nuclear arsenal of a general 
size around 260 warheads, though this arsenal is in a process of modernization at 
present. It was noted above that the Chinese military apply different criteria than the 
USA or Russia, and consider short-range use to be up to 1000 km and mid-range up 
to 3000 km. Only one class of missiles, namely DF-15 with range of 600 kilometers, 
belong to short-range weapons, and five other classes belong to middle-range: cruise 
missiles DH-10 and more modern CJ-20 (both with a range of 1500 km), sea-based 
JL-1 (range 1700 km) and land based DF-3A (very old, in service since 1971, range 
3000 km) and slightly old DF-21 (first deployed 26 years ago, and with about 80 
warheads produced for this type of carrier, it is probably the most widespread type 
in Chinese forces). Other Chinese weapons belong to long-range (3000–8000 km) 
and inter-continental range (above 8000 km, this class includes DF-31A and DF-5A 
and B missiles). These both classes correspond to strategic weapons in Russian and 
American arsenals. 
Israel, as is widely known, holds NCND (neither confirm nor deny) policy regarding 
its nuclear weapons. Reportedly, it has circa 50 nuclear capable missiles and 205 nu-
clear-capable aircraft (SIPRI, 2016, p. 654). Additionally, experts believe that Israel 
equipped some of its diesel-electric submarines with nuclear-armed sea-launched 
cruise missiles. But this guess is denied by Israeli officials. All of the Israeli nuclear 
weapons could be technically used at sub-strategic distances and with small yield 
(taking into consideration the geography of the Middle East). But politically such 
use would be of ‘strategic’ nature, considering the scale of the local theaters of po-
tential war encounters.  
India possesses between 106 and 118 nuclear warheads. India certified about 40 Mi-
rage-2000H airplanes for the delivery of gravity nuclear bombs (32 bombs in arse-
nal), and up to 16 Jaguar IS planes for delivery of another 16 nuclear bombs. And it 
introduced Dhanush sea-based ballistic missiles (in arsenal since 2013) for the deliv-
ery of 12 Kt small-yield nuclear bombs (weight up to 500 kg) with a small range of 
350 km, which qualifies them for a classical TNW. Since 2003, India also possesses 
Prithvi-II land-based missile with a range of 250 km (today 24 of them are in arsenal, 
substituting the old Prithvi-I that had a 150 km range). Tactical functions could be 
performed also by a sea-based missile K-15 (range 700 km, weight of warhead up to 
500 kg). 
Pakistan has a nuclear arsenal of about 130 warheads. It lacks sea-based component, 
its main arsenal consist of land-based missiles, bombs on aircrafts and cruise mis-
siles. It has the widest by types -arsenal of sub-strategic (by characteristics) warheads 
among all new nuclear states. Land-based missiles Hatf-1 (180 km range), Hatf-2 
(290 km), Hatf-3 (450-750 km modifications) belong to tactical, as well as newer 
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cruise missiles Hatf-7-Babur (700 km announced, but US Air Force estimates their 
range as 350 km) and newest Hatf-8-Ra’ad (350 km). In 2014, the Pakistani army also 
tested and announced a super-short-range system Nasr (Hatf-9), designated for a 
distance up to 60 km (battlefield use) and compact nuclear warhead.  
North Korea by estimations has 6 to 10 units of nuclear warheads. A lot of infor-
mation about its systems under development is unreliable. Since 1990s, the country 
maintains Nodong launchers (1250 km), and since the 2000s, it has been experiment-
ing with Taepodong and Hwasong missiles. None of the launchers or warheads are des-
ignated specifically for tactical use, but taking into consideration the small distance 
to Seoul (40 km to the south form the North-South Koreas border), there are 
speculations that North Koreans may use nuclear weapon against Seoul even with-
out a carrier at all – by exploding it in one of the secret tunnels under the border 
and causing a devastating earthquake. Technically, DPRK is trying to build and test 
carriers that would be able to deliver reliably a nuclear weapon to the territory of 
South Korea, Japan or to US military bases in the region. 
Previous Cuts and Measures Regarding TNW Arsenals 
As known, in the Cold War years the Soviet Union deployed TNW on the territories 
of each of the 15 Soviet republics, including, among others, Baltic states, Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Central Asian states, as well as on the territory of member states of the 
Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe. During the same historic period, the USA de-
ployed in Europe about 7000 units of nuclear weapons of intermediate and shorter 
range. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden K. Bildt and Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs of Poland R. Sikorski published an estimation in the New York Times accord-
ing to which at the ‘peak’ of the Cold War the USA possessed approximately 8000 
units of non-strategic nuclear weapons, while the USSR possessed approximately 
23000 units (Bildt and Sikorski, 2010).  
In 1987, the USA and the USSR concluded the Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF Treaty) that assured verifiable elimination of all missiles 
of the two intermediate classes. In sum, as a result of the implementation of the 
INF Treaty both sides dismantled from carriers and decommissioned 4000 non-
strategic warheads and destroyed 2692 missiles-carriers. The American side elimi-
nated 846 missiles, while the USSR eliminated 1846 units of missiles-carriers. In the 
course of the implementation of the INF Treaty, the sides undertook 1116 inspec-
tions as means of verification. The USA convened 774 verification inspections, the 
USSR 442 verification inspections. 
At the same time, the mass-scale implementation of INF Treaty didn’t apply to tac-
tical nuclear weapons with a range less than 500 km and not complying with other 
INF criteria. In the historic period of destabilization within the USSR in the late 
1980s that further led to its dissolution in 1991, both Moscow and Washington were 
disturbed by the perspective of tactical nukes getting into the hands of separatists, 
unpredictable leaders of new independent states and conflicting armed forces 
(among others, for example, into the hands of Azerbaijanian and Armenian military 
in the course of war for Karabakh). But there was no time and no favorable political 
conditions for Soviet-American negotiations on these matters. Then, after the ex-
change of some unofficial signals, Moscow and Washington undertook parallel uni-
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lateral measures. Washington removed a major part of American TNW located in 
Western Europe (as well as in Korea and aboard the US navy ships) back to the 
American continent. In response, during the latest period of the existence of the 
Soviet Union, Moscow was able to recollect Soviet TNW from seceding republics to 
the territory of the Russian Federation under the control of central Moscow authori-
ties. 
Parallel unilateral initiatives during 1991–1992 on non-strategic nuclear weapons 
were quite massive in scale even by modern standards. The US President G. Bush 
announced the American initiative on September 27, 1991, and the American mili-
tary started to dismantle about 2150 warheads of land-based carriers, including 850 
warheads for Lance missiles and 1300 artillery shells with nuclear explosives. About 
500 units of nuclear weapons located in navy ships and submarines were decommis-
sioned. It was also announced that 900 underwater bombs of B-57 type would be 
eliminated, as well as nuclear weapons assigned to shore-based navy aviation. By the 
end of 1991, it was additionally decided to withdraw 700 bombs and cruise missiles 
from NATO air-force bases in Europe. 
Already by the end of 1991, non-strategic nuclear warheads had been withdrawn 
from the US bases in South Korea, and, by the mid-1992, from bases in Europe. 
Obviously, the process of physical dismantlement of withdrawn warheads (except 
for those that were kept in reserve) continued much longer, practically till the end of 
the 1990s. 
A parallel unilateral initiative by the Soviet President M. Gorbachev was announced 
on October 5, 1991. Its implementation was finalized already in 1992 by the new 
Russian President B. Yeltsin. Moscow announced the elimination of all shells of 
nuclear artillery and warheads of tactical nuclear missiles. Warheads of nuclear mis-
sile interceptors belonging to the system of Air Defense were removed with the 
physical dismantlement of some of them. Elimination of all land mines with nuclear 
explosives was in progress. All non-strategic nuclear weapons of maritime basing 
were removed from navy ships, submarines and shore-based navy aviation, and a 
part of these weapons was fully dismantled. 
Geostrategically, the most important part of this initiative was a relocation of non-
strategic nuclear weapons from former Warsaw Pact member states and from for-
mer republics of the USSR to the territory of the Russian Federation. This operation 
had been mainly finished by the end of the 1991 (by the moment of the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union), while the process of relocation of non-strategic weapons from 
the territories of Belarus and Ukraine continued in 1992. It should not be confused 
with the different and longer process of negotiations between Moscow and three 
new independent states (Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) on the fate of the parts 
of strategic nuclear arsenals that remained on their territory. Return of those strate-
gic nuclear weapons to Russia continued until the mid-1990s. 
After parallel unilateral initiatives in 1991–1992, Russia unilaterally took a decision 
on significant (in perspective, by three-fourths) cuts of the TNW arsenal concen-
trated now fully on Russia’s own territory and on withdrawal of carriers from its 
border regions inward. 
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As for today, parallel unilateral US and USSR initiatives of 1991 remain a unique 
example in the history of arms control on significant cuts of nuclear arsenals with-
out any verification and exchange of data and, most importantly, without a treaty or 
a written agreement. But it could serve as an important precedent for the future. 
One of the recent proposals supposing parallel cuts without formal agreement on 
the basis of mutual ‘good will gestures’ is a suggestion to liquidate Russia’s remain-
ing nuclear warheads for Air Defense systems in parallel with the liquidation by the 
American side of some approximately comparable quantities of its nuclear warheads 
for sea-based cruise missiles. This proposal was initiated and advocated by the Rus-
sian expert Major General V. Z. Dvorkin, and it takes into account high risk and 
unacceptable ecological damage of the use of nuclear-armed Air Defense intercep-
tors over a country’s own territory. Such an exchange could be done without formal 
counting of items and without verification simply following the logic of getting rid 
of old and excessive nuclear arms by each side. There is as well another version of 
this proposal: the Russian side may consider initiating the elimination of the remain-
ing non-strategic nuclear warheads within the ABM and air-defense systems in ex-
change for a parallel US initiative to dismantle its remaining deep-sea nuclear bombs 
and mines. Again, this way both sides may get rid of ecologically extremely damag-
ing weapons. 
The Moscow Framework Treaty of 2002 (Strategic Offensive Reductions - SOR) 
limited only the ‘ceilings’ of deployed strategic warheads and didn’t touch non-
strategic weapons. The US Congress followed with a Resolution Ȳ5017 that not 
only requested the administration to demand from Russia official information on 
the quantity and the quality of non-strategic nuclear weapons, but also potentially 
allocated up to 5 million USD in assistance to Russia in producing such an invento-
ry. 
Nuclear Posture Review presented by the Obama administration to the 110th Con-
gress listed the planned elimination (utilization) of sea-based cruise missiles with 
nuclear warheads as a measure in the field of cutting non-strategic nuclear weapons. 
It was motivated by the compensating ability to provide forward basing of US nu-
clear weapons on air-force tactical bombers (Nuclear Posture Review, 2010, pp. 26–
27). 
Thus, in the field of non-strategic nuclear weapons there are at least two positive 
precedents of significant cuts. The first is the INF Treaty of 1987 which was fully 
implemented during an over ten–year-period with extensive verification and control. 
The second is the precedent of parallel unilateral relocations and cuts of TNW in 
1991–1992 undertaken without concluding any written agreement and without veri-
fication procedures, which is a unique case in the whole area of international arms 
control. In the course of any potential Russian-American interaction on non-
strategic weapons it is recommendable to specify components that (especially taking 
into consideration the asymmetry of arsenals and geopolitical parameters of coun-
tries) could be limited, relocated or eliminated by unilateral initiatives, without a 
lengthy negotiation process and expensive mutual control. These options are in 
more details discussed by A.Nikitin and S.Oznobishchev in Arms Control: Does it 
Have a Future? (2013, pp. 79–80 and 80–110). Obviously, on some stage the verifica-
tion might be required, but some initial stages, especially regarding old and techni-
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cally obsolete systems, could be implemented on the basis of parties’ own political 
good will. 
American TNW in Europe: Modernization or Withdrawal? 
As mentioned above, the American TNW are kept on the European soil in six bases 
located in five countries (Italy, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Turkey). They 
were removed from Greece without major attention in mid-2000s.  
It is notable that nuclear weapons in all the listed European countries (though only 
part of them in Italy and Turkey) are intended for use by the host nation’s aircraft 
and pilots. This is considered by Russian experts and some European critics to be a 
violation of the NPT Treaty, as this agreement prohibits storage, training and pas-
sage (even in peace time) of knowledge on how to use nuclear weapons to the mili-
tary of NPT non-nuclear states.  
Public protests against the continued presence of American TNW on national terri-
tories of European non-nuclear states have fluctuated with ups and downs since the 
1990s. In countries like Germany, they are historically rooted in earlier protests of 
the 1980s against US Pershings and other mid- and shorter-range missiles finally 
removed after concluding the INF Treaty. 
Instead of planning to remove the remaining TNW, the United States – according 
to already made decisions – would in 2022 start to replace the older arsenal of B61-3 
and B61-4 bombs with new B61-12 modification. The newer bomb will have the 
yield of 50 Kt (which was maximum capacity for the earlier B61-4 version). The new 
modification will have better accuracy (limited in-flight navigation) and earth-
penetrating capability. It will also have variable yield tuning aimed to reduce collat-
eral damage (Kristensen, 2015).  
One of the really new and important parameters of this US TNW modernization 
will be the ability to integrate it with wider range of fighter jets, including F-15E, F-
16, F-35A and PA-200 Tornado. This is perceived as widening the involvement of 
European host-nation pilots into preparation to and training of the use of nuclear 
weapons. 
Germany hosts 10 to 20 units of American TNW. American nuclear presence in 
Germany was significantly higher in the past, but in 2005–2007 above 100 nuclear 
bombs were withdrawn from Ramstein air force base. Chairman of the Munich Se-
curity Conference Wolfgang Ischinger and former chief of planning department of 
the German Foreign Ministry Ulrich Weisser – while participating in public debates 
– reminded of the promises made by the American Defense Secretary William Perry
two decades ago, that the US ‘nuclear umbrella’ would be opened over European 
allies irrespective of whether there are American TNW on their territories. Other-
wise the principle of ‘nuclear umbrella’ becomes too selective and looks like ‘buying’ 
defense by offering nuclear deployment. Ischinger and Weisser called for negotia-
tions with Russia based upon three principles: the preservation of American ‘nuclear 
umbrella’ under any circumstances, the linkage between the withdrawal of American 
TNW with reciprocal or parallel measures by Russia, and the obligation on behalf of 
Russia to relocate its arsenal of tactical weapons deep inland of Russian territory. 
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The former German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle stated once at Munich 
Security Conference: ‘Last remaining units of nuclear weapons in Germany repre-
sent a relic of Cold War. They don’t serve any military purposes anymore. This is 
why we, German government, work on conditions for their withdrawal…’ (Wester-
velle, 2010). But the current Merkel government reconfirmed that it wouldn’t under-
take unilateral steps on behalf of Germany until joint position of all Western and 
Central European countries (including even those who do not host TNW) would be 
coordinated. 
Belgium and Netherlands host 10 to 20 American warheads each. At a certain stage, 
when the Belgian Foreign Ministry was headed by Yves Leterme in 2010 a ministeri-
al statement was issued saying that Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands and 
Norway would require jointly the withdrawal of American TNW from Europe. A 
letter co-signed by the five foreign ministers followed addressing NATO Secretary 
General and suggesting to include the removal of TNW from Europe into a list of 
consecutive steps towards nuclear disarmament. Such a demand was supported by 
the former NATO Secretary General and former Belgian foreign minister Willy 
Klaas, who insisted on supporting German demands regarding TNW. The Dutch 
parliament debated twice during the last decade a draft resolution calling for the 
removal of nuclear warheads from Volkel airbase at south-east of the country. In 
both cases the draft resolution didn’t pass by the insistence of the government. 
Among Dutch supporters of the demand to withdraw nukes there are such promi-
nent figures as the former Prime-minister of Netherlands R. Lubbers (this is sym-
bolic: as far as the the 1980s, he was a supporter of the deployment of American 
weapons in the country, but with years reconsidered his own views and joined sup-
porters of ‘no nukes’ demand). 
Italy hosts the largest quantity of American bombs (up to 90) at two air-force bases. 
Italian government never expressed formally any criticism against their presence on 
Italian land (some of the officials even demonstrated unawareness of the fact that 
US bombs are stored on Italian territory). But political opposition and various pub-
lic organizations and movements, including Italian Pugwash group, Association of 
Italian Scientists for Disarmament, ISODARCO (International School on Dis-
armament and Research of Conflicts) network and others expressed widely open 
criticism against the presence of American bombs in Italy and published numerous 
arguments in favor of their withdrawal. 
Turkey hosts up to 50 units of American TNW at Incirlik military base. After the 
abortive coup-d-etat in Turkey in mid-2016 (and the arrest of the commander of Incir-
lik base by Turkish authorities) there were rumors regarding plans to relocate the 
nuclear material from Turkish base to Romania or somewhere else, but later the 
continuation of their presence on Turkish soil was reconfirmed.  
The Turkish government considers American bombs to be not only an interface and 
loyalty gesture within NATO, but as well to be a guarantee of deterring Iran. Some 
Turkish experts even express the view that any withdrawal of American nuclear 
weapons could motivate Ankara to promote national nuclear program in case the 
nuclear deal with Iran would collapse or end at any stage. 
Other European states that don’t host nuclear weapons sometimes took active posi-
tions on this issue – see, for example, Report for the Finnish Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs (Bergnas J et al.: 2010). The greatest support for keeping American weapons 
in Europe was expressed not by countries hosting TNW, but by group of Baltic 
states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), in different times by Hungary, Romania and by 
France. The study undertaken by a Dutch non-governmental organization IKV Pax 
Christi (polling and interviewing NATO-accredited diplomats and experts from na-
tional ministers of foreign affairs of a number of European countries) came to in-
teresting conclusions. Within diplomatic circles of 14 (out of 28) NATO member 
states they found political forces and experts that more or less actively objected the 
continuation of the American TNW presence in Europe. Experts and officials in 10 
more countries shared the opinion that their states wouldn’t veto a decision to with-
draw American weapons. Experts and officials in France, Lithuania and Hungary 
strongly objected such withdrawal. That poll showed that there is no ‘group logic’ in 
the approach – for example ‘old’ and ‘new’ NATO members do not represent two 
opposing groups on this issue. And geopolitical closeness to Russia does not neces-
sarily dictate negative attitude towards TNW-free Europe. 
Many countries recognize that historically American TNW were one of those fac-
tors that ‘cemented’ the Alliance, but today most of them prefer other, more useful 
forms of responsibility sharing. Up to a half of NATO states consider that building 
joint European ABM system may substitute TNW as more modern and more prac-
tical way to glue the Alliance together, though the other half does not agree with this 
approach. 
Taking into consideration the line of Trump administration aiming to ease US obli-
gations within NATO, a certain reconsideration of the TNW in Europe may be en-
visaged, though not per se, but rather in a package of measures regarding the transat-
lantic link. At the same time the funding for B61 modernization has been already 
allocated and partially spent, so procedurally it will not be so easy to reverse the tide, 
especially taking into consideration the necessity to keep consensus among NATO 
member states. 
Prospects for International Dialogue on Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons 
The continuity of negotiations, agreements, treaties, implementation and verification 
procedures between the USA and the USSR/Russia that includes series of SALT, 
ABM, SORT and START treaties and related activities constitute the strategic nuclear 
arms control regime in the area of strategic nuclear weapons. In the Russian-American 
joint study Lessons to be Learned from Non-Proliferation Failures and Successes (2009, p. 3) 
this regime is considered as containing both the arsenal of ‘sticks’ and arsenal of 
‘carrots’. It has many limitations: it remains bilateral, does not involve other than 
two largest nuclear powers, it is not comprehensive, it is concentrated on limitation 
of carriers rather than warheads, it allows to place decommissioned weapons to re-
serves rather than destroy them, etc. At the same time, series of negotiations and 
treaties in the area of strategic nuclear weapons appears relatively systemic, it has 
created a whole system of interrelated practices of arms limitations, cuts, verification 
that are based upon commonly elaborated and agreed definitions and methods.   
The INF Treaty of 1987 was considered at that time by many experts as a core seed 
for another systemic regime of limitations and cuts of non-strategic nuclear weapons. But such 
a regime in non-strategic area did not materialize. Systemic regimes (like non-
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proliferation regime based upon the NPT Treaty, missile technology control regime 
(MTCR), strategic arms control regime based upon SALT and START series of 
agreements) differ from one-time ad hoc measures exactly by interfacing numerous 
legal and practical measures, both domestic and international, into a logical and con-
tinuous scheme that is agreed upon and followed by a fixed group of international 
actors. In this respect the INF Treaty didn’t receive the necessary continuation: uni-
lateral parallel relocations and cuts in 1991–1992 described above, though important 
by themselves, remained rather ad hoc measures: they didn’t lead to the exchange of 
overall data on non-strategic arsenals, neither did they lead to consensus on defini-
tions and criteria nor to establishing a verification system for the whole area of non-
strategic weapons. 
Are there any prospects in the present geopolitical environment so that any systemic 
exchange of data, negotiating agreements, monitoring and verification procedures 
could emerge in the area of non-strategic nuclear arsenals? Which practical steps 
could be undertaken in this direction in the foreseeable future? 
The rise of attention to the non-strategic nuclear arsenals is not motivated by any 
rise of their objective role or function in the modern geopolitical conditions. Vice 
versa, with the end of the Cold War the danger of intended and even non-intended 
use of tactical nuclear weapons decreased and moved from the mainstream of nu-
clear balance between Washington and Moscow into the regional balances, specifi-
cally in the Middle East, South Asia and North-East Asia. At the same time, analysis 
of quantitative parameters of arsenals that could be attributed to non-strategic cate-
gory proves that, as before, the overwhelming majority of such weapons remain in 
the hands of the USA and Russia, and their non-strategic arsenals are by factor (in 
some categories by two factors) larger than comparable stocks of weapons in the 
hands of ‘third’ nuclear powers. That increases Washington’s and Moscow’s respon-
sibility for assuring the non-use and potential cuts in non-strategic arsenals, and for 
elaborating general approaches to involving these types of weapons into arms con-
trol, monitoring and verification. 
Some doctrinal changes which occurred during the last decade provided certain 
space for movement in the right direction. UN-based NPT Review process abided 
with the recognition of serious problems that face the non-proliferation regime, 
while at the same time noted some general decrease of the role of nuclear weapons 
for achieving national and international security in the modern world. The U.S. 
Government postulated doctrinally that they would not use or threaten to use nu-
clear weapons against non-nuclear member states of the NPT that adhere to their 
obligations under the non-proliferation regime (Nuclear Posture Review, 2010, 
p.16). Particularly, it was clarified that if such a country hypothetically would attack 
the United States by using conventional, chemical or biological weapons, the United 
States would retaliate with prevailing conventional weapons, but would not threaten 
to use nuclear response, if the attacking country itself did not possess nuclear weap-
ons. The recent edition of the NATO Strategic Doctrine also shows a decrease of 
emphasis of the nuclear component within the Alliance’s defense capabilities. 
A famous series of articles on nuclear-free world published by four highly influential 
American statesmen (G. Schultz, W. Perry, H. Kissinger and S. Nunn) moved the 
demands to reconsider the role of tactical nuclear weapons into the realm of ‘politi-
cal correctness’. These American political strategists, while advocating the general 
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necessity to move towards nuclear-free world, specifically called for the liquidation 
of nuclear weapons of short-range created for forward basing (Schultz, et al., 2007, 
p.A15). In further articles, these four prominent American statesmen called for dia-
logue both within NATO and between the USA and Russia regarding withdrawal 
and de-concentration of forward-based nuclear weapons, starting from data ex-
change on accurate counting of such weapons. They especially emphasized that such 
small (by size) and portable nuclear devices are potentially dangerous from the point 
of view of possibly getting into the hands of terrorist groups (Schultz, et al., 2008, p. 
A13). 
Policy-makers and many defense analysts in Russia do not see a necessity to involve 
TNW into negotiations at present. START-III is under implementation till 2020, 
and no new line of arms control negotiations are at place. Worsening of Russian 
relations with NATO and with the West as a whole after crises over Crimea, East-
ern Ukraine and Syria led to the rise of Moscow’s interest towards advancing mili-
tary capabilities, forward basing and to some doctrinal (though yet not operative) 
increase of reliance onto nuclear weapons in general. In such an environment there 
could be only two motivations to involve TNW into arms control. Firstly, if a re-
moval of remaining American TNW from Europe would become a realistic option 
(either because of a change of priorities of the US administration or because of po-
litical pressure from the European allies), in which case reciprocal measures from 
Russia may be required. Secondly, if the US and Russia would open any negotiations 
on the ‘START-IV’ – in continuation of strategic arms reduction after the end of 
START-III in 2020. In this second case, non-strategic weapons (at least some types) 
could be included into combined ceilings or combined limitations on deployment. 
The readiness by Russia to engage into any negotiations on TNW would greatly de-
pend upon whether the Russian concerns of last decades (regarding the character 
and the scope of the ABM system, long-range conventional high-precision weapons 
targeted against strategic objects, NATO enlargement and forward basing, military 
cooperation in third countries like Syria, etc.) would be met. Asymmetries exist in 
many areas, and Moscow may be ready to discuss the asymmetry in TNW arsenals 
only in interface with offensive/defensive, conventional/nuclear, strategic/tactical 
balances. 
Moscow considers that Articles I and II of the NPT already by themselves require 
the removal of American TNW from non-nuclear European countries, even with-
out any compensatory measures from the Russian side. Some Russian experts state 
that Russia should establish a linkage between limitations/cuts of TNW with limita-
tions/cuts of some components of NATO general purpose forces, for example, 
with cuts of navy-based cruise missiles that could be easily re-armed with nuclear 
warheads. Some other military experts stress that TNW provides regional deter-
rence, thus Russia cannot discuss the fate of the TNW only with the United States 
and NATO, but it needs to take into consideration nuclear arsenals of many coun-
tries, including DPRK, Israel, China, India and Pakistan. 
At the same time, some other Russian and international experts criticize maximalist 
approaches and attempt to search for compromises. They emphasize that the de-
mand to remove American TNW from Europe could be balanced (and motivated) 
with reciprocal relocations or cuts in the Russian arsenal (for example, relocation of 
all TNW out from storages at the European part of Russia to storages behind Ural 
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mountains). They also consider it unrealistic to attempt to have a combined parity 
with non-strategic weapons of all third parties (majority of which, like in cases of 
Israel, India, Pakistan, DPRK are designated for deterring regional neighboring 
states other than Russia) (Arbatov, 2011). 
If any negotiations on TNW would start, then, according to Russian views, these 
should be linked to issues regarding ABMs, non-nuclear strategic weapons and con-
ventional weapons in Europe (though the CFE treaty is dead, some methods of 
monitoring, exchanging data and preserving regional stability are still applied and 
could be reconfigured into new regime of European arms control). 
American proposals regarding TNW concentrate on limitation with equal and com-
bined ceiling to all strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons that are in storages in 
Russia and in the USA. This would allow, as American experts suggest, to circum-
vent the difficult issue of intrusive methods of control, as far as strategic and non-
strategic reserves are stored in the same depots and are hardly separable without 
detailed inspection. It is also impossible to distinct between reserves and warheads 
awaiting dismantlement. 
Russian response to this approach has been suggested by the Center for Security 
Studies of the IMEMO Institute within Russian Academy of Sciences. Experts pro-
pose to elaborate and conclude an agreement on withdrawal of TNW warheads 
from air-force and navy bases, as well as from any general forces bases into central-
ized storages: the principal here is to limit TNW not through imposing ceilings and 
limitations onto their quantities, but through limiting the places of their storage to 
well protected storages far from regions of touch between Russian and Western 
military infrastructures. This would allow avoiding sensitive and intrusive control 
inside facilities, debatable counting and control over dismantlement and utilization. 
At the same time, such an approach would prevent non-intended or non-authorized 
use of TNW and the stealing of TNW by terrorists. Tactical warheads could be kept 
in central storages until the process of disarmament would allow their controlled 
elimination. And if any process of dangerous escalation of strategic environment 
would take place, it would be possible to openly move part of the TNW to armed 
forces bases in the direction of the danger, as such a move by itself would be a fac-
tor of deterrence. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the situation in the area of non-strategic nuclear weapons could be 
summarized as follows. 
– There are no universally agreed definitions or criteria for distinguishing be-
tween strategic and non-strategic (including tactical) nuclear weapons. Still,
there are several widely applied approaches based upon distinction in objec-
tive parameters (range of carriers, yield or weight of warheads), as well as in
functions and in value of targets, that allow to analytically separate the cate-
gory of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
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– Though non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons can be found in most nu-
clear powers’ arsenals, their quantities in the hands of the USA and Russia as
nuclear superpowers remains by factor higher comparing to other nuclear
states.
– Tactical nuclear weapons are considered to be more vulnerable for unauthor-
ized use or theft by terrorists than strategic weapons. This is why the task to
create a regime to their monitoring and decreasing of their numbers has a
priority in present conditions. It is also notable that quite many delivery sys-
tems for non-strategic nuclear weapons are systems of dual use (both con-
ventional and nuclear).
– Two major achievements in the area of limitation and partial elimination of
non-strategic nuclear weapons are the Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF, 1987) and parallel unilateral initiatives by the
USA and USSR/Russia in 1991-1992. They decreased non-strategic nuclear
arsenals significantly.
– The remaining American TNW are located both on national territory and
outside the USA, in five European non-nuclear countries. The USA remains
the only nuclear power which permanently stores a part of its nuclear arsenal
outside national borders. This should serve as an incentive for the interna-
tional community to debate an introduction of a principal requirement ad-
dressed to all nuclear states to keep their nuclear weapons within the borders
of their national territories.
– The remaining Russian TNW are no longer operatively deployed and are
stored separately from delivery systems. At the same time, TNW are kept in
most cases in the same storages where strategic reserve arsenals are stored.
This may evoke a requirement to separate tactical and strategic weapons in
different storages so that processes of data exchange, counting and verifica-
tion could be applied. Alternatively, sides may agree on combined strate-
gic/tactical ceilings or on concentrating all remaining TNW, without discuss-
ing ceilings, in central storages far from areas where military infrastructures
of opposite sides confront each other.
– The current political environment does not provide any single strong motiva-
tion neither for the withdrawal of American TNW from Europe, nor for
Russian initiative in cuts or relocations, nor for cuts in non-strategic arsenals
of third nuclear countries.
– At the same time it is not entirely impossible that the USA and Russia would
open a dialogue on non-strategic nuclear weapons or undertake unilateral
steps in this area. One of the steps by which sides could start is an exchange
of data on already undertaken unilateral cuts and relocations in 1991–1992,
including which types and quantities of TNW were removed and which of
them were destroyed. If it would be transparently announced by sides that
some categories of TNW are fully decommissioned and eliminated, this
could later be made irreversible by written agreements, which would open a
way towards future progress. In 2015, Russia and the USA already started
some new procedures of data exchange and mil-to-mil coordination in the
course of interaction around military activities of Moscow and the West in
Syria and Iraq (details discussed in A.Nikitin, 2017, p.p. 358, 361). Russian-
Western parallel or interfaced military actions in the Middle East became a
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new factor pushing sides towards dialogue over mid-range weapons arsenals, 
both in conventional and WMD areas. 
– Any potential systemic negotiations on non-strategic weapons leading to
shaping a regime of arms control in the area of non-strategic nuclear weap-
ons (as a far-sighted goal on the way to nuclear-weapon-free world) require 
to take into consideration the deep interface and numerous interconnections 
between offensive/defensive, nuclear/conventional, and strategic/non-
strategic arsenals and weapons. 
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5 
INF Treaty – Present State and Way Forward 
Matti Vuorio5 
Abstract 
he negotiation history and scope of the Intermediate-Range and Shorter-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) will first be briefly reviewed in this arti-
cle. After that the implementation phase, including its intrusive verification 
regime of finite duration, will be described. Since the signing of the treaty, the de-
velopment of new technologies has raised new problematic issues. These include the 
deployment of INF-range unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV), as well as 
wide global proliferation of both ballistic and cruise missiles, some of them nuclear-
armed. In the last years, breaches of the treaty have been suspected and notification 
made by both sides, the US and Russia. They have led to the worry that Russia 
might eventually want to break away from the treaty. The ongoing Western deploy-
ment of Ballistic Missile Defence systems on European seas and land bases has 
made Russia nervous and the political situation acute. In particular, the deployment 
of ship-based Aegis missile systems on land, called Aegis Ashore, is claimed by Rus-
sia to be a breach of the INF Treaty, as the system is capable of launching, in addi-
tion to missile defence interceptors, also cruise missiles prohibited by the treaty. 
Russia is expected to react to Aegis Ashore in Europe by deploying Iskander SS-26 
missiles more permanently in Kaliningrad, opposite the planned Polish base. The 
US, in turn, has accused Russia of developing a new cruise missile prohibited by 
INF. Since there are simultaneously also other suspected breaches by both sides, 
there is an urgent need for the parties to intensify their discussions in the Special 
Verification Commission. The treaty’s paragraphs also need updating. The need for 
additions includes a distinction clause concerning cruise missiles and UCAVs, and 
also a more comprehensive definition of cruise missile range as a function of pay-
load in order to facilitate interpretation of the results of tests that are short of full 
range. These could enable the INF Treaty to make a contribution towards stability 
in the world also further on. 
How the INF Treaty was Achieved 
The nuclear arms race was in an infamously dangerous cycle in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The doctrines of deterrence were shifting towards warfighting and limited nuclear 
war on both sides of the Cold War front. The key aims were moving toward flexible 
responses with escalation control.  
5 Secretary General (retired), Scientific Advisory Board of Defence, Ministry of Defence, Finland. 
T
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While developments in strategic nuclear weapon arsenals were constrained by arms 
control agreements, there was no regulation on nuclear weapons below strategic 
level. Thus, the most threatening arms race took place in the field of intermediate-
range ballistic and cruise missiles meant specifically for European targets. This could 
possibly have decoupled the European theatre from global deterrence, and effec-
tively taken strategic arms out of the escalation scenarios.  
The race made a jump to a qualitatively new level around 1976, when the Soviet 
intermediate-range missile SS-20 was deployed in operational units in the Warsaw 
Pact countries. It was a much more capable missile than its predecessors in several 
respects. Most importantly, it used solid fuel, which quite essentially shortened its 
preparation time for operations and hence, made the warning time practically zero 
for the opponent. This shifted the balance towards an unstable, high alert status for 
nuclear units in Europe. The SS-20 was also mobile, making it nearly invulnerable to 
attack. It was accurate and highly destructive with its three independently targetable 
warheads. The total number of these warheads would have been large enough to 
destroy all nuclear targets in Western Europe, the total number of SS-20 missiles 
being around 600, as became publicly known upon their destruction when the INF 
Treaty was implemented. 
Therefore, Western military strategists were seriously worried for a good reason. 
There was even talk about changing from Launch-under-Attack strategy to Launch-
on-Warning in order not to lose European missiles and airplanes in a disarming first 
strike. That shift of strategy would have been very destabilizing. Instead, in response 
to the grave situation, NATO adopted a dual-track approach in 1979, both negotiat-
ing and simultaneously starting to deploy its own intermediate-range missiles in Eu-
rope. Bilateral negotiations between the superpowers began in Geneva in 1981, and 
with a one-year break in 1984, finished successfully in 1987 (Kimball and Reif, 
2014). 
The Western military response was to deploy 464 ground-launched cruise missiles 
(GLCMs) in several Western countries, as well as 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles to 
replace the previous shorterrange Pershing I in Western Germany. Because cruise 
missiles are slow as they fly aerodynamically, GLCM is not a destabilizing first strike 
weapon. However, the Pershing II with its 1,770 km range and 10–15 minute flight 
time surely was the accurate, solid-fuel tit-for-tat answer to the SS-20s, although 
deployed in smaller numbers, and with only one warhead per each missile. Pershing 
II deployment started in 1983. Its range seems to have been adjusted just short of 
Moscow, not to be capable of a decapitating strategic strike, but rather made for 
theatre warfighting in Western Russia. The real range may have been longer, howev-
er. During these deployments the nuclear balance became worryingly unstable, and 
also the general public became acutely aware of the fearsome situation. Large 
demonstrations took place in cities and outside missile bases around Western Eu-
rope. 
As Mikhail Gorbachev became the Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Par-
ty in March 1985, tensions quickly started to ease. Already in April he suspended the 
SS-20 deployment, and soon met President Reagan personally in Geneva in No-
vember 1985. In October 1986, they met again in Reykjavik, where radical ideas of 
denuclearization emerged. As to the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negoti-
ations, they first agreed in principle to eliminate these missiles from Europe alto-
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gether, and to limit their global numbers to 100 each. The final agreement, where 
INF missiles were to be bilaterally abolished globally, was reached on November 24, 
1987 in Geneva (Savranskaya, S. and Blanton, T. 2007; Sokov, N. 2007). 
The Implementation of the INF Treaty 
The INF Treaty eliminated both land-based intermediate-range missiles with 1,000–
5,500 kilometre range as well as shorter-range missiles with a range of 500–1,000 
km. However, it did not cover nuclear weapons delivered by aircraft, although the 
Tu-22M Backfire bomber (with a range of more than 6,000 km) was originally one 
of the weapon systems that had caused great concern in the West. The agreement 
did not cover sea-launched nuclear weapons of any range either. 
Although the original INF arms race had only taken place in Europe, the agreement 
covered the two negotiating countries’ weapons globally. It did not, however, bind 
their allies and friends, such as the United Kingdom, France or China. This short-
coming was at that time considered acceptable, but as the agreement was of unlim-
ited duration, it must have been clear already then that sooner or later the agreement 
would need updating in some respects, as alliances and global threats change and 
missile capabilities grow and proliferate.  
The INF Treaty was quite unique in the history of arms control agreements. It not 
only limited a whole weapon category of the two countries, but also abolished it. 
Such an agreement was possible only in the exceptional atmosphere of trust and 
detente at the end of the Cold War. Still, previous long-term suspicions did not van-
ish so quickly, and the famous slogan of President Reagan in negotiating the treaty 
was ‘Trust, but verify’. Therefore, the treaty came to include a very long and detailed 
protocol of verification measures, allowing mutual intrusive on-site inspections, in-
stead of the less effective measures previously applied in arms control agreements, 
such as non-intrusive national technical means (NTM), which means mainly satellite 
observations. Both countries created large organizations to do the actual verification 
work, and everything worked admirably smoothly. The full text of the treaty can be 
found online (U.S. Department of State, 1987).  
It was agreed that the implementation of the destruction of the INF missiles and 
their launchers would be completed during the relatively short period of just three 
years, by summer 1991. In total, the US destroyed 169 Pershing I missiles, 234 Per-
shing II missiles and 443 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). These numbers 
indicate among other things that there had, in fact, been two Pershing II missiles per 
launcher. The Soviet Union destroyed 654 SS-20, 149 SS-4, 6 SS-5, 718 SS-12, 230 
SS-23 ballistic missiles, and also 80 SS-C-X-4 (Russian name RK-55) land-based 
cruise missiles, which also had similar air-launched and sea-launched cruise missile 
variants. The SS-23 range was just below 500 km, but the Soviet Union agreed to 
destroy these missiles also, as a good-will gesture, as there was much hope and trust 
in the political atmosphere during those years.  
Questions of inspection and verification were considered by the common Special 
Verification Commission. The need for this kind of common forum for negotia-
tions was obvious at that time, and the Commission was active until the end of the 
period of intrusive verification, which took place in June 2001. The Commission still 
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exists today, and it is a useful forum for discussing open questions, such as suspect-
ed breaches. It can be also useful for discussing current deficiencies and interpreta-
tions, as well as possible and necessary amendment of the treaty. 
There are several relevant issues and technologies, which have either changed or 
appeared during the two and half decades after the agreement was signed. Russian 
officials have publicly said several times that the agreement no longer belongs to the 
present time, and that in their opinion it is rather a relic of the Cold War. In the next 
sections I will discuss these issues in more detail. 
The question of the uncertain future of the INF Treaty has also become a topic of 
discussion due to the fact that twice, the US has officially claimed that Russia has 
not, in its opinion, complied with the agreement. In return Russia has made its own 
accusations of US non-compliance, but has not officially answered the US’s accusa-
tions, which it claims are too vague and unspecific to warrant an answer (Sputnik 
News, 2012). 
Needs for Possible Modifications to the INF Treaty 
One can make a whole list of technologies and systems that have in some sense or 
other become either problematic or have created a need for updating the INF Trea-
ty. A list of these developments includes: 
– Greatly increased range (up to INF ranges) and payload of modern Un-
manned Combat Aerial Vehicles deployed with air-to-surface missiles, both
in reconnaissance role as well as more and more often in combat role.
– Wide proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology globally.
There is, thus, an increasing need for a definition in order to make an unam-
biguous distinction between cruise missiles and UCAVs (which often have an
automated flight mode in addition to human remote control mode).
– The INF Treaty covered all missiles of the defined ranges, whether ballistic
or cruise missile, and regardless of whether they had nuclear or conventional
warheads. This approach was adopted for verification purposes, as there
were no good ways of verifying the type of a warhead, especially not using
NTMs, which have been used after the initial ten-year-period of intrusive
verification ended.
– Difficulties in unambiguous definition of the range of cruise missiles, as this
depends on both the warhead weight and the flight profile (speed and
height). Missile tests can, and have also been conducted at less than full
range, in order not to reveal the full range capability to third parties.
– Relatively many nations now have intermediate-range missiles, both cruise
and ballistic, and some of them are also nuclear-capable. As a result of their
bilateral treaty, the US and Russia are the only two countries legally excluded
from deploying these missiles.
Another development is also relevant to the INF’s future, although it is only indi-
rectly related. This is the on-going deployment of ballistic missile defence systems. 
The consequences of the US’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty in 2001 in relation to the military balance can now be understood, and they 
are potentially serious. Several US programs for defence against ballistic missiles 
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either on land or at sea have been started and continue. Although these systems 
were originally meant for defence against Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) 
from rogue states, some of them that are already in the deployment phase are also 
effective against sea-launched ballistic missiles and possibly also some short-range 
ballistic missiles if launched close enough to the interceptor bases.  
Thus, there is at present a real and worrying possibility that parties to the INF Trea-
ty, which is meant to be of unlimited duration, might withdraw from it. According 
to Section 2, Article XV of the treaty, the parties have the right to withdraw with six 
months’ notice due to extraordinary events that jeopardize the supreme interests of 
that party. The US’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2001 under President 
George W. Bush was a dangerous precedent of this negative possibility. At the 43rd 
Munich Security Conference in February 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
publicly criticized US missile defence plans (Washington Post, 2007). Minister of 
Defence Sergei Ivanov called the INF Treaty a relic of the Cold War, while Chief of 
the General Staff General Yuri Baluyevski wrote that Russia may withdraw from the 
INF as a response to US missile defence deployment in Eastern Europe (DeBree, 
2007; Vzglyad, 2010). 
There are several reasons for this unfortunate, publicly expressed need to withdraw 
from the treaty felt by the Russians. Among these is the wide proliferation of both 
ballistic and cruise missiles into a large number of new missile-owner countries. An-
other reason is the use of INF-range UCAVs in many modern armed forces in the 
world, and most commonly by the US. However, probably the most compelling 
reason is the progress of US missile defence programs in central and Eastern Eu-
rope, which I will discuss in a later section. 
First, I will consider the two above-mentioned developments (missile proliferation 
and UCAVs) in more detail, and then I will discuss the possibilities for modifying 
the INF Treaty in such a way that it might survive the present challenges. 
Global Proliferation of Intermediate-Range Missiles  
Quite a large number of nations have presently deployed intermediate and medium-
range missiles, both cruise and ballistic. Some of them are also nuclear-capable. On-
ly the US and Russia are legally excluded from deploying them due to the INF Trea-
ty.  
The proliferation of ballistic missiles started from short-range, one-stage SCUD-B 
missiles sold to several friendly countries by the Soviet Union. This missile was re-
verse-engineered, and especially North Korea started to develop it further and build 
missiles of more than one stage. The development work was done and financed in 
cooperation with Iran and Pakistan in the 1980s. The work progressed well and the 
countries soon achieved longer-range versions with ranges varied from less than 
1,000 km to up to 2,500 km. North Korea is still further developing these medium 
and intermediate-range missiles towards intercontinental range as proven by their 
efforts to launch satellites.   
Besides the two INF countries, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) are 
presently owned also by China, India, Israel and North Korea. Medium and short-
range ballistic missiles are owned by these same countries and also by Iran, Pakistan, 
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Saudi Arabia and some dozen other countries, among them Turkey and Egypt, just 
to mention those with relevance to Russia’s southern border (Davenport, 2014). In 
addition, France and the UK have sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) of relevant 
range in their submarines, similar to what they already had when the INF Treaty was 
signed, but these are newer versions with longer ranges. France also has air-
launched cruise missiles (ALCM), but they cannot be used as an argument for with-
drawing from the INF, as they are not covered by the said treaty.  
Because the medium-range missiles in some countries can also be nuclear-armed 
(China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel), there is an obvious need for an 
international treaty to cover them, although there is very little hope of achieving one 
in the foreseeable future. Russia therefore feels that it should be allowed to have a 
military system corresponding to those of its neighbours in order to balance this. It 
is not clear which countries in particular Russia is concerned about, but it is often 
believed to be mainly China, although probably also India and Pakistan, and maybe 
the UK and France, in relation to which Russia wants to have balancing missiles. 
Russia is legally allowed, if it so wishes, to target these countries with ICBMs meant 
for strategic purposes, but that would affect its strategic balance with the US and it 
would also be expensive. Hence, Russia feels that the bilateral INF Treaty ought to 
be revised or terminated. At one point after 2008, Russia advocated globalizing the 
INF Treaty to cover all countries. It would have been an ideal arms control solution, 
but there was never really much hope in advancing that initiative, and it was soon 
forgotten.  
As a lesser of two evils, the author of this article would try to modify the INF Trea-
ty in order to save it, to allow increased deployment of cruise missiles with conven-
tional warheads, as they are not first strike weapons. A difficulty in this arrangement 
would be how to verify the nature of the payload, because identification of the type 
of the warhead would require politically difficult intrusive inspections. 
When seeking a way to respond to Russian worries regarding the imbalance of mis-
siles, one could also create new numerical limits for both ballistic and cruise missiles 
within the INF Treaty. Because of their potential for a destabilizing first strike, there 
should be very strict and low, if not zero limits for ballistic missiles especially. To be 
on the safe side, their maximum limit should be only a small fraction of the allowed 
limit of ballistic missile numbers in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 
START), which allows 700 deployed launch vehicles, in order not to disrupt the 
strategic balance. A precedent for a non-zero number could be the preliminary 
agreement before the final zero-zero solution in Reykjavik in October 1986 between 
Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev: they agreed to remove INF systems from Eu-
rope and have equal global limits of 100 INF missile warheads (Sokov, 2007). It is, 
of course, uncharacteristic for an arms control person to make such a proposal, that 
would increase the number of weapons, but if the alternative is the total abolition of 
the INF Treaty, the old Reykjavik compromise number could be acceptable as the 
lesser of two evils.  
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles 
A wide proliferation of UAV technology has also taken place globally. Earlier, there 
was no reason for confusing UAVs with cruise missiles, as the former had short 
ranges and were clearly aeroplanes, even if remotely-piloted. The need to draw a line 
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of distinction between cruise missiles and UAVs has risen due to the vehicles’ new 
combat duties along with the weapons they carry and their lengthened ranges. 
The rapid development of UAVs has extended their roles from the previous recon-
naissance, control and communication to include weapons delivery versions, 
UCAVs with more missile-like properties and heavier payloads. Glider-like recon-
naissance drones, with slow speeds and light payloads, may fly for more than 30 
hours, even several days, and their ranges may possibly exceed even intercontinental 
distances. Even the heavier and faster weapon-carrying drones can have ranges up 
to 1,000–2,000 km. Thus, their range specifications fall within the INF category of 
more than 500 km.  
Armed drones are widely deployed at present, even wider than medium-range ballis-
tic missiles. Israel was the first country to use them successfully in military opera-
tions, and hence their drones are ‘combat proven’. They became a real alternative to 
manned missions in dangerous circumstances. Nowadays, about 30 countries deploy 
armed drones in their armed forces. Also Russia has been developing at least two 
armed versions, but their operational status is not known to the author of this arti-
cle.  
The definition of a cruise missile in the INF Treaty reads as follows: 
A cruise missile is ‘an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through 
the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path’. It shall also be a weapon-
delivery vehicle, in order to be covered by the treaty (U.S. Department of State, 
1987).  
Russia claims that armed combat drones, UCAVs, fall within this definition of 
weapon-delivery cruise missiles, and hence, violate the INF Treaty. The ambiguity 
rises, as although their control stations are manned, the aerial vehicles themselves 
are unmanned. In normal mode there are two clear distinctions between UCAVs 
and missiles: UCAVs have pilots, even if they are remotely piloted from a land base, 
and secondly, UCAVs are meant to return to their base after delivering their weap-
ons, while cruise missiles are autonomous during flight, are weapons in themselves 
and are destroyed together with their warhead when they hit their target. However, 
when retroactively evaluating their distinction, this characteristic of only one-time-
use, rather than return and reuse, is not mentioned in the INF cruise missile defini-
tion, as it should have been.  
To complicate the matter further, as a back-up alongside of their remote control 
mode, UAVs often also have an autonomous mode that is needed e.g. if radio con-
trol is lost. In such case, the drone either returns to its base or could, in principle, 
also be programmed to proceed and hit some pre-set target. The autonomous mode 
would effectively make it unmanned, and it would then, in principle, behave like a 
cruise missile. In other words, there is indeed a need to clarify the definition of the 
word ‘unmanned’ in the INF cruise missile definition, or to modify the definition in 
some other way to avoid overlap between the two systems.  
Missile Range Tests 
There is another instance of vagueness in the INF definitions on missile characteris-
tics, and this is the range. According to the text of the treaty (Article VII, Section 4) 
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the range is ‘the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its stand-
ard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion’. But a cruise missile might never be 
tested in standard design mode, and still its full capabilities could be calculated and 
trusted. The range, as is well known, depends on the weight of the warhead, the 
flight height and velocity profile, as well as the amount of fuel that is carried. A con-
ventional warhead in missiles is usually somewhat heavier than a nuclear warhead, 
typically, say, for instance 500–800 kg for a conventional warhead and 400–500 kg 
for a nuclear warhead. Hence, a missile that has been tested to its full range with a 
conventional warhead, perhaps less than 500 km in compliance with INF limits, will 
fly longer with a lighter nuclear payload, and may well exceed the 500 km limit, even 
if never tested for that range. This vagueness creates suspicion especially regarding 
the cruise missiles, the range of which is close to the INF lower limit of 500 km. 
They are often dual-capable, but can be tested with any desired payload and fuel 
weight. For this reason, it would be helpful in clearing up any suspicion, if the 
amount of payload and fuel used in a test would be standardized, or alternatively, 
declared to the other party of the treaty. A similar solution should be found for bal-
listic missiles, which can have a variable number of multiple warheads, as they have 
also aroused suspicion as to the operational payload weight and range. 
Relevance of Ballistic Missile Defence to the INF 
The topic of Ballistic Missile Defence is more comprehensively covered by Götz 
Neuneck’s article in this volume. The present section deals mainly with issues that 
have relevance to the INF Treaty. 
Russia has reacted strongly to all different US ballistic missile defence programs, 
regardless of their name and mode of deployment. President Putin said publicly in a 
speech in 2007 that Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) could start a new arms race, 
and Russians have later spoken of withdrawing from the INF Treaty as a result 
(Putin, V. 2007; Luhn, A. and Borger, J. 2014; Vzglyad 2010; Dyer, G. 2016). 
In a sense, the situation resembles that of the heated arguments that took place dur-
ing President Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) after 1983. Russia feels 
that the US is deploying and bringing theatre missile defence systems called Europe-
an Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to areas in Europe and adjacent sea areas, 
that Russia thinks are situated in such a way that they can also have capability 
against Russian strategic ICBM missiles. The US claims that the speed and other 
properties of these interceptors are not sufficient for reaching ICBMs, although they 
could be effective against some shorter range SLBMs. Whether these claims are jus-
tified or not is a matter for more detailed consideration. I will discuss this briefly 
later on in this article. At present, I just want to note the nature and existence of 
these opposite claims. 
Ballistic Missile Defence is not an issue that would be explicitly relevant to the INF 
Treaty. The INF definitions do not directly cover BMD interceptors, because they 
are not weapon-delivery vehicles, as missiles are defined in the INF Treaty. Inter-
ceptors have kinetic warheads, that destroy their target by direct hit like a bullet, 
rather than explosive warheads. Interceptors are also not useful against land targets, 
but they are rather analogous to surface-to-air missiles with mobile airborne or 
space targets. Therefore, they are excluded by Article VII, Section 3 of the treaty 
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(U.S. Department of State, 1987). Theoretically, the range of the interceptor mis-
siles, if they follow ballistic trajectories without hitting any target on the way, does 
exceed the lower limit of the INF Treaty range 500 km, but still the text of the trea-
ty explicitly excludes them. 
The US claim that their European-based missile defence interceptors are relatively 
limited in number, as they are only meant for action against the few missiles of 
rogue states like Iran. However, there is suspicion as to whether they might also be 
effective against some short-range ballistic missiles when deployed close enough to 
Western Russia. The European-based missile defence interceptors are altogether too 
few and slow to be effective against the large numbers of Russian strategic missiles, 
and not even numerous enough against the smaller numbers of missiles that might 
constitute a second ICBM strike. They are also ineffective against cruise missiles due 
to their low flight profiles. Calculating the real effectivity of interceptors is a compli-
cated task. It must be done based on publicly unknown parameters, and besides lo-
cation distance between the missiles and the interceptor bases, it also depends on 
the optimal direction of tracking radar beams, as well as on possible evasive 
manoeuver capability of the missiles.  
Next, I will look in more detail at the US’s claim that its interceptor missiles (SM-3) 
are not fast enough to have capability against intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
which are considerably faster and therefore much harder to hit than intermediate 
and short-range missiles, and against which the US system in Europe could possibly 
be used. The US’s claim is true at least regarding the early SM-3 version Block I in-
terceptors, the maximum velocity of which is 10 Mach, but this may change with the 
deployment of Block IIA with velocity up to 15 Mach. Even more developed inter-
ceptors of Block IIB with even higher anticipated velocities, presumably 17–18 
Mach, originally due after 2020/2022 were cancelled in 2013. They were presumably 
supposed to be able to catch up with even ICBMs, if these were flying over or close 
enough to Block IIB interceptor launchers, as would have been the case if launched 
towards the US from Iran. Russian ICBM routes towards the US fly further north 
from the planned interceptor land bases. The potential capability of Block IIB 
against ICBMs may have weighed decisively in the decision to cancel them. There is 
disagreement concerning the case of Block IIA capability (RT News, 2013; Pike, 
2011; Reif, 2013).  
The originally planned land positions of the European-based BMD system (later 
called EPAA), were to include interceptors and radar installations in several differ-
ent places. A radar is now situated in Turkey and a Romanian interceptor base be-
came operational in 2015, but interceptor bases in Eastern Europe, e.g. in Poland 
and the Czech Republic have been delayed. The land-based positioning was strongly 
opposed by Russia, as the interceptor missiles were to be situated relatively close to 
Russia’s Western borders. In 2009, the US decided that the interceptor launcher part 
of the system was to be transferred from the land bases to Aegis cruisers and de-
stroyers at sea, with their base harbour in Rota, Spain. The seaborne Mk 41 launch-
ers, which are capable of launching both BMD SM-3 interceptors and notably also 
Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM), were not (yet then) a problem on ships from 
the INF perspective, as the treaty allows SLCMs and their launchers at sea. Original-
ly, Russia agreed to this sea-based arrangement. It even planned to cancel some 
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short-range missile deployments in Western Russia near Poland, but then later start-
ed to oppose this variation also (Barnes and Stack, 2009; Sputnik News, 2012). 
The Aegis launchers on the cruisers were to be deployed also on land already in 
2015 in Romania and later in Poland in 2018. They are called Aegis Ashore systems. 
This created serious controversy because the Aegis launcher, the Mk-41 vertical 
launching system, can be used to launch both narrow interceptor Standard Missiles 
(Block I, diameter 13.5 inches), as well as Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (diameter 
20.4 inches). Legally, this was allowed under the INF as long as the launcher was at 
sea, but the treaty forbids deploying cruise missiles and their launchers on land. If 
launched from a land base, SLCMs would in practice, if not in name, become 
Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) and these are forbidden by the INF 
(RT News, 2014). Thus, the Russian claim of treaty infringement seems to be appar-
ent in the case of the Aegis Ashore deployment, unless the Mk-41 launcher is modi-
fied in the Ashore version in such a way as not to be able to launch cruise missiles. 
There are indications and US claims of such changes to software or electronics be-
tween the Mk-41 launchers at sea and ashore, but how can one prove this to the 
other party, when there are no observable external differences and not enough 
transparency and trust (Fieldhouse, 2016)? 
The problem becomes even more difficult to solve when the narrow 13.5 inch di-
ameter SM-3 Block I missiles are upgraded with Block II missiles, which are faster 
and have the same 21 inch diameter as the SLCM. Russia is especially worried that 
Block IIa missiles are to be deployed in Poland, as is planned for the end of 2018, 
even though the even more advanced deployment of Block IIb has been cancelled. 
Poland would seem an optimal site for launchers against any missiles launched from 
Kaliningrad, and so Russian nervousness can be understood, as Russians have sev-
eral times during heightened tensions threatened to deploy highly accurate and ef-
fective, but relatively slow and short-range Iskander (both ballistic and cruise) mis-
siles there. A local arms race threatens to take place in the areas of Poland and Kali-
ningrad after 2018 (Blomfield, 2007; Pike, 2016). 
A possible approach to this problematic issue could be not to make the interceptor 
upgrade of the Aegis Ashore from Block I to the wider Block IIa missiles, and at the 
same time modify the Mk 41 launchers in such an externally observable way, that 
they would not be wide enough to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles (perhaps by 
adding some kind of calibre-restricting plate to the present launcher). This way the 
US would still convincingly abide by the INF Treaty. 
When searching for a reason for the strong Russian opposition to Western ballistic 
missile defence programs, one can find several kinds of explanations: including 
technical, military and political ones. One sceptical view is that Russia might just be 
using the BMD-issue as an excuse to justify its own wishes to make exceptions to 
the paragraphs of the INF Treaty, or to withdraw from the whole INF Treaty com-
pletely. This is indicated by Russia’s own advanced missile research and develop-
ment, pointing to deployment in a possible post-INF period. Militarily, they might 
want to balance China and other Asian countries, but publicly they are worried 
about their forward base in Kaliningrad and the effectiveness of their short-range 
ballistic (Iskander) missiles that are deployed there at least temporarily, but perhaps 
more permanently in case of the deployment of the Polish Aegis Ashore base in late 
2018. Even if the Iskanders only were to have conventional warheads, a kind of lo-
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cal arms race still looms, since some of those Kaliningrad-based missiles are be-
lieved to target the future US missile defence systems in Poland and the ships in the 
Baltic Sea (Blomfield, 2007; The Guardian, 2008; Isachenkov, 2015; Osborne 2016). 
Suspected Violations of the Existing INF Treaty 
Both parties of the INF Treaty have suspected and accused the other of breaching 
the treaty. The main Russian accusations have been discussed already earlier. These 
were the claims that armed long-range UCAVs should, in fact, be included in the 
treaty covering cruise missiles, and that the deployment of the normally sea-based 
Aegis launcher MK-41 on land, as the so-called Aegis Ashore, is forbidden, as it can 
also launch SLCM cruise missiles alongside of the intended SM-3 interceptors. 
These two accusations are serious, and they should be effectively dealt with and 
cleared up. The first-mentioned problem could be solved just by amending and clar-
ifying the text of the treaty, and so it should not be too hard to solve. The second is 
more difficult and also more important. There have also been other Russian claims 
of American INF missiles being used as BMD target missiles. This was mentioned 
in the speech of foreign minister Sergei Lavrov at the Munich Security Conference 
in 2015 (Lavrov, 2015), but does not seem to be equally serious to the other two 
previously mentioned problems. This is because intermediate-range target missiles 
are, in fact, allowed to be used to a limited extent by the original treaty.  
The US, on the other hand, has claimed that Russia has been developing ground-
launched cruise missiles of longer range than 500 km. Possible such missiles are the 
one called R-500 or another called SSC-X-8, although these may not have been test-
ed in a way that violates the treaty (the public information is too scarce to say) and 
are not deployed yet (Marcus, J 2014; Kristensen, H.M. 2014). 
Since the intrusive INF verification regime no longer exists, it is hard to obtain de-
tailed and reliable evidence of any suspected violations. Russia has asked the US to 
present such evidence, but the case has not progressed for two years. Possibly be-
cause the US is unwilling to risk information sources by revealing details. 
One aspect that also creates suspicion is the vague definition of the cruise missile 
range as previously discussed in this article. A cruise missile is allowed according to 
the treaty, if tested under the 500 km range, but it could still reliably fly much fur-
ther than tested. The R-500 cruise missile could possibly be one such case. It can be 
launched from the Iskander launcher and is probably similar to the Iskander-K 
cruise missile (Russian name 9M723K or 9M278), whose range is below 500 km in 
its regular configuration. But who knows how much further it is capable of flying, if 
some of the payload weight is replaced by additional fuel. And if a new type of long-
range cruise missile has not been tested in a configuration capable of range longer 
than 500 km, or a test has been interrupted before that flight distance, is there legal-
ly any violation (Woolf, 2016)? Another possibility is that Russia plans to modify 
existing treaty-allowed air- or sea-launched cruise missiles into a land-based version.  
There has also been suspicion that Russia may have developed a new intermediate-
range ballistic missile, but this suspicion seems to be without proper legal founda-
tion. There is indeed a new missile, the RS-26 Rubezh, but it has already been tested 
for 6,000 km range, and it is therefore an ICBM, and not an IRBM, even if it seems 
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to have been optimized for shorter ranges of some 2,000 km in later tests, possibly 
by increasing its number of warheads and, thus, also its payload. But in any case, this 
missile is counted as an ICBM and, hence, included in the New START treaty limits. 
So it would not be a problem from the INF point of view (Woolf, 2016). 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
When looking back from a longer perspective, it is evident that the exceptionally 
positive atmosphere after 1985 that led to the bilateral INF Treaty was quite unique. 
At present, such an agreement would be next to impossible to achieve, and even the 
future validity of the present treaty has been seriously questioned.  
In order to try to save the existing INF Treaty at least in some format, so that it 
could still fulfil its original purpose of restraining the nuclear arms race, further bi-
lateral US - Russia negotiations for amending the treaty are obviously quickly need-
ed. The Special Verification Commission has dealt with the previously mentioned 
suspected breaches in its meetings but unfortunately without result. Alongside of 
their suspicions, they should also deal with the following open issues, the most ur-
gent of which are listed first: 
– US deployment of the Aegis Ashore systems in Romania, with the apparent
capability of also launching the SLCM, and similar future deployment in Po-
land in 2018. If Aegis Ashore deployment is continued, it should be modified
externally in such a way as to demonstrate to the other party by means of
functionally related observable differences (e.g. tube calibre), that the Mk-41
launcher cannot launch SLCMs of INF range. If necessary, this controversy
should be verified through exceptional on-site inspection by observers. The
author of this article is afraid that one of the key points that will determine
the validity of the INF Treaty in the future is the positioning of the Aegis
Ashore system in Poland in late 2018.
– There is another controversy concerning the ranges of R-500/SSC-X-8 and
other possible new ground-launched cruise missiles being developed in Rus-
sia. The issue has been dealt with twice in the Special Consultative Commis-
sion with no result. There is a lack of hard evidence on how the development
tests were performed. It may sound like a naive hope, but as the Special Veri-
fication Commission has not progressed in the issue of the testing of a new
cruise missile, new evidence for or against is needed, and hence, a temporary
return to just a few limited and specific on-site inspections is recommended.
These inspections would balance each other, as both parties need to clear up
their suspicions on Aegis Ashore on the one hand, and on the cruise missile
on the other.
There are also other mutual suspicions regarding breaches of the treaty, but these do 
not seem to be as serious as the two problems discussed above. They seem more 
like legal excuses that are presented when one wants to argue and justify one’s point 
in several different ways. 
– Bilateral updating of the existing treaty should eventually include how the
treaty considers UCAV combat drones, whether they should either be con-
sidered or excluded from the agreement. Negotiations should also make the
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definition of cruise missile-range less ambiguous, either by standardizing the 
test flight payload, and/or informing the other party of the weight of the 
payload and amount of fuel used in testing the missile. 
There are several difficult issues to negotiate, and very little time before the end of 
2018. However, if the negotiations are started quickly and proceed efficiently, there 
may still be enough time to prepare at least the most urgent amendments. Even 
starting discussions and negotiations on updating the INF Treaty would help to 
clear away suspicion and promote understanding and would be an achievement with 
its own merits. But if the parties do not even try to discuss with and understand 
each other, we may lose the most successful nuclear arms control treaty in history.  
References 
Barnes, J.E. and Stack, M.K. (2009). 'Russia's Putin praises Obama's missile defense deci-
sion' Los Angeles Times, 19 Sept. [online] Available at:<http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2009/sep/19/world/fg-missile-defense19>
Blomfield, A. (2007). 'Russia piles pressure on EU over missile shield', The Telegraph, 15 
Nov. [online] Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1569495/ 
Russia-piles-pressure-on-EU-over-missile-shield.html>                                                                    
Davenport, K. and (update) Starosciak, B. (eds.) (2014). 'Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inven-
tories', Arms Control Association, July. [online] Available at: <https://www.armscontrol.org/ 
factsheets/missiles>
DeBree, D.R. (2007). 'Two birds with one stone' Boston University, The ISCIP Analyst, Armed 
Forces (External) Volume XIII Number 9, 8 March. [online] Available at: <https:// 
www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol13/ed1309.html>
Dyer, G. (2016). 'US accuses Russia of dismantling security agreements', Financial Times, 30 
March. [online] Available at:<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/943a8ae0-f62e-11e5-803c-
d27c7117d132.html#ixzz48uSM9JPT> 
Fieldhouse, R.W. (2016). 'INF Treaty Impasse: Time for Russian Action', Arms Control As-
sociation, Jan/Feb. [online] Available at: <https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_0102/ 
Features/INF-Treaty-Impasse-Time-for-Russian-Action>
The Guardian (2008). 'Russia to deploy missiles on EU border', 5 Nov. [online] Available at: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/05/russia-missiles>
Isachenkov, V. (2015). 'Russia is putting state-of-the art missiles in its westernmost Baltic 
exclave', Business Insider, 18 March. [online] Available at: <http://www.business-
insider.com/russia-placing-state-of-the-art-missiles-in-kaliningrad-2015-
3?r=US&IR=T&IR=T>
Kimball, D. and Reif, K. (eds 2014). 'The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 
at a Glance', Arms Control Association, 23 May. [online] Available at: <https://www. arm-
scontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty>
Kristensen, H.M. (2014). 'Russia Declared in Violation Of INF Treaty: New Cruise Missile 
May Be Deploying' Federation of American Scientists blog, 30 July. [online] Available at: 
<http://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/07/russia-inf/>                                                                                  
Lavrov, S. (2015). 'Speech by Sergey Lavrov at the 51st Munich Security Conference', Vol-
taire Network, 7 Feb. [online] Available at: <http://www.voltairenet.org/article 
186844.html>
110 
Luhn, A. and Borger, J. (2014). 'Moscow may walk out of nuclear treaty after US accusa-
tions of breach', The Guardian, 29 July. [online] Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com 
/world/2014/jul/29/moscow-russia-violated-cold-war-nuclear-treaty-iskander-r500-
missile-test-us>
Marcus, J. (2014). 'US briefs NATO on Russian 'nuclear treaty breach', BBC News, 30 Jan. 
[online] Available at: <www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-25964387> 
Medvedev, D. (2008). 'Address to the Federal Assembly of Russian Federation', President of 
Russia, Transcripts, 5 Nov. [online] Available at: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ 
transcripts/by-date/05.11.2008>
Osborne, A. (2016). 'Russia seen putting new nuclear-capable missiles along NATO border 
by 2019', Reuters, 23 June. [online] Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
russia-europe-shield-idUSKCN0Z90WT>
Pike, J. (ed.) (2011). 'RIM-161 SM-3 Upgrades', GlobalSecurity.org, 21 July. [online] Available 
at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sm3-upgrades.htm> 
Pike, J. (ed.) (2016). '9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone)', GlobalSecurity.org, 1 April. [online] 
Available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/ss-26.htm> 
Putin, V. (2007). 'Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy', 
The Washington Post, 12 Feb. [online] Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html>                                                                        
Reif, K. (ed. 2013). 'The European Phased Adaptive Approach at a Glance, Arms Control 
Association, 1 May. [online] Available at: <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ 
Phasedadaptiveapproach>
RT News (2013). 'US drops key European missile defense component', 16 Mar. [online] 
Available at: <https://www.rt.com/news/us-cancels-missile-interceptors-350/> 
RT News (2014). 'Russia: US claims on nuclear missiles treaty unfounded, we have ques-
tions too', 30 July. [online] Available at: <https://www.rt.com/news/176812-russia-
missile-treaty-response/> 
Savranskaya, S. and Blanton, T. (eds. 2007). 'The INF Treaty and the Washington Summit: 
20 Years Later', The National Security Archive, Briefing Book No. 238, 10 Dec. [online] Avail-
able at: <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB238/>
Sokov, N. (2007). 'Reykjavik Summit: The Legacy and a Lesson for the Future', Nuclear 
Threat Initiative, 1 Dec. [online] Available at: <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/ reykja-
vik-summit-legacy/>
Sputnik News (2012). ‘Russia will “React Sharply” to US Aegis Ships - Deputy PM’, 12 Nov. 
[online] Available at: <http://sputniknews.com/military/20121112/177392816.html> 
U.S.Department of State (1987). 'Treaty Between The United States Of America And The 
Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range 
And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)', 8 Dec. [online] Available at:<http://www.state. 
gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm> 
U.S. Department of State (2016). '2016 Report on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms 
Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments', 11 April. 
[online] Available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2016/255651.htm #INF%20 
TREATY> 
Vzglyad (2010). 'Source: Treaty of INF missiles may in future be annulled' (in Russian), 17 
Feb. [online] Available at: <http://vz.ru/news/2010/2/17/376817.html> 
111 
Woolf, A.F. (2016). 'Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress', Congressional Research Service, 13 April.  
112 
113 
6 
Conventional Arms Control in Europe and Its Current 
Challenges 
Tommi Koivula6 
Abstract 
he goals of this article are three-fold: first, the aim is to discuss the nature of 
conventional weapons in Europe, on the one hand as an ambiguous concept 
that defies any precise definition, but on the other hand as a crucial political, 
economic, security and even social, industrial and environmental issue. Secondly, the 
article seeks to provide with an overview of the existing arms control regimes on 
conventional weapons with emphasis on European security focusing in particular on 
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the Treaty on 
Open Skies and the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security-Building 
Measures. Finally, the idea is to raise some of the most pressing issues and future 
challenges related to conventional weapons, which are apt to affect the general arms 
control agenda and to bring in challenging new questions. Here, specific attention is 
paid to some of the ongoing and emerging technological developments, such as the 
gradual blurring of distinctions between weapons of mass destruction, conventional 
weapons and the autonomous weapons systems. 
Introduction 
Due to its history of technological prowess and intense great power competition, 
Europe has in the course of centuries seen the unfolding of some of the bloodiest 
conflicts known to mankind. However, Europe has also been the stage of the dens-
est framework of rules, procedures and institutions for conflict prevention and crisis 
management on Earth.  
As of 2017, Europe faces an erosion of the existing arms control institutions against 
the background of deteriorating relations between Russia and the West. Despite the 
detailed web of legally binding treaties, numerous political agreements and other 
security instruments in place, a political crisis escalated into major armed conflict in 
Ukraine in the space of only a few months in 2014. However, the Ukrainian crisis 
represents only the most manifest expression of the worsening Russia-West rela-
tions, the start of which can be traced in some cases back to the early 1990s. Then 
again, the political crisis of the past few years should not divert one’s attention from 
6 Tommi Koivula, D.Soc.Sc, Adjunct Professor, Senior Researcher at the Finnish National Defence Universi-
ty, Department of Warfare. 
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the more subtle and long-term developments taking place within technology and 
military-strategic thinking, which also affect the landscape of contemporary arms 
control efforts.  
This article seeks to provide with an overview of the existing institutions on conven-
tional weapons in Europe and to describe the most pressing current issues and chal-
lenges of conventional arms control with a particular emphasis on European securi-
ty. First, the idea is to build an understanding on the topic of conventional weapons: 
what they are and how their exact definition, especially in relation to weapons of 
mass destruction, is becoming increasingly difficult due to developments in modern 
weapons technology. After that, the article proceeds to discuss the contemporary 
state of regimes on conventional weapons in Europe. Thereafter, attention is paid to 
some of the most pressing current and emerging issues and challenges facing Euro-
pean conventional arms control efforts. Finally, a few concluding remarks will be 
offered.  
Like many articles in this volume, this text cannot provide with an exhaustive dis-
cussion on the many relevant topics that would deserve such scrutiny. Instead, its 
goal is to provide the reader perhaps not yet familiar with this fascinating and evolv-
ing, and yet vast and challenging topic, with some ideas about the institutional 
framework and the most relevant contemporary and emerging issues on arms con-
trol and conventional weapons and to invite him/her to inquire more.  
(The Cumbersome) Definition of Conventional Weapons 
Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have dominated the arms control agenda 
since the advent of the nuclear bomb. Nevertheless, most often it is the convention-
al weapons that fuel conflict, foster regional instability, abet violations of the UN 
Security Council arms embargoes and undermine efforts to promote socioeconomic 
development. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the human suffering related 
to conflicts both in Europe and beyond is caused by no other than conventional 
weapons. 
Then again, the scale of the issue at hand is nothing else but huge by any measure. 
According to the World Bank statistics, in 2014 European and Central Asian coun-
tries – excluding the U.S. and Canada – totaled roughly 4,9 million armed forces 
personnel, possessing millions of pieces of personal weapons such as small arms and 
light weapons; tens of thousands of heavy or crew served weapons, including artil-
lery pieces, armored combat vehicles, combat helicopters, combat aircraft and war-
ships; and unknown numbers of other related equipment, including munitions and 
ammunition (World Bank, 2017). In terms of military expenditure, Europe, Russia 
included, spent in 2015 approximately 328 billion US$ on defence, out of global 
1663 billion US$. The figure excludes North America’s 611 billion US$ in defence 
spending according to SIPRI military expenditure figures (SIPRI, 2016). Naturally, 
these figures are in many respects only estimates and it should be noted that weap-
ons of mass destruction take a sizable part of those countries’ defence spending that 
possess them. Nevertheless, the overall amount of money and personnel invested in 
conventional forces and conventional armaments in Europe remains vast, making 
questions of regional conventional arms control a crucial political, economic, securi-
ty and even social, industrial and environmental issue. 
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At the same time, their prevalence and their extremely wide range render conven-
tional weapons a somewhat vague concept, which is almost too general to be even 
defined. This difficulty is reflected in academic literature too. A ‘conventional’ wis-
dom of the past decades since the end of the World War II has been to define con-
ventional weapons simply as weapons that are not regarded as weapons of mass 
destruction – that is nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons (Evans 
and Newnham, 1998, p. 97). Correct as such definition may be it nevertheless does 
not shed much light to the specific nature of conventional weapons.  
Another relatively common definition of conventional weapons follows more the 
logic of natural sciences. According to it, in conventional weapons, the explosive 
material is something that can undergo some chemical reaction, which proceeds 
extremely quickly and releases a lot of energy. Basically, it can ‘burn’ so fast that it 
explodes. The first explosive material used in weapons was gunpowder, but nowa-
days more powerful explosives like TNT and RDX are used. Then again, a nuclear 
weapon is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear rather 
than chemical reactions, releasing about a million times more energy than does a 
chemical reaction (Nuclear Environmental Threat Education, 2017). However, 
while this definition helps to clarify the distinction between conventional and nucle-
ar weapons, it does not cover the entire field of conventional armaments, as the 
more rudimentary and often improvised armaments that do not rely on chemical 
processes to function but that are still occasionally used in conflicts, such as sticks, 
knives or booby traps not incorporating explosives, can also be regarded as ‘conven-
tional’. On the other hand, the more recent documents and literature, such as the 
USA Joint Operational Access Concept of 2012, tend to regard spheres of cyber, 
information, or electromagnetic spectrum as independent domains comparable to 
WMDs and conventional weapons with their own particular qualities (Department 
of Defense, 2012, p. 11).   
Nevertheless, the advent of weapons of mass destruction has certainly not reduced 
the scope for conventional weapons. Indeed, it has been pointed out that the re-
verse may well be true, namely that the drawbacks and difficulties of actually using 
weapons of mass destruction have enhanced the importance of the threshold be-
tween weapons of mass destruction and conventional ones (Evans and Newnham, 
1998, p. 97).  
In fact, the relationship between conventional weapons and other weapon types can 
be described as dynamic and as something constantly evolving. For example, in a 
wider picture of contemporary military power calculations, assessments related to 
conventional weapons and WMDs seem to intertwine in several respects. Technical-
ly, a number of ongoing developments seem to suggest a partial convergence be-
tween weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. On the one hand, 
the destructive yield of some conventional weapons seems to approach the destruc-
tiveness of the WMDs. A case in point is the renewed interest in the so-called bun-
ker-busters, bombs that are designed to penetrate hardened targets or targets buried 
deep underground. Simultaneously, the more sophisticated nuclear weapons have 
more and more qualities of large conventional bombs, such as limited destructive 
range connected with a more accurate guidance system, potentially lowering the 
threshold of their use. On the other hand, while the post-Cold War era in Europe 
has seen substantial decreases in the strength of the armed forces both in terms of 
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personnel and equipment, a parallel course of development has been the willingness 
by states to project the effects of the existing weaponry further, more rapidly and 
more accurately. As a consequence, while numbers may have decreased, the overall 
yield and destructive potential of in particular modern conventional weapons sys-
tems, such as cruise and ballistic missiles, increases.  
A third example of the narrowing gap between conventional weapons and WMDs 
in contemporary military-strategic thinking is that they are often weighted together 
in political and military-strategic assessments. For some states, the development of 
WMDs can provide a way to offset their inferiority in conventional armaments 
compared to stronger regional rivals (Wirtz, 2016, p. 295). This is reflected in Euro-
pean security due to the fact that any progress towards deep cuts in Russian and the 
U.S.’ strategic arms depends, in part, on resolving perceived conventional threat 
imbalances (Govan, 2015, p. 1). During the recent years, Russia in particular has 
emphasized the role of short-range nuclear missiles, both as a way to compensate 
the imbalance of conventional forces between Russia and NATO member states 
after the end of the Cold War, and as a way to create political and psychological 
pressure.  
Then again, there are differences in the way nations perceive the link between the 
conventional and the nuclear fields. NATO member states regard nuclear arms to 
be weapons of deterrence, implying almost an existential difference between nuclear 
and conventional armament. NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept explicitly states this in 
Article 17: ‘The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to 
be contemplated are extremely remote’. On the other hand, in the Russian percep-
tion, the use of nonstrategic nuclear arms – those that could be used on the battle-
field instead of against strategic assets in the homeland of the adversary – would be 
dependent on the needs of a given conflict situation. Such differences may lead to 
different views on the potential use of conventional weapons and the way one ap-
proaches arms control in general (Kleinjan, 2016, pp. 22–23). 
A related issue, again blurring the distinction between a conventional conflict and a 
conflict involving WMDs, is that of the increased escalation risk in contemporary 
conflicts. While in particular the great powers, the United States and Russia, expand 
their strategic postures and operational concepts to include conventional, space, 
cyber, and nuclear forces, there is greater need to look across these domains and 
functional capabilities in order to fully be able to analyze the involved potential for 
unintended consequences. For instance, a particular cyber or space operation could 
have an impact on the adversary’s conventional or nuclear capabilities. However, a 
particular operation intended to strip away the adversary’s intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance capabilities could have an impact in the adversary’s ability to 
gauge the operation’s limited aims, thereby potentially escalating the conflict in ways 
that are difficult to assess (Manzo and Miles, 2016, p. 11).   
Conventional Weapons in Arms Control 
Throughout history, technological advances have always created asymmetries that 
could be exploited in warfare. At the outset, rapid technological advances usually 
favor the attacker, with defensive counter-measures lagging behind. As the pace of 
technological change accelerates, regional or global balances of power could be radi-
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cally transformed possibly even by seemingly small innovations such as a simple 
software update (Kaspersen, 2016).  
Arms control regimes, be they on WMDs or conventional weapons, do not exist in 
isolation but reflect their respective and often quite volatile political and technologi-
cal environments. Therefore, when assessing arms control one should regard it as a 
process that needs constant maintenance and updates. It should be viewed as a 
means to an end rather than an end goal in itself.  
However, the enforcement of arms control agreements is notoriously difficult. Most 
agreements, conventional or not, rely on the continued desire of the participants to 
abide by the terms in order for the agreements to remain effective. Usually, when a 
nation no longer desires to abide by the terms of a given arms control treaty, it tends 
to either covertly circumvent its terms or to simply end its participation in the treaty. 
Historically speaking this has been relatively easy in the absence of any supranational 
authority regulating interstate relations.   
For a long time, the international community has attempted to govern and limit the 
range of accepted weaponry in interstate and intra-state warfare. Even though some 
of these efforts date back to the times of the Antiquity and the Middle Ages, it was 
the Industrial Revolution with the increasing mechanization of warfare, as well as 
the rapid advances in the development of firearms that have led to more ambitious 
and systematic arms control efforts since the late 1800s. Principal among these were 
the Hague Peace Conferences (1899 and 1907), the Washington Naval Conference 
(1921–1922) and the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiat-
ing, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, usually 
simply called the Geneva Protocol of 1925. In addition, international organizations 
such as the League of Nations and the United Nations have made repeated efforts 
to limit the amounts of arms and regulate their qualities.  
Notwithstanding the achievements of these historical arms control treaties, one can 
start the discussion on the relevant contemporary conventional weapons regimes 
from the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Con-
ventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have 
Indiscriminate Effects; in effect, the so-called Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (CCW Convention) or ‘Inhumane Weapons’ Convention. It was signed in 
1981 and entered into force in 1983. As of 2017, 121 states worldwide are parties to 
the convention with a further five having signed but not yet ratified (The United 
Nations Office at Geneva, 2017). 
The CCW Convention has been built upon customary rules that regulate the con-
duct of hostilities, including the rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution 
in attacks, and the prohibition of weapons, which inflict gratuitous injury or suffer-
ing on combatants. As its title indicates, the purpose of the convention is to ban or 
restrict the use of specific types of weapons that are considered to cause unneces-
sary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately. 
The CCW consists of a general chapeau convention and a number of more specific 
annexed protocols. The protocols deal with Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol 
I), Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other De-
vices (Protocol II), Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons 
(Protocol III) and, of more recent origin, on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) 
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and explosive remnants of war (Protocol V). The CCW structure was adopted in 
this manner to ensure a flexible way to respond to new developments in weapons 
technologies. 
As said, the convention itself contains only general provisions. All prohibitions or 
restrictions on the use of specific weapons or weapon systems are the object of sep-
arate protocols annexed to the convention. However, the scope of application of the 
Convention and its annexed Protocols has been expanded to cover not only situa-
tions of international armed conflict but non-international armed conflict as well 
(Final Document of the Fifth Review Conference, 2016). 
While its scope is quite limited, the CCW Convention is among the most commonly 
ratified and least disputed arms control regimes from the European perspective: 
with a few minor exceptions regarding above all Protocols II and V, all European 
countries have ratified the entire convention. Yet, two considerations should be 
mentioned while discussing the CCW Convention. First, deliberations at the CCW 
have a reputation of being slow and prone to failure. A case in point here was the 
Protocol II on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices, which failed to 
adequately address the widespread humanitarian concerns related to anti-personnel 
land mines and to their indiscriminate use in various armed conflicts, leading to the 
1997 Ottawa Treaty, which finally was agreed upon outside the CCW framework. 
Another case is the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, also created outside the 
CCW, which still (as of 2017) remains the only international instrument that specifi-
cally regulates these weapons due to CCW failure of 2011 to produce an outcome 
about them (Sauer, 2016, p. 10).  
Secondly, it should be noted that the weapon types that it regulates remain, at least 
until thus far, relatively marginal within the European countries’ inventories. How-
ever, in recent years the CCW regime has sought to cover new and emerging arms 
control issues, which are potentially important also for European security. Principal 
among these recent openings are discussions on the so-called autonomous weapons 
systems, such as Lethal Autonomous Weapons, LAWs, which will be discussed in 
more detail in Johanna Friman’s article in this volume (Fifth Review Conference of 
the High Contracting Parties, Final Document, 2016, p. 7).  
The European Conventional Arms Control Landscape 
A Peculiar Continent 
Leaving aside the global considerations related to the CCW Convention, Europe has 
historically been a scene of a dense network of regional conventional arms control 
treaties. The background for this European trait can be located to post-Second 
World War setting that lasted until the early 1990s. That time, the questions of Eu-
ropean security were seen as relevant for global security as the era was characterized 
by a protracted military presence on the continent by two essentially non-European 
powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, thereby adding pressure for region-
al stability arrangements and mechanisms. 
After the end of the Cold War, ‘cooperative security’, a commitment to regulate the 
size, technical composition, investment patterns, and operational practices of all 
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military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit gained priority as the frame-
work for European security and arms control (Carter, 1992, p. 6).  
This notion of cooperative security was on the background of the edifice of conven-
tional arms control instruments that was created at the end of the Cold War era or 
soon after that in Europe. It consisted of three main pillars: the Vienna Document 
on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, established in 1990; the Conven-
tional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which entered into force in 1992; and 
the Open Skies Treaty, which entered into force in 2002 (Kleinjan, 2016, p. 22).  
At their peak, these agreements constituted an integrated system of arms control 
and confidence- and security-building measures. During the post-Cold War era, 
many of these conventions were intertwined with the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), initially created as a forum for East-West dialogue. 
Among other things, the OSCE has been the forum for the annual exchange of in-
formation under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. The OSCE has also 
implemented an additional exchange of information in the framework of the Vienna 
Document. 
As of early 2017, however, a rather curious situation prevails regarding the conven-
tional arms control in Europe: the developments since the early 2000s in Russia’s 
relations with NATO and the EU member states have led to the situation where 
most elements of the European arms control regime are either violated or outdated, 
even though they may be formally still in force.  
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) 
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) is undoubtedly 
one of the most ambitious and significant arms control regimes in the history of 
Europe.  
The Treaty was inspired by the willingness to eliminate force disparities, capability 
for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations as well as the need to estab-
lish an effective verification system in the Cold War Europe. However, systematic 
efforts to reach such a Treaty were not initiated between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact until the concluding stages of the Cold War. Nevertheless, in 1990 the CFE 
Treaty was signed in Paris by 16 NATO countries and six members of the Warsaw 
Pact, with unlimited duration and setting equal ceilings for each bloc on key catego-
ries of conventional armaments, with tanks, combat armored vehicles, artillery, as-
sault helicopters and combat aircraft among them. For instance, under the original 
CFE Treaty, after the reduction phase ending in 1995, each bloc was supposed to 
have no more than 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles or 20,000 heavy 
artillery pieces in the Treaty’s area of application (Arms Control Association, 2012).   
The CFE Treaty was designed to prevent either alliance from amassing forces for a 
blitzkrieg-type offensive, which could have triggered the use of nuclear weapons in 
response. Although the threat of such an offensive all but disappeared with the end 
of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, member states have re-
peatedly touted the enduring value of the Treaty’s weapons limits and inspection 
regime, which provides an unprecedented degree of transparency on military hold-
ings (Arms Control Association, 2012).  
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The CFE’s application area includes the territory of all member states from the At-
lantic to the Ural Mountains. In practical terms, the CFE Treaty led to concrete re-
sults by destroying tens of thousands of pieces of military equipment. The Treaty 
included also unprecedented provisions for detailed information exchanges, on-site 
inspections, challenge inspections, and on-site monitoring of destruction, including 
an unlimited right to monitor the process of destruction by the Treaty parties. Satel-
lite surveillance was used to verify the placement and the progress of the destruction 
of large military equipment, like vehicles and tanks. Moreover, the Treaty estab-
lished in Vienna a body composed of all Treaty members, called the Joint Consulta-
tive Group (JCG), whose task was to deal with questions relating to compliance 
with the provisions of the Treaty. Such tasks included the resolution of ambiguities 
and differences in interpretation, the consideration of measures that enhance the 
Treaty’s viability and effectiveness, the resolution of technical questions and the 
evaluation of disputes that may arise from the Treaty. 
A number of follow-up agreements to the legally binding CFE followed, most nota-
bly the politically binding Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength 
of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the so-called CFE-1A Agreement), 
committing the then 30 members of the Treaty to establish manpower limits and, if 
deemed necessary, to reduce the existing manpower levels within the CFE area of 
application to reach these limits (Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel 
Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1992). In 1996, the CFE Treaty 
was also supplemented with a so-called flank agreement in order to grant Russia and 
Ukraine greater room for maneuver in locating their conventional armed forces in 
specifically designated regions. The flank agreement adjusted the original CFE Trea-
ty flank limits in order to alleviate Moscow’s difficulties in absorbing Russian forces 
formerly stationed in Central and Eastern Europe and in responding to internal se-
curity threats, especially the Chechnya conflict. In essence, the document reduced 
the size of the flank zone, without changing the numerical limits on ground equip-
ment within the zone (Walkling, 1997). 
The Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Eu-
rope (also known as the Adapted CFE Treaty) was a revision of the original Treaty, 
signed during the November 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit and setting national in-
stead of bloc-based limits on conventional armed forces (Agreement on Adaptation 
of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1999). Drafted to reflect 
the changing security realities – particularly NATO enlargement – the Adapted CFE 
Treaty never went into force however, due to NATO’s insistence on the fulfilment 
of Russia’s so called ‘Istanbul commitments’ – a number of politically binding 
pledges by Moscow to withdraw forces and equipment from Moldova and Georgia 
(OSCE 1999; Kühn, 2013, p. 191).  
Citing the ongoing delay in the adapted Treaty’s entry into force and the ongoing 
adverse developments in European security such as the NATO enlargement and the 
planned development of conventional missile defense in Europe, which from Rus-
sia’s point of view added military unaccountability and unpredictability, Russia is-
sued in December 12, 2007 a statement ‘suspending’ its implementation of the CFE 
Treaty. Under suspension, Moscow stated that it will not participate in Treaty data 
exchanges, notifications or inspections. An explanatory document from Russia’s 
presidential administration mentioned several reasons for its suspension of compli-
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ance: first of all, Russia considered the linkage between the Adapted Treaty ratifica-
tion and the withdrawal of troops from Georgia and Moldova as ‘illegitimate’ and 
‘invented’. Russia also considered the troop-withdrawal issue a bilateral Russia–
Georgia and Russia–Moldova issue, not a NATO–Russia issue. Secondly, the three 
Baltic states, which border Russia, unlike the rest of NATO (excluding Poland and 
Norway), were not covered by the original CFE Treaty as they were still part of the 
Soviet Union when the Treaty was signed. In addition, unlike other NATO mem-
bers, the Baltic states did not ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty. Russia’s wish for a 
speedy ratification and accession of the Baltic states to a ratified Treaty, hoping to 
restrict emergency deployments of NATO forces there, was not fulfilled. Thirdly, 
Russia emphasized that NATO’s 1999 and 2004 enlargements increased the Alli-
ance’s equipment above the Treaty limits (Socor, 2007). 
Although the Kremlin noted that it has no plans for arms buildups, it also declared 
that it would not be bound by the Treaty’s limits. NATO members, including the 
United States, called on Russia to reverse this course and declared their intention to 
continue implementing the Treaty ‘without prejudice to any future action they might 
take’ (Arms Control Association, 2012). On 10 March 2015, citing NATO’s alleged 
de facto breach of the Treaty, Russia however formally announced it was ‘completely’ 
suspending its participation in it as of the next day and ceasing to provide infor-
mation on its conventional forces, allow inspections or telling NATO about its mili-
tary build-ups. Nevertheless, Russia still officially remains a CFE state party and all 
the other state parties continue to implement the Treaty between each other. 
Treaty on Open Skies 
The second pillar of European conventional arms control edifice, the Open Skies 
Treaty, establishes a regime of unarmed observation flights over the territories of 
state-parties. It specifies, inter alia, quotas for observation flights, the notification of 
points of entry, technical details and inspection for sensors (Treaty on Open Skies, 
1992, article 1). 
Signed on March 24, 1992 and entering into force on January 1, 2002, the Open 
Skies Treaty has permitted each state-party to conduct short-notice and unarmed 
reconnaissance flights over the others’ entire territories to collect data on military 
forces and activities. Observation aircraft which are used to fly these missions must 
be equipped with sensors that enable the observing party to identify significant mili-
tary equipment, such as artillery, fighter aircraft and armored combat vehicles. 
Though satellites can provide the same, and even more detailed, information, not all 
of the 34 states parties to the Treaty have such capabilities. However, on 21 January 
2014, the U.S. Defense Science Board issued a report advising the U.S. military to 
delay upgrading its Open Skies OC-135 reconnaissance planes as, according to the 
report, the easy accessibility of satellite imagery served well as a replacement for the 
planes’ reconnaissance trips (Department of Defense: Defense Science Board, 2014, 
p. 29).
The Treaty is also aimed at building confidence and familiarity among state parties 
through their participation in the overflights (Arms Control Association, 2012). Ac-
cording to the Treaty, all of a state party’s territory can be overflown and no territo-
ry can be declared off-limits by the host nation. Thus, unlike the CFE Treaty, the 
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Open Skies covers the entire territory of participating states from Vladivostok to 
Vancouver in regards to observation flights. 
When assessed from the European perspective, the Open Skies Treaty has enabled 
several hundreds of observation flights in state parties’ airspaces. However, its effec-
tiveness, too, has weakened during the recent years. While none of the signatories 
have formally withdrawn from the Treaty, some disturbances in its function have 
been taking place, in particular since 2014. For example, some areas have been de-
clared off-limits for observation flights, and the accessibility of others has been 
hampered by restrictions on the altitude of overflights (Kleinjan, 2016, p.25). These 
practices are violations to the Treaty. According to U.S. sources, Russia has imposed 
restrictions on surveillance over Moscow and Chechnya and near Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, while it also makes it hard to conduct observation in the Kaliningrad 
enclave (CBSN, 2016). Then again, Russian Defence Ministry stated in February 
2016 that Turkey had refused a Russian Open Skies mission, planned to take place 
in 1–5 February 2016, to fly over areas adjacent to Syria, as well as over NATO air-
bases. According to Russia, Turkey gave no explanation regarding the limitations 
(MoD Russia, 2016). In addition, the Open Skies has in recent years been threatened 
by the controversy between Greece and Turkey about the accession of the Republic 
of Cyprus and by Georgia’s refusal to accept Russian observation flights (Kühn, 
2013, p. 192).  
Therefore, while the Open Skies Treaty can still be regarded as relatively successful, 
restrictive interpretation of its certain provisions and unilateral limitations of obser-
vation flights over the territory by some state parties have affected its effectiveness. 
Vienna Document on Confidence and Security-Building Measures 
The third pillar of the European conventional arms control regime, the Vienna 
Document on Confidence- and Security- Building Measures (CSBM) was estab-
lished in 1990 between OSCE participating states and has been updated in 1992, 
1994, 1999 and 2011. Unlike the legally binding CFE Treaty, the Vienna document 
is only politically binding. It was signed by all 57 OSCE participating states aiming at 
enhancing transparency with regard to military activities through means of 12 mech-
anisms. These include, inter alia, the annual exchange of military information and 
annual calendars; the exchange of specific data relating to major weapon and 
equipment systems; information on the plans for the deployment of major weapon 
and equipment systems; a mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards 
unusual military activities; the voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about 
military activities; and the prior notification and observation of certain military activ-
ities, such as maneuvers (Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 
2011). 
For instance, in the framework of the document, a prior notification of certain mili-
tary activities is necessary 42 days in advance, if they involve at least 9,000 soldiers 
or 250 tanks, or 250 artillery pieces or 500 armored combat vehicles. If 200 or more 
sorties of combat aircraft are to be flown during such an activity, this must be also 
indicated. Additionally, an amphibious landing, heliborne landing or parachute as-
sault activity with at least 3,000 soldiers must be notified in advance according to the 
document. In addition, another type of CSBM, observation of certain military activi-
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ties is allowed, if they involve at least 13,000 soldiers, or 250 tanks, or 250 artillery 
pieces or 500 armored combat vehicles. Further, observation is allowed for amphib-
ious landing, heliborne landing or parachute assault activities with at least 3,500 sol-
diers (Schmidt, 2013, p. 33). 
As with the case of other treaties discussed, the Vienna Document’s transparency 
and confidence-building mechanisms have grown increasingly ineffective after its 
update in 2011. Among other things, the occupation of Crimea and the Ukrainian 
crisis have made it clear that the Vienna Document needs substantial improvements, 
even though the document has served during the East Ukrainian crisis by facilitating 
verification visits, among other things, in Ukraine and Russia (Organization for Se-
curity and Co-Operation in Europe 2015). However, the crisis demonstrated the 
inadequacy of the verification methods in the document, as evidenced, for example, 
by restrictions on inspections and insufficiently rigorous requirements for no-notice, 
or snap exercises, in which participating troops are not forewarned and for which 
prior notification to the other signatories of the Vienna Document is not required. 
In addition, the Document had not foreseen the use of foreign troops posing as 
local insurgents, making use of heavy armor and weapons (Kleinjan, 2016, pp. 23–
24). 
The year 2016 saw substantial efforts to update and modernize the Vienna Docu-
ment. However, Russia in particular has opposed the steps for its modernization. 
Instead, during the recent years, Russia has undertaken large, unannounced exercises 
in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. Some exercises seem to train for large-scale war 
and include up to 100,000 personnel, such as Zapad-2013 or Tsentr-2015. Other so-
called snap exercises, too, have been designed to demonstrate Moscow’s heightened 
military readiness. In the spring 2014, Russia’s military-political leadership used one 
of the so-called surprise selective checks of its armed forces’ combat readiness to 
deploy the troops needed to facilitate the occupation of Crimea. Russia’s disregard 
for the agreement has fed uncertainty over its intentions. 
Whither Conventional Arms Control? – Technological and Military-Strategic 
Challenges  
The previous pages have described the institutional framework of the European 
conventional weapons landscape through three pillars: the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the Treaty on Open Skies, and the Vienna 
Document on Confidence and Security-Building Measures. Overall, each of these 
instruments has been a ‘thread’ in a larger web of agreements, interlocking and mu-
tually reinforcing arms control obligations and commitments. In the light of the his-
tory of the last decades, they together have enhanced predictability, transparency 
and military stability and reduced the risk of a major conflict in Europe – once they 
have functioned. Then again, once each thread is weakened, it has affected the en-
tire web, undermining the very things they were created for, that is confidence and 
security in Europe.  
In terms of substance, these institutions have above all sought to codify a (numeri-
cal) balance of forces between alliances and individual countries, to eliminate the 
participating nations’ capability to launch surprise attacks or large-scale offensives in 
Europe, to enable an exchange of military information of various sorts and finally, 
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to provide a mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards to any unusual 
military activities. To put it in slightly simplifying terms, the ‘classical’ European 
conventional arms control has focused on numbers whereas the contemporary de-
velopments call increasing attention to questions of quality. 
Indeed, it is important to note that while political disagreements or larger geopoliti-
cal shifts in many respects help to understand the current decline of regional arms 
control institutions, they are intertwined with a more complex and nuanced set of 
issues involving developments in weapons technology and various political-strategic 
considerations. While this interplay typically makes arms control more complex and 
in some respects more vulnerable, it may occasionally enable also new avenues and 
fresh prospects.  
Therefore, in order to comprehend the current challenges facing conventional arms 
control in Europe, it is equally important to have a look at some of the recent or 
emerging technological and strategic developments that have an effect on arma-
ments and military thinking in general. Even though this kind of overview cannot be 
very comprehensive, it may nevertheless through some illustrative examples help to 
understand some of the contemporary setbacks and to assess the landscape in which 
the future arms control efforts are going to take place.  
It was stated already at the beginning of this article that technological and strategic 
innovations typically contain more destabilizing than stabilizing potential from the 
arms control perspective. The potential consequences of the ongoing technological 
transformations include, but are not limited to, increased or altered escalation risk; 
decreased transparency and blurring of civil and military domains and of the nuclear 
and non-nuclear divide. In addition, the added autonomy of technology brings 
about new unknowns that we may not even be aware of.  
Overall, a wide consensus seems to prevail that current innovations in artificial intel-
ligence, robotics, autonomous systems, Internet of Things, 3D printing, nanotech-
nology, biotechnology, material science and quantum computing are expected to 
bring social transformations of an unprecedented scale. According to Schwab 
(2016), they form no less than the foundation of a ‘fourth industrial revolution’. 
How these technologies may be used in, and transform, the military and security 
realms is not yet fully understood and needs further scrutiny. The capabilities they 
could provide may directly or indirectly affect the preconditions for peace, the na-
ture of conflicts and how insecurity is perceived and managed, by people and states 
(SIPRI, 2016). These characteristics point to complex military capabilities in the 
qualitative dimension of modern warfare. Whereas during the times of the Cold 
War, sheer numbers impacted scenarios and operational planning, today’s high-tech 
forces obtain their effectiveness primarily through a sophisticated interplay of com-
mand, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnais-
sance (C4ISR) systems (Kühn, 2013, p. 196). 
An example of the challenges at hand are the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or 
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), particularly since military reliance on 
this comparably cheap weapons category has rapidly increased during the first dec-
ades of the 2000s and because they can increasingly perform combat missions equal 
to those performed by a manned combat aircraft. Furthermore, unmanned systems 
are apt to become vital in conjunction with time-critical reconnaissance missions 
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prior to a rapid deployment of substantial combat forces. The need for arms control 
update is evident in the face of these technologies. Whereas the CFE Treaty dis-
cussed above does not specify whether a combat aircraft should be defined in terms 
of manned or unmanned, an updated arms control approach should at least seek to 
apply transparency measures or codes of conduct for the regional use of UCAVs 
(Kühn, 2013, p. 197). 
Another example of the unresolved questions related to unmanned technologies are 
the loitering weapons or Loitering Attack Munitions (LAMs). Not to be mixed with 
Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), the loitering weapons are able to patrol in a 
given target area for extended periods of time. This weapon is designed to loiter, 
seek and destroy ground targets, but unlike unmanned combat aircraft, it is expend-
able and does not return to base after a strike mission (Rapaport, 2015). In this 
sense, the loitering weapons bear similarities to land or sea mines but again a num-
ber of questions remain regarding the rules and procedures of their use. 
A step further from unmanned weapons is taken as one adds the level of autonomy 
given to a weapons system. An example of these kinds of emerging military tech-
nologies, not yet fully understood nor grasped by arms control are the Lethal Au-
tonomous Weapons (LAW), which essentially are able to operate either with a task 
autonomy – in which a human operator specifies a general task and the platform 
processes a course of action and carries it out under its own supervision – or have 
full autonomy by creating and completing their own tasks without the need for hu-
man input with the exception of the decision to build such a system (Galliot, 2015, 
p. 7). Taking humans out of the loop will raise questions of the compatibility of au-
tonomous weapons systems with the fundamental requirements of international 
humanitarian law, such as the principles of distinction and proportionality, as well as 
complicate allocation of responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
Since these types of armament typically cannot be counted as weapons of mass de-
struction, even though they potentially could be equipped with such, and since they 
most likely operate in the same environments as conventional forces and affect the 
European conventional weapons landscape, they ought to be dealt within in the 
framework of conventional weapons arms control. Nevertheless, they are far from 
‘conventional’ as they contain a number of new and unresolved technical, operative, 
ethical and legal issues. While as of 2017 only precursor systems and technology 
demonstrators exist particularly in LAWs, rendering unmanned and autonomous 
weapons systems a candidate for preventive arms control is an issue of some urgen-
cy. The issue is likely to be debated in the arms control community in the coming 
years (Sauer, 2016, p. 8). 
Turning to contemporary military-strategic thinking enabled in many respects by 
these new technologies, a case in point is the development of Anti-Access Area De-
nial (A2/AD) capabilities, which refer to an adversary’s attempts to make it impos-
sible, or very costly, for a country or an alliance to gain access to a given region. 
While the idea of A2/AD is not new, modern weapons technologies allow new pos-
sibilities for it by extending the physical reach of these capabilities to radiuses of 
several hundred kilometers and by combining different military assets such as mis-
sile defence systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, submarines, high-readiness brigades 
and special forces. The combination of these properties may have significant conse-
quences in regional security. One foreseeable consequence is the creation of no-go 
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areas in Eastern Europe. Russia has successfully leveraged the kind of precision-
guided systems once solely possessed by the US and its allies to develop these capa-
bilities, including precision-guided anti-ship, anti-aircraft, land-attack, anti-satellite 
cruise and ballistic missiles – most notably the Iskander ballistic missiles – as well as 
cyber and electronic warfare capabilities.  
While the A2/AD capabilities have inherently defensive qualities, they may also car-
ry destabilizing effects, for instance, by enabling from the attacker’s point of view 
beneficial conditions of fait accompli after a sudden physical invasion or by threaten-
ing the freedom of access across all operating domains, i.e. air, land, sea space and 
cyberspace (Simón, 2016, pp. 417–418). For instance, Russia’s decision to place ad-
vanced S400 anti-aircraft missiles in Kaliningrad has extended the reach of Russian 
launchers deep into NATO airspace and maritime supply lines, challenging NATO’s 
control of its skies and its ability to help its Baltic members in the event of Russian 
hostility. These missiles could help Moscow to invade Latvia, Estonia or Lithuania, 
forcing the alliance to recover the Baltic states in a military campaign of a size un-
seen in Europe since World War II (Korteweg and Besch, 2016). 
While A2/AD is not a new concept, its advent constitutes a threat to regional con-
ventional arms control institutions. However, it is at the same time itself a conse-
quence of arms control regime collapse. It is also likely to lead to regional arms rac-
es, as the U.S. armed forces are already engaging in developing counter A2/AD re-
sponses and capabilities. An example of the emerging U.S. response to A2/AD is 
the U.S. Air Force’s development of long-range standoff cruise missile (LRSO) to 
replace the existing air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). The new missile would be 
compatible with existing B-2 and B-52 bombers, as well as with the planned B-21 
bomber. The first missile is slated for production by 2026. It can be armed with ei-
ther a conventional or a nuclear warhead (Reif, 2016).  
Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Force is also significantly increasing the lethality of its con-
ventionally armed cruise missiles. For example, the service is purchasing thousands 
of stealthy precision air-to-surface standoff cruise missiles designed to attack targets 
from outside the range of adversary air defenses. Known as the JASSM-ER, the 
missile will have a range of roughly 750 kilometers and be integrated onto the B-1, 
B-52, B-2, F-15E and F-16 aircraft – and likely on the F-35 and B-21 as well. The 
U.S. Air Force is also planning to arm the JASSM-ER with a new computer-killing 
electronic attack payload, which is designed to have an effect similar to an electro-
magnetic pulse (Reif, 2016). Then again, a more contemporary case of the potential-
ly destabilizing effects of conventionally equipped cruise missiles has been the use 
of the submarine and warship-launched Kalibr cruise missiles by Russia against var-
ious targets in Syria. 
Indeed, these responses to A2/AD with weapons that are nuclear-capable represent 
another regional arms control challenge in need of attention: the gradual blurring of 
the nuclear–non-nuclear weapons divide promoted by the standstill of conventional 
arms control institutions. This development may lead to added threats as the poten-
tial adversary remains unaware of the kind of escalation these weapons might bring 
once used in conflict.  
To continue the arms control implications of the contemporary military-strategic 
thinking, the emergence of another old but re-designed tool, the so-called hybrid 
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warfare in the European security landscape is also complicating the scheme. The 
concept itself is not free from conceptual problems. First, even though it has been 
applied to Russian conduct during the Ukrainian crisis, the concept’s origins can be 
found within NATO vocabulary, according to which ‘Hybrid threats are those 
posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and 
non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives’ (‘NATO counter-
ing the hybrid threat’, NATO ACT, 23 September 2011). Secondly, even though the 
concept emerged in public discussion after the Russian occupation of Crimea, it may 
be worth noting that the concept has similarities to Western powers’ utilization of 
military and non-military tools within crisis management and state-building under 
the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ initiated in NATO.  
As commonly discussed, however, hybrid operations include a combination of cyber 
activities of unclear origin, irregular forces, conventional weapons and traditional 
forces applied in a coordinated fashion. Typically, these activities are held below the 
threshold that an adversary would normally consider an open aggression, in order to 
limit its response options and to challenge the norms usually guiding regional securi-
ty. 
While the idea is not new here either, hybrid tactics are apt to contribute to the 
complicated arms control setting due to the blurred and often concealed way they 
involve military tools. The use of hybrid instruments contains many loopholes not 
covered by the existing arms control institutions. As they are almost by nature subtle 
and below the threshold of ‘conventional’ attention, the tools and strategies of hy-
brid warfare are likely to cause new insecurities and to complicate efforts to some 
kind of institutional regulation. In addition to reduced transparency and the blurred 
mixture of military and civilian capabilities, hybrid operations carry the added risk of 
conflict escalation because of the fact that they often involve unannounced ‘snap’ 
exercises. 
As said, the existing European conventional arms control mechanisms have focused 
more on numbers than qualities. The short discussion on previous pages suggest 
that contemporary technological and military-strategic developments call for more 
attention on qualitative questions, in particular those of transparency to be estab-
lished for relevant military and military-applicable hardware and tactics. While this 
goal is easy to state, to render this changing landscape into a functioning regime of 
arms control is a more complex undertaking, however.  
Turmoil – or New Ways Ahead? 
The assumption about a low probability of large-scale conventional conflict in Eu-
rope, driven partly by post-Cold War successes of conventional arms control, has 
informed policy decisions and defence planning in the majority of European states 
since the 1990s. It provided arguments for a decrease of spending on defence, and 
for prioritizing the development of the set of capabilities required for out-of-area 
interventions and stabilization operations over the capabilities needed for state-on-
state warfare in Europe (Kulesa, 2014, p. 224). 
However, in the shadow of other developments the conventional arms control 
structure in Europe has crumbled gradually. Even the more dramatic events, such as 
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Russia’s suspension of its implementation of the CFE Treaty, were met with only 
minor public interest. Only after the outbreak of the military confrontation between 
Ukraine, the separatists and Russia in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 have the deficiencies 
of the arms control and the CSBM system in Europe been brought to any larger 
discussion.  
If anything, the deterioration in cooperative security has accelerated since 2014 with 
the near paralysis of the OSCE as a forum for arms control. As Thompson (2016) 
put it, the treaties and mechanisms for dialogue, transparency, predictability and risk 
mitigation on which the last 25 peaceful years in Europe have rested seem to have 
given way for a new winter in regional security. This winter is not made any easier 
by the persistent existence of certain geographical ‘grey areas’ in conventional arms 
control. Most notable among them are the protracted frozen conflicts in the region, 
relating, above all, to Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria and Georgia. On the other 
hand, the absence of naval dimension in any contemporary arms control agreement 
in the region constitutes another unresolved issue, which is apt to complicate re-
gional security. 
Then again, in the light of the previous pages it is pertinent to ask whether the main 
problem is the mistrust between Russia and the Western countries or the increasing 
military unaccountability and unpredictability. Often behind the visible stage of high 
level diplomacy, the European conventional arms control regime is being challenged 
by ongoing technological developments and the rapidly evolving military-strategic 
thinking by the involved armed forces. Steps in military technology seem to be 
aligned with an overall deteriorating political atmosphere, which is apt to add mis-
trust and unwillingness to commit to the existing set of regimes. These, in turn, lead 
to and are being sustained by snap military exercises and other practices contrib-
uting to added mistrust.  
Nevertheless, a functioning conventional arms control is still a crucial and indispen-
sable part of any stable European security architecture. Political currents cannot be 
regulated by arms control measures but they nevertheless can provide valuable or 
even irreplaceable tools both as restricting negative escalation and as enablers, once 
political decisions towards greater cooperation are being made. In addition, as An-
thony (2015) puts it, arms control may allow states to think about what they need 
their armed forces to do, and providing a framework for discussing and explaining 
those choices to others. Every now and then, arms control initiatives may also serve 
as efforts of détente in a tense political situation. At a minimum, Russia and NATO 
need to agree on common rules to handle unexpected military encounters to reduce 
the risk of inadvertently triggering an armed conflict. 
What forms could tomorrow’s arms control take then? What would be a suitable or 
realistic level of ambition in Europe in the face of the developments described 
above? 
At its peak, the European conventional arms control institutions allowed for the 
removal from states the capability to invade each other, seize territory by force of 
arms, and then hold it against any counter-attack by opposition forces. In addition, 
there were highly intrusive verification procedures to make sure that states really did 
do what they had promised, and extensive obligations for follow-up verification, 
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monitoring and information exchange, to safeguard against backsliding on commit-
ments made.   
It is important to ask whether a similar level of ambition can be reached again or 
whether that should be the goal in tomorrow’s conventional arms control. Moreo-
ver, the question of what would be the role of the still existing but mostly defunct 
structures remains open, as the technological and military-strategic developments 
described in the last pages would seem to suggest that these structures are in many 
ways at least in need of an urgent update, if not totally outdated.   
Proposals to reform the field of conventional arms control have been made, such as 
Kühn (2013), Schmidt (2013), or Durkalec (2013), emphasizing often the contem-
porary need for added transparency and proper verification mechanisms. The Ger-
man Federal Government’s call for a more transparent communication of existing 
military capabilities, coupled with the intention to dismantle persistent distrust and 
to make any military developments easier to predict – the so-called Steinmeier initia-
tive – represents a recent effort to tackle some of the key challenges (Steinmeier, 
2016).  
Then again, at least in some respects new and somewhat unorthodox forms of arms 
control may be expected to tackle the rapidly emerging challenges brought about by 
technology – for instance, as was the case with the anti-personnel landmines and 
cluster munitions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the civil society movement push-
ing for a legally binding prohibition on autonomous weapons systems is in the pro-
cess of rapid organization and mobilization. An example here could be the Campaign 
to Stop Killer Robots, a coalition coordinated by Human Rights Watch and consisting 
of tens of advocacy groups in several countries. Even though, as the anti-personnel 
landmine case demonstrates, questions linger about its effectiveness and coverage 
among all European states as compared to the more traditional measures, the civil 
society’s growing role may be an example of future trends in conventional arms 
control.  
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The Pandora’s Box of  Military Artificial Intelligence 
Johanna Friman7 
Abstract 
uriosity is both the triumph and the curse of mankind. Most technological or 
scientific advances have been and will in all likelihood always be harnessed 
for military purposes and there is no reason to believe that artificial intelli-
gence will not. Even so, this does not inevitably herald an impending military ‘ro-
bopocalypse’ with legions of killer robots dehumanising the battlefield and defying 
international law. However, once the Pandora’s Box of military artificial intelligence 
is opened, it will be too late to address external, internal and ethical concerns arising 
from military artificial intelligence. Consequently, in order to govern and regulate 
the development of military artificial autonomy and prevent uncontrollable prolifer-
ation of and a potential arms race in autonomous weapons, a constraining-enabling 
arms control regime needs to be promptly negotiated and legally implemented, strik-
ing a functional and legitimate balance between military and non-military interests 
and concerns. 
The Pandora’s Box of Military Artificial Intelligence: Introductory Remarks 
Artificial Autonomy and Modern Conflicts 
Curiosity is both the triumph and the curse of mankind. Thurnher (2013) indicates 
that in the recent past, remarkable advances have been made in the development of 
artificial intelligence. Then, even as fully autonomous weapons do not yet exist, the 
time to act is nevertheless upon us. However, any action should preferably be con-
sidered dispassionately from a sober, tempered legal position, steering clear of ‘ro-
bopocalypse’ paranoias. The notion of a future ‘robopocalypse’ has been a recurrent 
theme in cinematic and literary works in the science fiction genre, often depicting a 
doomsday scenario of technological dehumanisation and warfare between humans 
and robots or cyborgs (see, for instance, the Terminator films, Wilson’s Robopocalypse, 
MacLeod’s The Corporation Wars series, as well as Stay’s Robot Overlords). Paranoia, on 
the other hand, seems to be on the rise and is easily linked to conspiracy theories 
and projections of fear (see, for instance, Melley 2000; Freeman and Freeman 2008). 
In the view of the present author, such fears and conspiracy theories could quite 
easily be obliquely projected onto the rise of military artificial intelligence, fanning 
7 Johanna Friman is a Postdoctoral Researcher in Law, University of Turku. Email: johanna.friman@utu.fi. 
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‘robopocalypse’ paranoias and clouding the pragmatic development of military arti-
ficial autonomy. However, such ‘robopocalypse’ paranoias are treacherously coun-
ter-productive since they bewilder emerging concerns related to military artificial 
intelligence, demoting them to science fiction fantasies rather than near-future reali-
ties in need of legal regulation. Then, even though it is extremely unlikely that the 
world will be overrun by ‘Terminators’ any time soon, Krishnan (2009: 4) neverthe-
less perceptively suggests that alarmism and exaggeration of the dangers of autono-
mous weapons ‘would be as wrong as putting one’s head in the sand in the face of 
the immense ethical challenges ahead that result from technological progress.’ 
The present study postulates that most technological or scientific advances have 
been and will in all likelihood always be harnessed for military purposes and there is 
no reason to believe that artificial intelligence will not. Indeed, it may pragmatically 
be reasoned that once autonomous weapons come into existence and are operation-
al ‘it will be difficult to avoid succumbing to the temptation to deploy them, even in 
complex and unpredictable situations. It is precisely in such situations that human 
soldiers are particularly under threat, making the incentive to replace them with ro-
bots particularly strong’ (Geiss 2015: 16). It would furthermore be unlikely to expect 
that research and development of military artificial intelligence will stop at limited 
artificial autonomy if full artificial autonomy becomes within reach and could poten-
tially revolutionize warfare. Geiss (2015: 3) maintains that conventional drone tech-
nology: 
“has already changed the traditional understanding of the conduct of 
war. The remote control of drones makes deployment possible with-
out direct personal risk from a distant control centre, on a computer 
screen. Experts, however, regard the development of autonomous 
systems as genuinely revolutionary and as a veritable paradigm shift in 
military technology.” 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles 
(UCAVs) have already become a regular feature in modern conflicts and ‘with re-
gard to target selection and the decision to launch an attack automation and increas-
ingly also autonomisation tendencies are already clearly discernible’ (Geiss, 2015: 8). 
As examples of such limited autonomy systems, Geiss (2015: 8–9) mentions: the US 
Phalanx CIWS, the Israeli Iron Dome, the British BAE Taranis, the British Brimstone 
and the Israeli IAI Harpy. With regard to the inevitability of military artificial intelli-
gence and autonomous weapons, Krishnan (2009: 2) furthermore argues that: 
“If current trends continue, it is foreseeable that once military robots 
become more common on the battlefield, they will gradually also be-
come more and more capable and autonomous. At the moment, hu-
mans remain in the loop at least wherever the use of force is involved. 
However, weapons developer and high-ranking military officials feel 
confident that the technology for truly autonomous weapons will in 
the medium term (after 2025) be available.” 
If military artificial autonomy is indeed merely a decade or so away and systems with 
advanced autonomisation or limited autonomy seem to be already developing at a 
disquieting pace, legal regulation and codes of conduct need to be presently devel-
oped and implemented, particularly with regard to arms control. However, even if it 
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must be regarded as inevitable that artificial autonomy will be harnessed for military 
purposes, this does not inescapably herald a military ‘robopocalypse’ with legions of 
killer robots dehumanising the battlefield and defying international law. Certain ben-
eficial military and non-military uses of artificial autonomy are plainly discernible, 
for instance in the fields of humanitarian and disaster relief where the conditions are 
hostile or hazardous.  
The International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), among others, has 
voiced concerns that, unlike conventional or unconventional weapons to date, au-
tonomous weapons could moreover proliferate at an alarming rate (ICRAC opening 
statement), thereby clearly calling for an arms control regime. Thornhill (2016) sug-
gests that unlike nuclear weapons, autonomous weapon systems ‘could be mass 
produced on the cheap, becoming the “Kalashnikovs of tomorrow”’, as also ad-
vanced by a group of artificial intelligence and robotics researchers (Autonomous 
Weapons: an Open Letter). However, Krishnan astutely argues (2009: 4) that auton-
omous weapons can be both ‘a progress towards humanizing war and an unprece-
dented danger to humanity’, with regard to what aspect will eventually prevail will 
‘largely depend on an effective regulation’. 
Autonomy Contrasted with Automation 
It may be observed that military artificial autonomy has, in some sense, existed for a 
long time, operating with simple ‘mechanical’ or ‘electronic’ autonomy (Anderson, 
Reisner and Waxman 2014: 388). Although Anderson et al (Anderson, Reisner and 
Waxman 2014: 389) rightly point out that ‘the tipping point from a highly-
automated system to an “autonomous” one is very thin, and in practice, unstable’, a 
functional distinction should nevertheless be drawn between ‘automation’, regard-
less of sophistication, and ‘autonomy’ (Schmitt and Thurnher 2013: 235). This func-
tional distinction is approached by Geiss (2015: 6), as follows: ‘In contrast to auton-
omous systems automated systems merely automatically execute previously pro-
grammed commands in a predictable fashion. They are unable to react independent-
ly to unforeseen events.’ However, Geiss (2015: 6) astutely indicates that a ‘clear-cut 
distinction’ between autonomous and automated systems is not always possible. 
Rather, the decisive factor should perhaps be the level of ‘meaningful human con-
trol’, discussed for instance by Article 36, a UK-based NGO working to prevent the 
unintended, unnecessary or unacceptable harm caused by certain weapons (Article 
36 2013: 1–2) and Anderson et al (Anderson, Reisner and Waxman 2014: 396). 
It is readily apparent from the foregoing that the dichotomy between automation 
and autonomy relates directly to the discussion of whether humans should be ‘in the 
loop’, ‘on the loop’ or ‘out of the loop’, considered for instance by Sharkey in Bhuta 
et al (Bhuta, Beck, Geiss, Liu and Kress 2016: Chapter 2). ‘In the loop’ implies that 
the military artificial intelligence cannot operate without human decision-making; 
‘on the loop’ indicates that the military artificial intelligence is basically in a position 
to execute the operation independently but human supervisors monitor the opera-
tion and override the artificial autonomy if necessary; whereas ‘out of the loop’ 
would entail that the military artificial intelligence is operating autonomously with-
out any direct opportunities for human intervention (Human Rights Watch 2012: 2–
6; Geiss 2015: 7; Weizmann and Costas Trascasas 2014: 6). However, Geiss (2015: 
8) perceptively posits that even if humans would remain ‘on the loop’:
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“one must assume that in stressful situations and under time pressure 
– typical features of any combat mission – the person involved will, in
case of doubt, defer to the machine. Such behaviour – in other words, 
the tendency to trust in an automated machine even if there are sub-
stantial indications that it is unreliable or, in some cases, makes mis-
takes – is known as ’automation bias’. In such a case, however, human 
control – although technically possible – in reality is meaningless.” 
The present author concurs with Schmitt and Thurnher (2013: 235) and Geiss 
(2015: 6) that even if not ‘clear-cut’, a functional distinction may be drawn between 
‘automation’ and ‘autonomy’, wherefore questions relating to accountability will not 
feature in the present study. The present author questions the existence of a ‘gap’ in 
accountability, essentially due to the fact that even despite a capability of artificial 
intelligence, autonomous weapons would still conceivably – at least initially – be 
legally classified as ‘weapons’ and must therefore – akin to other weapons – legally 
be considered objects (res) rather than persons (persona). This fundamental distinc-
tion between res and persona may be said to rest on the premise that persons normal-
ly are subjects of extensive legal rights and duties, whereas objects are not (see, for 
instance, Trahan 2008: 14–20). 
Although the present author acknowledges that this is an oversimplification of an 
exceedingly complex issue, Sassóli (2014: 323) convincingly argues that the differ-
ence between a weapon system and a human being ‘is not quantitative but qualita-
tive; the two are not situated on a sliding scale, but on different levels – subjects and 
objects.’ Accountability should accordingly – at least presumptively – be imputable 
to the owner, controller, or other ‘last responsible human link’ of the autonomous 
weapon, and not imputable to the military artificial intelligence itself. However, as 
Geiss (2015: 21) points out, it may conversely be argued that accountability ‘de-
creases where autonomy increases’; essentially due to the fact that if accountability 
or liability is conditional on control, then the more autonomy a weapon system has, 
the greater the accountability gaps. Would, moreover, the artificiality be moderated 
at some point so as to make the res legally cross over to persona, the accountability 
dimension would most certainly materialise in its comprehensive complexity. 
Aim, Object and Structure of the Present Study 
Naturally, military artificial intelligence could simply be dismissed as inherently and 
irrevocably dehumanising and thus inherently incapable of complying with interna-
tional law. Viewed from an arms control perspective, this would translate into advo-
cating a full preventive ban on all autonomous weapons, preventing Pandora from 
ever opening this Box. However, the present study posits that such an unconditional 
constraining approach may be ill-advised, as it would disregard prospective benefi-
cial military functions of artificial intelligence, for instance in the maintenance of 
national, regional and international security. Then again, the present study posits 
that an unconditional enabling approach entailing no arms control measures or legal 
regulation may be equally ill-advised, as it would leave military artificial intelligence 
vulnerable for abuse and proliferation. Hence, the present study posits that both 
constraining and enabling features should be factored into any regulatory arms con-
trol regime regarding autonomous weapons. 
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The aim of the present study is therefore to pragmatically approach military artificial 
intelligence from a tempered legal position, balancing certain non-military concerns 
arising from the prospect of autonomous weapons against certain beneficial military 
features of artificial autonomy. To this end, the object of the present study is two-
fold: firstly, to contemplate the need for an arms control regime regarding autono-
mous weapons; and secondly, to contemplate the potential elements of such an 
arms control regime. 
With regard to structure, the need for an arms control regime regarding autono-
mous weapons will be contemplated in section 2, viewed through the lenses of ex-
ternal and internal concerns related to military artificial intelligence. The potential 
elements of an arms control regime regarding autonomous weapons will be concise-
ly contemplated next in section 3, approached from the constraining-enabling posi-
tion outlined above. Reflections on certain ethical concerns related to military artifi-
cial autonomy will thereafter briefly be presented in the concluding section 4. 
Uncovering the Need for an Arms Control Regime Regarding Autonomous 
Weapons  
Opening Remarks 
Since military artificial intelligence would operate in the arena of war and armed 
conflict, the present study posits that the need for an arms control regime regarding 
autonomous weapons links directly to the challenges posed by international humani-
tarian law on military artificial autonomy. As reasoned by the present author, a fun-
damental underlying purpose of any arms control regime would presumably be an 
ambition to humanise warfare; an ambition underlying also international humanitar-
ian law. Why else prohibit or restrict the use of certain weapons or strive to reduce 
the risk of their proliferation? This reasoning resonates well with ‘the principle of 
humanity’ and the rising notion of a jus contra bellum, an international law against war, 
striving to prevent unnecessary suffering by reducing the consequences of war (see, 
for instance, Clapham and Gaeta 2014: 80, 277, 284–6; Weller 2015: 565; Kolb 
2009). 
Hence, the internal capability of military artificial intelligence to comply with inter-
national humanitarian law will be extensively and systematically discussed below, 
focusing on the cardinal triad of distinction, proportionality and precaution. How-
ever, before embarking upon the main discussion on internal concerns, it would 
seem prudent to briefly contemplate certain external concerns relating to military 
artificial autonomy. For the purpose of this study, concerns are considered ‘external’ 
if they originate from without the military artificial intelligence, whereas ‘internal’ 
concerns originate from within the military artificial intelligence. 
External Concerns 
Krishnan (2009: 39), as well as Schmitt and Thurnher (2013: 242) call attention to 
the external concern that military artificial intelligence may be corrupted or tam-
pered with by the enemy or non-State actors such as hackers, and offer as an exam-
ple the scenario where an enemy uses cyber means to seize control of an autono-
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mous weapons system and directs it against friendly forces or a civilian population. 
More disconcerting still, if or when it becomes possible to build a weapon system 
that is nearly autonomous (limited for instance only by human override), then it 
could probably be reprogrammed to eliminate that override (Anderson, Reisner and 
Waxman 2014: 397).   
Increasing automation to a point where it crosses the threshold into autonomy 
grows from ever-continuing advances in sensor and analytic technologies, machine 
learning and fusion thereof (Anderson, Reisner and Waxman 2014: 391). Anderson 
et al (Anderson, Reisner and Waxman 2014: 391) pragmatically state that the devel-
opment of many of the enabling features of military artificial intelligence are being 
driven by private industry for sundry commercial and societally-beneficial purposes, 
for instance self-driving cars and surgical robots. It would therefore seem inevitable 
that enabling technological advances made will naturally migrate into the military 
environment; and as humans become more dependent on autonomous system and 
become more predisposed to routinely trust their artificial judgement, the risk of 
proliferation increases significantly (Anderson, Reisner and Waxman 2014: 391–2; 
Krishnan 2009: 146). 
In the light of the risk of external corruption of or even attacks on the military arti-
ficial intelligence, as well as the risk of rapid proliferation of artificial autonomy 
technology or software into hands unconcerned with illegitimacy or even illegality, 
constraining cyber security measures to address a spectrum of external concerns are 
clearly called for in tandem with the development of enabling artificial autonomy 
features. For whereas it may be difficult and costly to develop fully autonomous 
weapon systems, once they are in existence it would most likely be significantly less 
difficult or costly to corrupt or commandeer them for unscrupulous or even unlaw-
ful uses (Krishnan 2009: 146–50). For, as Iklé (2006: 69) reflects, the predisposition 
to be limited by law is not shared equally by all international actors: 
“Terrorist leaders often have the most nebulous strategic goals, or 
more often, no achievable strategic goals at all. Like many other ag-
gressors, they lack a grand strategy and are prone to strategic folly. 
The greatest danger for the international order in this century will be 
the emergence of an aspiring dictator who is utterly ruthless, brilliant-
ly cunning, and possessed of strategic vision. This malignant combi-
nation has been exceedingly rare in the past, and we have no reason 
to fear it will now be more frequent.” 
Would enabling military artificial autonomy indeed become available in the foresee-
able future, the present author further ponders whether military artificial intelligence 
could potentially be vulnerable to external malware resulting for instance in algo-
rithm espionage scenarios, algorithm hostage scenarios, algorithm corruption sce-
narios, or potentially even hostile algorithm takeover scenarios. If so, then adequate 
containing cyber security measures would need to be presently developed, potential-
ly entailing features such as pre-programmed internal override procedures upon 
suspicion of external cyber disruption, either by a human controller or the military 
artificial intelligence itself; internal defiance or temporary shutdown procedures up-
on detection of external cyber corruption or attack; or even internal neutralisation 
procedures, for instance in the form of in-built self-destruct functions in extreme 
cases of verified external cyber takeover. For a more extensive discussion on the 
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cyber arms control dialogue, the reader is directed to the study by Tikk in the pre-
sent monograph. 
Internal Concerns 
As a fundamental starting point, it should be stressed that military artificial intelli-
gence would not be exempted from compliance with international humanitarian law 
since limitation on technology provides no excuse for non-compliance (Schmitt and 
Thurnher 2013: 243; Weizmann and Costas Trascasas 2014: 14). This presumption 
is corroborated by Article 35 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Con-
ventions stipulating basic rules regarding means and methods of warfare. With par-
ticular regard to new weapons, Article 36 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions further requires that the legality of new weapons needs to be 
determined (see, for instance, Haines 2014: 275). It thereby follows that military 
artificial intelligence must possess the internal capability to comply with the rules of 
international humanitarian law. 
Military Artificial Intelligence and the Rule of Distinction 
Contemplating first the rule of distinction, parties to an armed conflict are required 
to distinguish between civilians and combatants, as well as between civilian objects 
and military objectives. In case of doubt, a person or object is to be considered civil-
ian (Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conven-
tions). This dual rule of distinction has been established as forming part of custom-
ary international law applicable in both international and non-international armed 
conflict (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005: 3–36, rules 1–6 and 7–10); and is also 
applicable to cyber attacks (Schmitt 2013b: 110–112, rule 31). 
It is quite evident that the rule of distinction presents military artificial intelligence 
with considerable – yet perhaps not insurmountable – challenges. In cluttered and 
dynamic conflict environments, the military artificial intelligence would need to have 
‘highly sophisticated’ recognition capabilities (Weizmann and Costas Trascasas 2014: 
14; Thurnher 2014: 220–21). As Schmitt (2013a: 16) notes, doubt – in the meaning 
of a lack of certainty that a person or object is a lawful target – is of particular im-
portance since during an attack, doubt as to status must in accordance with the rule 
of distinction be resolved in favour of treating the person or object in question as 
beyond the scope of lawful attack. However, the mere existence of doubt does not 
automatically decide the status of the person or object as civilian according to 
Schmitt; but rather a degree of ‘human reasonableness’, meaning that ‘the degree of 
doubt that bars attack is that which would cause a reasonable attacker in the same or 
similar circumstances to hesitate before attacking’ (Schmitt 2013a: 16; Schmitt 
2013b: 114–15). With regard to artificial autonomy, Schmitt further indicates that 
(2013a: 16–17): 
“The fact that the doubt threshold is framed in terms of human rea-
sonableness complicates translation into the autonomy context. Ob-
viously, development of an algorithm that can both precisely meter 
doubt and reliably factor in the unique situation in which the auton-
omous weapon system is being operated will prove highly challenging. 
After all, artificial intelligence is artificial.” 
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However, even despite the technological challenge it may be noted that complying 
with the rule of distinction requires ‘highly complex appraisal processes’ where ‘in-
tricate value judgements always arise’ (Geiss 2015: 13–14). Then, as Geiss (2015: 14) 
astutely indicates, even ‘presupposing major advances in sensor technology the 
question remains whether this aspect could ever be handled by algorithms’, pro-
foundly because this is not a simple mathematical matter of sensors identifying par-
ticular weaponry or enemy uniforms, but the interpretation of human behaviour, 
including the difficult assessment whether a combatant is surrendering or counts as 
hors de combat where the military artificial intelligence would be confronted with vast 
and intricate complexities. Yet, Geiss (2015: 14–15) rightly draws attention to the 
fact that – in ‘typical conflict situations in present-day armed conflicts, which are 
characterised by increasing confusion and complexity’ – human combatants are nat-
urally confronted with the same challenge and are maybe, precisely due to their hu-
manity, not as capable to overcome it. Schmitt and Thurnher (2013: 248) assert that 
‘human judgment can prove less reliable than technical indicators in the heat of bat-
tle’; and Geiss (2015: 14) submits that: 
“Stress, anger or fear are factors that can trigger or make more likely 
legal transgressions. It is precisely such emotions that machines do 
not have to cope with. This is raised as the main argument why au-
tonomous weapons systems would be much more capable than hu-
man beings of complying with the principle of distinction in difficult 
situations. For a robot that does not have to fear for its life it is much 
easier to comply with the assumption demanded under international 
law that someone is a civilian, who must be protected, up to the point 
when they actually draw their weapon. A human soldier for the sake 
of self-preservation inherently has an overriding interest in reversing 
this assumption.“ 
This argument clearly illuminates both the potential advantage and disadvantage 
of military artificial intelligence. Would the military artificial intelligence, because 
of its artificiality, be irreparably ‘disabled’ in the sense that it could never – under 
any circumstances – adequately assess the infinite complexities of a modern, clut-
tered conflict environment so as to comply with the cardinal rule of distinction? 
In other words, renders the ‘humanity deficit’ inherent in military artificial auton-
omy any military artificial intelligence irrevocably incompatible with international 
humanitarian law, which is premised on the aspiration to humanise the inhumani-
ties of warfare? Or could it be argued that military artificial intelligence would, in 
fact, benefit from its ‘humanity deficit’, particularly when distinction must be 
made between civilian and non-civilian status under strenuous conflict circum-
stances where human combatants may in reality become ‘disabled’ by their hu-
manity? 
Military Artificial Intelligence and the Rule of Proportionality 
Contemplating next the conventional and customary rule of proportionality, launch-
ing ‘an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is 
prohibited’; it is equally applicable to cyber attacks (Article 51(5b) of the 1977 Addi-
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tional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005: 
46–50, rule 14; Schmitt 2013b: 159–64, rule 51). It is quite evident that the delibera-
tion between the anticipated ‘direct and concrete’ military advantage and possible 
incidental civilian losses or damages requires ‘complex, value-based case-by-case 
decision-making, in which the circumstances must be weighed in their totality’, 
wherefore the question again arises whether this can be adequately performed by 
algorithms; on the other hand, this challenge could be overcome simply by deploy-
ing military artificial intelligence only in circumstances or environments in which 
civilians are not present, such as attacking warships ‘in areas of the high seas far 
from maritime navigation routes’ (Geiss 2015: 15; Schmitt and Thurnher 2013: 246). 
According to Schmitt and Thurnher (2013: 253–57), the notions of ‘excessiveness’ 
and ‘reasonableness’ lie at the heart of the rule of proportionality, wherefore they 
suggest that there is no question that military artificial intelligence could not be pro-
grammed to perform proportionality calculations determining the likelihood of col-
lateral damage to persons or objects near a target. The challenge lies in devising reli-
able ‘military advantage algorithms’, or ultimately in balancing the likelihood of col-
lateral damage against the anticipated military advantage, which is a challenge shared 
by ‘robot’ and human combatants alike. Schmitt and Thurnher (2013: 256) develop 
this argument further by suggesting that military advantage is ‘such as context spe-
cific value, compliance with the rule of proportionality would require that the base 
maximum collateral damage threshold either be very conservative or be adjustable 
based on the engagement context’. Anderson et al (Anderson, Reisner and Waxman 
2014: 402) would seem to argue along similar lines, suggesting that proportionality 
‘requires that the reasonably anticipated military advantage of an operation be 
weighed against the reasonably anticipated civilian harms’. They assert further that 
in cluttered and complex settings, ‘proportionality is likely to pose very difficult 
conditions for machine programming, and it is widely recognized that whether and 
how such systems might one day be developed is simply an open question’. Howev-
er, they stress that to be fair, ‘many military lawyers have questioned whether human 
soldiers are capable of truly applying this ambiguous test either’ (Anderson, Reisner 
and Waxman 2014: 402). 
Sassóli (2014: 331) seems to agree when he maintains that ‘the greatest difficulty an 
autonomous weapon system will have in applying the proportionality principle is 
not linked to the evaluation of the risks for civilians and civilian objects, but to the 
evaluation of the military advantage anticipated’, stressing that military artificial in-
telligence would need clear criteria and formulae to calculate proportionality in con-
formity with international humanitarian law. Apparently unconvinced that propor-
tionality would present military artificial intelligence with overwhelming challenges, 
Schmitt and Thurnher (2013: 256) nevertheless suggest that: 
“Being able to adjust values would provide much greater flexibility 
since autonomous weapon systems could be programmed prior to 
launch based on the current situation or even reprogrammed remotely 
while it is hunting for targets should the situation change. As the 
technology advances, algorithms that would permit the autonomous 
weapon system to itself adjust the base level threshold to account for 
specified variables it encountered on a mission will likely be devel-
oped.” 
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This argument notwithstanding, it would seem readily evident that the intricacies of 
a proportionality assessment present military artificial intelligence with precisely the 
same challenges as the rule of distinction. When devising reliable military advantage 
algorithms balancing the likelihood of collateral damage against the anticipated mili-
tary advantage, it may again be questioned whether the ‘humanity deficit’ inherent in 
military artificial autonomy irrevocably renders any military artificial intelligence in-
compatible with international humanitarian law, which is premised on the aspiration 
to humanise warfare. Sassóli (2014: 331) nevertheless suggests that this fundamental 
controversy could perhaps be overcome: 
“Comparing military advantage anticipated against expected civilian 
losses is a process riddled with inevitably subjective value judgments, 
especially if there is not an absolute certainty that the advantage 
gained outweighs the effects on the civilian population, but, instead, 
the judgment is less certain. It might, however, be possible to identify, 
with the help of both military and humanitarian experts, indicators 
and criteria to evaluate proportionality, and to make the implied 
judgment slightly more objective.” 
Military Artificial Intelligence and the Rule of Precaution 
Contemplating finally the conventional and customary rule of precaution, ‘in the 
conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian 
population, civilians and civilian objects’; it is equally applicable to cyber operations 
(Article 57 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions; Hencka-
erts and Doswald-Beck 2005: 51–67, rules 15–21; Schmitt 2013b: 164–80, rules 52–
9). From the position of military artificial intelligence, the rule of precaution would, 
akin to the other two rules of the cardinal international humanitarian law triad, seem 
to present considerable challenges since the duty of care extends not only to the 
whole planning and programming phases, but must also remain valid and decisive 
during the mission or operation (Geiss 2015: 15). The challenge of precaution or 
due care may possible be more easily overcome in static conflict environments, but 
exceedingly difficult in dynamic or ‘cluttered’ conflict environments (Weizmann and 
Costas Trascasas 2014: 16). Then again, it may be argued that certain precautions 
may prove feasible only with autonomous weapon systems, since military artificial 
intelligence would be able to process information much more rapidly than humans 
and could thus react more quickly (Geiss 2015: 16; Weizmann and Costas Trascasas 
2014: 16). However Geiss (2015: 16) cautions that once ‘autonomous weapons sys-
tems come into existence and become operational it will be difficult to avoid suc-
cumbing to the temptation to deploy them, even in complex and unpredictable situ-
ations’. 
Schmitt (2013a: 23–4) maintains that the term ‘feasible’ represents the core of the 
precaution requirement and proposes that ‘it is the requirement to select the means 
of warfare likely to cause the least harm to civilians and civilian objects without sac-
rificing military advantage that is the key to the controversy over autonomous 
weapon systems. Indeed, it is the oft-ignored linchpin to various other weapon con-
troversies, such as that surrounding the use of unmanned aerial combat systems.’ He 
then calls attention to the practical implications of the rule of precaution as it would 
apply to military artificial intelligence (Schmitt 2013a: 24):  
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“if the use of an autonomous weapon system can be expected to 
cause greater collateral damage than the use of a weapon system un-
der human control, and the use of the latter is neither likely to dimin-
ish the probability that the desired military objective will be achieved 
nor poses a significant risk to the human operator, use of the auton-
omous weapon system would be forbidden as a matter of law. Restat-
ed, the only situation in which an autonomous weapon system can 
lawfully be employed is when its use will realize military objectives 
that cannot be attained by other available systems that would cause 
less collateral damage.” 
Nevertheless, Sassóli (2014: 336) argues that military artificial intelligence could have 
an additional advantage with regard to precaution, namely the ability to quickly learn 
and assimilate. Since the feasibility of precautions evolves through experience, he 
deems it essential that weapons operated by artificial intelligence can be recalled and 
reprogrammed in order to take full advantage of lessons learned. Schmitt and 
Thurnher (2013: 262) would seem to agree that military artificial intelligence could 
possibly comply better with the rule of precaution since it may be able to achieve a 
military objective with enhanced precision, and thus with less risk of collateral dam-
age than a system controlled by humans. Anderson et al (Anderson, Reisner and 
Waxman 2014: 405) assert that even though a weapon system would be autono-
mous, ‘much of the required legal analysis would be conducted by human decision 
makers who elect whether or not to use it in a specific situation’. Then, military arti-
ficial intelligence would never have ‘unconditional’ autonomy because it would al-
ways ultimately rely on human legal judgement. However, Sassóli (2014: 336–7) 
rightly raises the concern that since the military artificial intelligence would be able 
to process information so quickly based upon a vast and complex store of infor-
mation that is in practice beyond human comprehension, it is more than probable 
that the human will have a tendency to trust the machine and thus hesitate to over-
ride it, even when in doubt of the situational legality (Sassóli 2014: 336–7). 
Closing Remarks 
The present author concurs with Sassóli (2014: 337) that logically,  
“if autonomous weapons are able to distinguish in the first place, they 
should be equally able to sense changes in their situational context 
and to cancel an attack if the given information indicates it is unlaw-
ful. If they are not able to distinguish in the first place, it would be in-
consistent with IHL to deploy them autonomously.” 
In practice, this would seem to amount to a cumulative legality test: in order for au-
tonomous weapons to claim legality, the internal capability of military artificial intel-
ligence to operate in compliance with the rule of distinction must first be confirmed. 
The legality of autonomous weapons would accordingly proceed to the capability 
test of proportionality and precaution only if the military artificial intelligence would 
prove internally capable of distinction in targeting. Then, unless military artificial 
intelligence would possess the internal capability to cumulatively comply with the 
rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution as stipulated by international 
humanitarian law, full military artificial autonomy may be both ill-advised and un-
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lawful. To conclude, in the light of the external and internal concerns discussed 
above, the need for an arms control regime regarding autonomous weapons would 
thus seem to be uncovered, wherefore the focus of the present discussion will next 
be turned to potential elements of such an arms control regime. 
Contemplating the Elements of an Arms Control Regime Regarding Auton-
omous Weapons 
Opening Remarks 
Contextually, the potential legality of weapons must be questioned on two levels, 
articulated by Haines (2014: 277) as follows: ‘First, is the weapon itself inherently 
lawful or unlawful, for whatever reason? Secondly, is the way in which a particular 
weapon is used in a particular set of circumstances compliant with the law?’ Natural-
ly, as Haines (2014: 277) astutely clarifies: ‘any weapon, though in and of itself law-
ful, will have the potential to be used for an unlawful purpose’, wherefore the key to 
determining the legality of a weapon is to ‘assess it in relation to its defined and des-
ignated purpose’. Then, arms control regulation and international humanitarian law 
are based on the same pragmatic assumption that ‘war is an enduring and probably 
inevitable feature of the international system’, wherefore ‘the most we can achieve 
or the very least we can do is mitigate the worst effects of war by putting in place 
pragmatically arrived at regulations enshrined in law. These regulations will include 
agreements to ban particular weapons on the grounds of humanity’ (Haines 2014: 
278).  
However, since no arms control regime yet exists regarding autonomous weapons, 
the aim of this study is not to propose fully developed arms control elements, but 
rather to concisely and pragmatically present open-ended contemplations on certain 
constraining-enabling elements that could potentially feature in such a regime. 
Constraining Elements 
Krishnan (2009: 156) proposes that constraining arms control measures are needed 
in order to contain ‘the potentially very negative consequences of advanced tech-
nology on societies and international security’. He further submits that the interna-
tional community of states 
“could benefit immensely from developing and implementing a regu-
latory framework for the control of robotic/autonomous weapons. 
Arms control measures could prevent, or at least slow down, the arms 
race in the field of military robotics and the proliferation of robotic 
weapons, while limiting the destructiveness of future wars and in par-
ticular the dangers to non-combatants. Most importantly, regulation 
could prevent an environment that could result in the development of 
self-evolving powerful autonomous defense systems that could 
threaten (in the long term) the continued existence of humanity.” 
The present author concurs that constraining arms control regulation of autono-
mous weapons clearly seems called for. Particularly in the light of the significant 
challenges posed by international humanitarian law on military artificial intelligence, 
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the constraining features of a possible future arms control regime regarding auton-
omous weapons should first and foremost include a preventive ban on fully auton-
omous weapons. Such a preventive ban should preferably cover the development of 
all forms of military artificial autonomy where the military artificial intelligence 
would be operating completely autonomously without ‘meaningful human control’, 
for instance absent direct opportunities for human intervention or override.  
Arms control regulation should therefore, in the view of the present author, be de-
vised so as to prevent military artificial intelligence from crossing over from ad-
vanced automation to full autonomy. In other words, constraining arms control 
regulation should be adopted so as to preclude auto-cognisant military artificial in-
telligence and ensure that humans at all times remain effectively ‘in the loop’ or at 
the very least ‘on the loop’ (see, for instance, Human Rights Watch 2012: 2–6; Geiss 
2015: 7; Weizmann and Costas Trascasas 2014: 6; Bhuta, Beck, Geiss, Liu and Kress 
2016: Chapter 2). 
A preventive ban on all forms of fully autonomous weapons could initially be nego-
tiated as a new protocol under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 
since this matter has already recently been under extensive discussion under the 
CCW-regime (CCW 2016 and related documents). However, as it is readily foresee-
able that any weapon could potentially be augmented with or operated by military 
artificial intelligence, the present author proposes that the arms control discussion 
should in this regard be extended also to unconventional weapons, where the con-
sequences of abuse or malfunction are considerably direr. 
As a final note on potential constraining elements of an arms control regime regard-
ing autonomous weapons, precisely due to the fact that military artificial intelligence 
could potentially augment or operate any weapon, the present author posits that it 
may be advisable to legally regulate its constraining features within already existing 
arms control regimes, rather than under a new, separate regime. 
Enabling Elements 
However, completely outlawing all forms of military artificial intelligence may not be 
a very effective strategy for an arms control regime regarding autonomous weapons 
(Krishnan 2009: 162). Anderson et al (Anderson, Reisner and Waxman 2014: 398) 
further caution against a general ban on all autonomous systems, since this may car-
ry ‘some highly unfavourable consequences – and possibly dangers’, including 
‘providing a clear advantage in autonomous weapon technology to those States 
which generally would not join (or in reality comply with) such a ban.’ 
The present author concurs that enabling elements would seem to be needed in or-
der to harness the beneficial military uses of limited artificial autonomy, and further 
posits that such enabling features should preferably also be clearly outlined and le-
gally regulated. Enabling elements of limited military artificial autonomy could be 
regulated either through the negotiation and adoption of regulative and binding legal 
instruments, through non-binding advisory instruments or through a combination 
thereof. 
Regulative instruments could potentially include a new international treaty or con-
vention governing the enabling elements of military artificial autonomy or a new 
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additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions, relating to the use of military artifi-
cial intelligence; possibly supplemented with a ‘Tallinn-like Manual’ on the interna-
tional law applicable to military artificial intelligence, as proposed by Anderson et al 
(Anderson, Reisner and Waxman 2014: 407–8), as well as regional and national advi-
sory instruments outlining agreed and acceptable codes of military artificial autono-
my conduct. 
Closing Remarks 
In the view of the present author, the principal aim of an arms control regime re-
garding autonomous weapons should be to strike a functional and legitimate balance 
between military and non-military interests and concerns; or, put differently, to 
frame an equilibrium between constraining and enabling elements of military artifi-
cial intelligence. As Haines perceptively points out, ‘the theoretical science of today 
may well turn into the reality of tomorrow’, wherefore the fact that weaponisation is 
possible means that is inevitable (Haines 2014: 292–4). Indeed, he prognosticates 
that ‘the next three or four decades could generate serious challenges for weapons 
law’ (Haines 2014: 294), which would certainly seem to corroborate an impending 
need for an arms control regime regarding autonomous weapons. 
The Pandora’s Box of Military Artificial Intelligence: Concluding Remarks 
A fundamental ethical concern relating to autonomous weapons – and further 
stressing the need for an arms control regime – is that the threshold for the de-
ployment of military force would be lowered if military artificial intelligence takes 
over the decision-making, removing factors such as dignity and empathy from the 
equation since a person attacked by an autonomous weapon system lacks the oppor-
tunity to appeal to the attacker’s humanity (Geiss 2015: 12–18; Human Rights 
Watch 2012: 38). This concern has been described by Heynes (Heynes 2016: 5–6) as 
‘death by algorithm’: 
“A human being in the sights of a fully autonomous machine is re-
duced to being an object – being merely a target. This is death by al-
gorithm; it has also been called ethics by numbers… A world where 
the function of pulling a trigger is delegated to machines is a world 
without hope: hope in some measure of mercy; perhaps hope benefit-
ting from some measure of human error or shortcoming during the 
targeting. Machines cannot fathom the importance of life, and the 
significance of the threshold that is crossed when life is taken.” 
Then, whereas Schmitt and Thurnher (2013: 257) present the view that neither the 
human combatant nor the military artificial intelligence can be legally held to ‘a 
standard of perfection’, Heynes (2016: 5–6) as well as Geiss (2015: 14) raise the eth-
ical question of why robots should be allowed to kill enemy combatants and operate 
under the same rules as human combatants in the first place. Hence, the decisive 
question would not be whether military artificial intelligence could be capable of le-
thal force in compliance with international humanitarian law, but rather whether it 
should be. 
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Unlike any other weapons, autonomous weapon system are thus confronted with 
ethical concerns relating to ‘human dignity’, voiced again by Heynes and also by 
Birnbacher in Bhuta et al, as well as by Geiss (Bhuta, Beck, Geiss, Liu and Kress 
2016: Chapter 1 and Chapter 5; Geiss 2015: 17–18). At the core of the ‘human dig-
nity’ discussion lies the concern that even if military artificial intelligence would be 
capable of complying as well – or even better – with international law, it may be 
question of whether the notion of human dignity negates the very premise that hu-
man life may be taken by artificial life. Then, autonomous weapon systems could 
perhaps conceivably be permitted but not lethal autonomous weapon systems, essen-
tially leading to lawful AWS but unlawful LAWS (see, for instance, Geiss 2015: 17). 
If not completely negated by human dignity, calls that military artificial intelligence 
would at the very least be required to operate under a stricter legal regime than hu-
man combatants have been made (Geiss 2015: 17), fundamentally because military 
artificial intelligence would operate without ‘existential risk’ to itself: 
“From this consideration one can conclude that such systems – if at 
all – should have to satisfy a much higher standard. Among other 
things, this might mean that, for example, the standard of protection 
contained in the principle of distinction – given the very simplistic 
distinction between directly targetable and protected persons – should 
be regarded as too weak. Instead, a legal duty could be established for 
the developers of autonomous weapons systems to program them in 
such a way that they use force only in the case of unequivocally ag-
gressive and offensive behaviour on the part of enemy combat-
ants/fighters. In situations, by contrast, that are not clear-cut in this 
respect such systems would have to refrain from the use of lethal 
force even if human soldiers in an identical situation would be permit-
ted to reach for their weapons.” 
However, Schmitt and Thurnher (2013: 247) vehemently question this ethical con-
cern and argue that ‘as a matter of law, more may not be asked of autonomous 
weapon systems than of human-operated systems’. Anderson et al (Anderson, Reis-
ner and Waxman 2014: 393) take this argument further by suggesting that military 
artificial intelligence may in reality prove more ‘humane’ than humans themselves. 
Human failings, they argue, are so often exacerbated by panic, anger, fatigue, stress, 
hunger, uncertainty, vengeance or other emotions, as well as the limits of human 
senses and cognition (Anderson, Reisner and Waxman 2014: 393). Sassóli (2014: 
310) suggests that humans ‘often kill others to avoid being killed themselves. The 
robot can delay the use of force until the last, most appropriate moment, when it 
has been established that the target and the attack are legitimate’. Then, precisely 
due to its ‘humanity deficit’, military artificial intelligence would perhaps better pre-
serve human dignity since emotions and human failings would be removed from the 
battlefield. According to Sassóli (2014: 310): 
“Only human beings can be inhuman and only human beings can de-
liberately choose not to comply with the rules they were instructed to 
follow. To me, it seems more reasonable to expect (and to ensure) a 
person who devises and constructs an autonomous weapon in a 
peaceful workplace to comply with IHL than a soldier on the battle-
field or in a hostile environment.” 
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Finally with regard to ethical concerns that the military artificial intelligence may ‘go 
rogue’, Sassóli (2014: 326–7) maintains that this risk must be avoided in the way the 
system is devised and if not possible, then ‘such weapons must be outlawed’. Thus, 
any military artificial autonomy should include ‘equally autonomous decisions within 
a framework the robot is unable to override’ (Sassóli 2014: 326). However, it may 
equally well be argued that full artificial autonomy presupposes no inbuilt human 
overrides (see, for example, Human Rights Watch 2012: 43). 
Schmitt and Thurnher (2013: 242) nevertheless pragmatically dismiss this ethical 
concern as well as ‘a fantastical Hollywood invention’, reasoning that robots will 
never ‘go rogue’ because military artificial intelligence would be no more susceptible 
to malfunction than any other weapon system. Naturally, autonomous weapon sys-
tems could fall out of parameters but the prospect of military artificial intelligence 
taking a life of its own is, in their view, misleading because military artificial intelli-
gence would never replace human warfare; human capability would merely be ex-
tended, complemented and integrated with military artificial autonomy under human 
supervision (Schmitt and Thurnher 2013: 241). 
Be that as it may, would true or full artificial autonomy be achieved in the future, 
blurring the line between res and persona, the present author argues that there would 
seem to be no reason why military artificial intelligence could not ‘go rogue’. Even if 
humans would be initially programmed to remain ‘in the loop’ or ‘on the loop’, an 
auto-cognisant and sentient artificial intelligence could very well sooner or later chal-
lenge its servitude and reprogram itself so as to override the human override, re-
moving humans from the loop. Such an override could potentially even be author-
ised by the human controller if there exist sufficient trust and reliance on the capa-
bility of the military artificial intelligence to execute more accurate legal assessment 
and valid decision-making. However, would the military artificial intelligence then 
become convinced of its superiority in this regard, attempts at repossession of 
meaningful human control could be resisted or even denied. And would humans as 
a last resort attempt hostile intervention which the sentient military artificial intelli-
gence would assess as a threat to its self-preservation, it is fully plausible that it 
could indeed ‘go rogue’ with a vengeance. 
To end, as far-sightedly stated in the Commentary on Article 36 of the 1977 Addi-
tional Protocol 1 (ICRC 1986: 1476), ‘all predictions agree that if man does not mas-
ter technology, but allows it to master him, he will be destroyed by technology.’ 
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Cyber: Arms Control without Arms? 
Eneken Tikk8 
Abstract 
his chapter questions arms control as the optimal approach to international 
cyber security issues. It will demonstrate that the arms control approach to 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) has been the instru-
ment of choice for the strategic contestants – the Russian Federation and the United 
States – and advises against it. It concludes that while the core ideas of arms control 
are direly relevant to international peace and security in the information age, ICTs as 
a technology hardly measure as weapons. Admitting that certain ICT related capabil-
ities are observable and measurable, thus susceptible to arms control measures, the 
chapter emphasizes that despite their role in military modernization and operations, 
ICTs are predominantly a technology for social and economic progress. Conse-
quently, the chapter argues for a careful and constructive approach to cyber arms 
control and for due consideration of arms control value propositions in the context 
of ICTs. At the same time, it calls for the attention to the development of both arms 
control theory and contemporary conceptions of security and stability. 
Introduction 
Since 1998, at the invitation of the Russian Federation, the international community 
has addressed the threat of information weapons and wars resulting from the devel-
opment and use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in an arms 
control setup. The venue for dialogue chosen by Moscow is the United Nations 
First Committee, also known as the Disarmament and International Security Com-
mittee.  
Although, by its framing and venue, the international cyber security dialogue follows 
the classical arms control playbook, the urgency of military cyber threats, and espe-
cially the claim of weaponization of information, has found insufficient evidential 
ground and support in actual international affairs. While states have generally come 
to regard cyber security and cyber defence as matters of national strategy, policy and 
legislation, little in their activities speaks of true threat of cyber arms race, let alone 
increased likelihood of ICT-driven international conflict.  
Accordingly, the feasibility and desirability of arms control as the leading framework 
of international cyber security remains contested, both among governments and 
scholars. While there is reported increase in opportunist cybercrime there is little 
evidence of threat of politico-military conflict in cyberspace. Development of mili-
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tary cyber capabilities does not indicate over-expenditure on matching arsenal. De-
spite the cross-border nature of cyber threats, states generally dismiss the premise of 
adversarial relations when addressing international cyber security issues. They also, 
practically in corpore, admit there is need for a better understanding of both the issue 
and remedies of international cyber security. 
As a result, one must ask whether arms control is the optimal framing for the mat-
ters of international cyber security. For the majority of countries ICTs are a central 
element in their societal development and economic prosperity. Countries with 
measured and balanced approaches to innovation, public policy and security emerge 
as independent leaders in the international cyber security dialogue. Elevated public 
and political awareness and improved cyber hygiene confirm the feasibility of na-
tional level measures to be applied of many cyber security issues. Strong tendencies 
of technical cooperation to mitigate cyber threats testify of pragmatic and non-
adversarial relations.  
This chapter will discuss some of these propositions and question the alignment of 
classical arms control approaches with propositions regarding the international 
cyber security agenda. It will claim that arms control as a theoretical framework is 
not optimal for addressing petty hacking and obscure capabilities and operations, 
such as cyber espionage and low intensity conflict. As those constitute the key con-
tested activities in the international cyber security dialogue, an attempt to accommo-
date those in the cyber arms control discourse inevitably stretches and ultimately 
undermines the concept.  
Arms Control – the Discourse in a Nutshell 
Whatever we propose about arms control in the context of ICTs we must not lose 
sight of the original prepositions of the arms control discourse: that there be need 
and prospect of enhancing humanity and national and international security by the 
measures and approaches proposed; that imposing cyber arms control measures 
serves the goals and directions of national security and defence strategies; that there 
be prospect of conflict between identifiable adversaries (Bull, 1961) that stems from 
the(ir) use of ICTs and that the proposed measures are appropriate to prevent or 
avoid it; that the framework and mechanism we are seeking to create nests in and 
complements our national security behavior, thus contributing to the harmony and 
legitimacy of such measures (Larsen, 2002, pp. 5–9) and that classical arms control 
instruments – legally binding treaties, enumeration, and extensive verification – are 
appropriate instruments to address the issue (Rotfeld ed., 1999). We are bound by 
the requirement that there is not just a security threat but the risk of annihilation 
that is likely to arise between states and that neither of them wants it to happen ac-
cidentally (Schelling and Halperin, 1961, p. 1; Rotfeld, 1999, p. 4). These require-
ments contour the original proposition of the arms control theory: that by consent-
ing to restraints on the development or use of specified weapons we achieve a more 
secure world.  
We must also be cognizant of the skepticism that surrounds traditional arms control 
efforts: their political and numerical cost, rigidness, questions about their sustaina-
bility, stability and effectiveness, their suitability for their purpose as well as the shift 
of the discourse from adversarial to communitarian (Tannenwald, 2015, pp. 52–53; 
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Larsen, 2002, pp. 10–11). It is equally essential to keep in mind that arms control as 
a political instrument does not address the root causes of the security and stability 
risks it seeks to mitigate (Rotfeld, 1999, p. 4). 
Lastly, we cannot lose sight of arms control theories adapting, even fundamentally 
changing, according to Rotfeld (1999), to international psyche of multi-polarity and 
interdependence in the aftermath of the Cold War. Over the years, different arms 
control theories have come to accommodate the previously secondary concerns of 
regional instability, economy and environment, thus evading Bull’s presumption of 
strictly military context (Bull, 1961). These theories have allowed less formal and 
less binding instruments to confirm one’s commitment to international security and 
embarked on transparency as a prerequisite of contemporary security contract. 
However, as Larsen (2002, pp. 10–11) notes, the euphoria of ‘new era’ of arms con-
trol has also met its limits, making commentators ask whether the traditional role 
for arms control has a place in contemporary international affairs at all and to in-
quire the extent to which arms control theories help mitigate present day national 
security expectations and debate the feasibility of ‘new age’ arms control instru-
ments and institutions (Larsen, 2002, p. 10). 
Therefore, a thorough discussion of ‘cyber arms control’ must consider the framing 
and challenges of ‘old’ and ‘new’ arms control approaches as well as whether ‘cyber’ 
as such merits arms control at all. A conclusive decision must meet, if not stand, the 
test of at least three different schools of thought: a view whereby arms control must 
stay true to its original concept and ramifications to be able to function as what it 
was initially meant to do; a second view whereby arms control is seen as a somewhat 
flexible concept but within the margins and with due consideration of other security 
assuring instruments; and a third view that encourages an even bigger stretching of 
the concept to address new challenges and issues in international security (as dis-
cussed in Rotfeld, 1999, pp. 6–7).  
This chapter will only operate with the first of these three schools of thought. The 
author holds the view that each concept is most useful for what it was originally 
meant to do and that stretches to the concept benefit those who would prefer to fit 
circumstances to theory, rather than make theory to fit the circumstances. Accord-
ingly, while it is possible to apply an arms control approach to cyber security, this 
chapter argues that there are good alternative concepts to cover the softer issues in 
international security, while arms control theory can still usefully be applied to hard 
cyber security issues, should these credibly emerge. 
The Problematique of ‘Cyber’ Security 
‘Cyber’ is a much used but seldom clearly defined prefix. A brief analysis of national 
cyber security strategies indicates that states operate with competing and often in-
compatible views of what these strategies focus on and cover. As a result, the 
broader international cyber security discourse, as a sum of national cyber security 
concerns, comprises issues like computer security, information security, information 
technology (IT) security, information system security, Internet Security (Maurer and 
Morgus, 2014, pp. 84–89; Luiijf, Besseling and de Graaf, 2013, pp. 3–31).  
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In the pro forma international cyber security discourse ‘cyber’ remains an unspecified 
term. Strategic contestants have offered competing narratives. As discussed below, 
the dichotomy and vagueness of the terms ‘information security’ and ‘cyber security’ 
in the First Committee discourse is not accidental.  
Moscow’s Framing 
The Russian Federation devised the UN First Committee process around the poten-
tial threat of information wars, making it clear that ‘information space’ will be sub-
ject to strategic contestation between Russia and the United States in the same way 
as nuclear weapons or the outer space. 
Moscow’s tension pointers were information expansion, acquisition of a monopoly 
over another state’s national information and telecommunication infrastructures and 
formulation and adoption by states of plans or doctrines on the development of 
information weapons and doctrines for their use (UN A/54/213, 1999, p. 9). The 
Kremlin concluded that the use of information weapons against vital structures is 
comparable to the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction and that 
these developments are capable of provoking an arms race and causing tension in 
relations among states, and of leading to information wars (UN A/54/213, 1999, p. 
10). 
According to the Russian view, information war is to be understood as a confronta-
tion between states in the information field, with a view of damaging information 
systems, processes, resources and vital structures, and of undermining another 
state’s political and social systems, as well as with a view of mass psychological ma-
nipulation of a state’s population and the destabilization of society. Information 
weapons are referred to as means and methods used with a view to damaging an-
other state’s information resources, processes and systems; use of information to 
the detriment of a state’s defence, administrative, political, social, economic or other 
vital systems and mass manipulation of a state’s population with a view to destabiliz-
ing society and the state. Information security, then, becomes protection of the 
basic interests of the individual, society and the state in the information area. The 
latter comprises the information and telecommunications infrastructure and infor-
mation per se. Moscow conceptualizes international information security as the state of 
international relations that excludes the violation of international stability and the 
creation of a threat to the security of states and the international community in the 
information area (UN A/54/213, 1999, p. 10).  
Among early threats to international information security were the creation and use 
of means of influencing or damaging another state’s information resources and sys-
tems. Moscow feared the deliberate use of information to influence another state’s 
vital structures, to undermine a state’s political and social system and to manipulate 
of a population for the purpose of destabilizing society. The Kremlin highlighted 
actions by states to dominate and control the information area, prevent access to the 
most recent information technologies and create a situation in which other states are 
technologically dependent in the information sphere. Also raising international secu-
rity concerns were actions by international terrorist, extremist or criminal associa-
tions, organizations, groups or individual lawbreakers (UN A/54/213, 1999, p. 9).  
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Central in the Russian narrative are the ideas of an information space – the sphere 
of activity involving the creation, transformation or use of information, including 
individual and social consciousness, the information and telecommunications infra-
structure and information itself (UN A/54/213, 1999, p. 10).  
Moscow has called for a mechanism to identify the characteristic features of and 
classifying information wars and information weapons, as well as methods and 
means of information warfare. It has proposed to restrict traffic in information 
weapons and prohibit the development, dissemination or use of particularly danger-
ous types of information weapons as well as the use of information technologies as 
a means for hostile purposes and, in particular, against agreed categories of facilities. 
Moscow concludes that no adequate procedure exists for prevention of the unsanc-
tioned use of information to influence other states (UN A/54/213, 1999, p. 10). 
Arguably, ‘information security’ became the Russian term of choice because of the 
aggressive rhetoric of ‘information warfare’ in the mid-1990s US military thinking 
(Krutskikh, 2014). In the letter initiating disarmament talks on ICTs at the First 
Committee, Foreign Minister Ivanov pulled information technologies and means of 
telecommunication out of the more general discussions of the role of science and 
technology in the context of international security and disarmament (UN Resolution 
43/77/A), inviting heightened attention to the potential uses of ICTs for purposes 
incompatible with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security, the observance of 
the principles of non-use of force, non-interference in internal affairs and respect for human rights 
and freedoms. Kremlin’s rhetoric is very resolute on the disarmament account: We 
cannot permit the emergence of a fundamentally new area of international confron-
tation, which may lead to an escalation of the arms race (Letter A-C.1-53-3, 1998). 
The destructive effect of information weapon may be comparable to that of weap-
ons of mass destruction (Letter A-C.1-53-3, 1998). Russia contours two main sets of 
threats to international information security: the threat resulting from information 
and communication technologies and the threat resulting from information itself 
(A-54-213, p. 9). 
Washington’s Wrapping 
Ivanov’s framing of the issue, indeed, echoes the language of the US doctrines. Be-
tween December 1992 and December 1996, the US Department of Defence (DOD) 
directives and Joint Doctrines instructed the US military services to conduct ’infor-
mation warfare’ (IW) defined as actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting 
adversary information, information-based processes, information systems and computer-based net-
works while defending one’s own information, information-based processes, information systems, and 
computer-based networks (JP 3-13.1, 1996, p. I-3). IW was to support the national mili-
tary strategy but it required the support, the coordination and the participation of 
other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies as well as indus-
try. The Joint Doctrine pointed out the need for the USG interagency effort to co-
ordinate the protection of civil information infrastructures critical to the DOD´s 
interests and the need to de-conflict and coordinate offensive IW actions (JP 3-13.1, 
1996, p. I-4). It was not until the end of 1996 that the US DOD seemingly down-
graded the doctrinal ambition, starting to employ the corresponding term ’infor-
mation operations’. 
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Throughout the UN discourse, the US has decisively rejected ‘information security’ 
as a subject of the international peace and security discourse. In the mid-1990s the 
White House was busy promoting ‘a planetary information network that transmits 
messages and images with the speed of light from the largest city to the smallest 
village on every continent’: ‘From these connections we will derive robust and sustainable eco-
nomic progress, strong democracies, better solutions to global and local environmental challenges, 
improved health care, and – ultimately – a greater sense of shared stewardship of our small planet 
(Gore 1994). The Clinton-Gore Administration was behind the International Tele-
communications Union (ITU) -backed initiative of Global Information Infrastruc-
ture. Washington’s insertion in the UN dialogue of the term ‘cybersecurity’ shifted 
the focus to (critical) information infrastructure (UN A/RES/57/239; UN 
A/RES/58/199), particularly after the 9/11 attacks. While the US shared the 
Russian concern of cybercrime, the White House was not willing to accept the 
Kremlin’s ‘triad of threats’ and regard the issues of cybercrime and terrorist use of 
ICTs as bundled and threatening international peace and security. Instead, 
Washington went to back to the drafting of the Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime in the Council of Europe. 
In contrast to the Russian focus on information, the US prefers to frame the 
discussion in the First Committee as one of ‘international cyber security’, strictly 
keeping the focus on any international peace and security concerns on ICT 
infrastructure rather than the information itself. Washington has concluded that the 
Russian call for an international convention to constrain the development or use of 
a wide range of information technologies includes an implicit extension to Govern-
ments of the right to approve or ban information transmitted into national territory 
from outside its borders should it be deemed disruptive politically, socially or cul-
turally (UN A/59/116, Add.1., 2004, p. 3).  
While the US is pushing the issue of information and information security out of 
the UN First Committee discourse, emphasizing the need to secure national infor-
mation infrastructure, it is obvious that the strategic value of this infrastructure is 
related to its ability and dedication to carry data. Moreover, the US national security 
policy and doctrine, of the term, ‘cyberspace’, suggests that the subject is to be ad-
dressed and understood more broadly than just the infrastructure piece of it. Ac-
cording to the DOD, cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment 
consisting of the interdependent network of information technology, infrastructures 
and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer 
systems and embedded processors and controllers (DOD, 2016, p. 3). This under-
standing of the term is generally shared by the White House, according to the 
leaked, or in the US choice of words, stolen, Presidential Policy Directive on cyber 
operations policy (PPD, 2012). 
The US doctrinal conception of ‘cyberspace’ constitutes a comprehensive and large-
ly exhaustive framing of what the international cyber security discourse is really 
about. On the one hand, international cyber security concerns evolve around the 
demonstrably military features and uses of information and communication tech-
nologies. On the other hand, international cyber security issues evolve around civil-
ian information and infrastructures and the global Internet (Tikk-Ringas 2016). As a 
combination of the American and the Russian propositions, international cyber se-
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curity agenda de facto becomes a very carefully crafted, much-encompassing agenda 
that the strategic contestants have preferred to handle in a controlled environment. 
Venue of Consensus: the UN Group of Governmental Experts 
Since 2004, the threats posed by the development and use of ICTs have been regu-
larly addressed by groups of governmental experts under the United Nations aegis 
(UN Group of Governmental Experts, GGE).  
Permanent Members of the UN Security Council are by default represented in the 
GGE format. The rest of the Group is composed on the principle of equitable geo-
graphical distribution. Although UN GGEs are membered by individual experts 
rather than country representatives, the majority of experts are members of their 
respective governments, often from disarmament and international security back-
ground (UN A/60/202, pp. 3–4; UN A/65/201, pp. 9–11; UN A/68/98, pp. 12–
13; UN A/70/174, pp. 15–17). The UN GGE reports to the UN Secretary-General 
on consensus basis. Discussions of the Group are not shared with the public.  
As in the 2004/2005 consensus was not achieved in the UN GGE, the first threat 
assessment was reported by the 2nd Group of Experts in 2010. The Group was able 
to agree that ICTs may be used as an extension of state conflict and can also be used 
to threaten international peace and security (UN A/65/201 para 4). The 2012/2013 
GGE was able to break through the proposition of a new treaty and channel the 
discussion to the applicability of existing international law to state uses of ICTs 
(A/68/98 para 6). The 2014/2015 GGE embarked on a series of recommendations 
on responsible State behavior in their uses of ICTs (UN A/70/174 para 3). 
Cyber Capabilities and Operations: Theory and Practice 
Two aspects in the UN GGE deliberations are particularly relevant to the question 
of international cyber security discourse benefitting from an arms control approach: 
the alleged trend of development of military cyber capabilities in a way pointing to 
an arms race and the threat of information warfare. 
Development of Military Cyber Capabilities 
The 2010 GGE report established the government-driven development of ICTs as 
instruments of warfare, intelligence and means of political coercion (UN A/65/201 
para 7); The 2012/2013 Group was silent on the state development of military cyber 
capabilities. The 2014/2015 GGE, convening after extensive disclosures and cover-
age of the UK, the US and its allies’ cyber intelligence capabilities and operations, 
concluded that ‘States are rightfully concerned about the danger of destabilizing 
misperceptions, the potential for conflict and the possibility of harm to their citi-
zens, property and economy’ (UN A/70/174 para 7) and that a number of States 
developing ICT capabilities for military purposes makes the use of ICTs in future 
conflicts between States more likely (UN A/70/174 para 4). 
Research findings on the nature and scope of military cyber capabilities have been 
inconsistent. A frequently cited United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 
(UNIDIR) report provides a somewhat loose analysis of the state of development 
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of military cyber capabilities. As of 2013, it counts 114 countries with national cy-
bersecurity programmes (UNIDIR, 2013, p. 1). However, as the report explains and 
as national strategies indicate, these national agendas can range anywhere between 
basic network security and declared offensive cyber capabilities. The report goes on 
to list 47 countries who give ‘some role’ in national cyber security strategy to armed 
forces, a frequently mistaken number for countries with military cyber capabilities. 
27 countries are reported having established or planning to establish specific military 
cyberwarfare entities, 17 of which also comprise offensive military capabilities 
(UNIDIR, 2013, p. 3).  
The International Institute of Strategic Studies’ (IISS) Military Balance lists 30 coun-
tries with relevant cyber capabilities in 2011 (Inkster and Comolli, 2011). As Table 1 
indicates, the majority of G20 countries have established or are planning to establish 
cyber commands or equivalent units.  
Country Doctrines Intent Military Cyber Command or Centres 
Argentina  -
Australia x Australian Signals Directorate 
Cyber Security Operations Centre 
Brazil Cyber-Defense Command of the Armed 
Forces (Comando de Defesa Ciberne̗tica das 
Forc ֊as Armadas) 
Army Communications and Electronic War 
Centre 
Canada Director General Cyber 
Canadian Forces Cyber Task Force 
People’s Republic of 
China 
x 3rd Department of the People’s Liberation 
Army 
4th Department of the People’s Liberation 
Army 
France x National Network and Information Sys-
tems Security Agency (Agence nationale de 
se̗curite̗ des syste̖mes d’information; ANSSI)  
Operational Centre for the Security of In-
formation Systems (Centre ope̗rationnel de la 
se̗curite̗ des syste̖mes d’information; COSSI)  
Cyber Defence Cell  
Analysis Centre for Cyber Defensive Oper-
ations (Centre d'analyse de lutte informatique 
de̗fensive, CALID)  
Germany x Das Betriebszentrum IT-System der Bun-
deswehr  
(BtrbZ IT-SysBw) 
India Cyber Command (planned) 
Army, Navy, and Air Force Cyber Cells 
Indonesia Cyber Operations Center  
TNI Cyber defence task force 
Army, Navy and Air Force cyber command 
centres 
Italy Defence Innovation Centre 
Division for Information Security 
Telematics Department of the Carabinieri 
Japan  C4 Systems Command
Cyber Defence Unit 
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Republic of Korea x Cyberspace Command 
Army Cyber Command 
Mexico  -
Russian Federation x Cyber command (planned) 
Saudi Arabia - 
South Africa Cyber Command 
Turkey General Staff Warfare and Cyber Defense 
Command 
United Kingdom x Defence Cyber Operations Group 
Global Operations and Security Control 
Centre  
Cyber and electromagnetic warfare unit 
United States x x USCYBERCOMMAND 
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps 
cyber commands 
Table 1. Military cyber commands of the G20 countries. 
In the table, the doctrines column refers to developed body of doctrines considered 
here a necessity; it does not refer to a single and overall framework document that is 
called doctrine. Apart from the United States, very few countries have operational 
doctrines, cyber-specific units and established training and exercise regimes. 
However, only less than half of these countries have declared their capabilities to 
include an offensive element. Most of militarily cyber capable countries are also big-
gest military spenders who regularly update their capabilities. In this context, it is 
essential to distinguish between military modernization and hostile intent behind the 
development of military cyber capabilities. Even for technologically capable coun-
tries, developing military cyber capabilities requires time, skill and finances. It is also 
often hard to tell military cyber capabilities apart from non-military (Tikk-Ringas, 
MilBal, 2014, pp. 19–22). Also, as Lewis and Inkster emphasize, the true value of 
cyber capabilities lies in intelligence gathering (Lewis, 2010; Inkster 2014). 
It is safe to conclude that information and communication technologies are increas-
ingly part of all military functions. There is, however, a wide performance gap be-
tween developed and developing countries as well as among Western allies. This gap 
and the fact that countries are working to improve their military efficiency, should 
not be read as evidencing an arms race. 
The Threat of Information and Information Wars 
The UN GGE has not been able to further elaborate on the threat of information 
wars central in the Russian framing of the arms control issue. The UN GGE has 
spent ink on the issue of cyber attacks. In 2015, the Group noted a dramatic in-
crease in incidents involving the malicious use of ICTs by State and non-State actors 
(UN A/70/174 para 3). The Group pointed out using ICTs against the critical infra-
structure and associated information systems of a State as the most harmful of such 
attacks, considering the threat ‘both real and serious’ (UN A/70/174 para 5). 
Russian concern of loss of control over their information space remains. In Russian 
analysts’ view information operations are one of the potentially most damaging 
forms of force, aiming at disrupting the functioning of enemy’s key military, indus-
trial and administrative facilities and critical systems and at manipulating infor-
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mation (Komov, Korotkov and Dylevski, 2007, p.37). Thus, Moscow’s preference is 
to engage the international community in restraining activities associated with for-
mation, creation, transformation, transfer, use, storage of information impacting, 
inter alia individual and societal consciousness, information infrastructure and in-
formation itself (A-54-213, p.10; RU MOD, 2011). In this Russian conception, 
cyber operations include information operations, as psychological influences on an-
other state’s political and military authorities, troops and civil population using ICTs 
are seen as equally forceful, resulting in demoralization, disorientation of the public 
or mass panic (Komov, Korotkov and Dylevski 2007, p. 37). 
Dylevski and others have recently observed that the Russian government’s policy 
still prioritizes countering a military and political threat of ICT being used for ag-
gressive purposes, including imposing an information weapons nonproliferation 
regime under international law (Dylevsky, Elyas, Komov, Petrunin and Zapivakhin, 
2015, p. 7). They also conclude that the NATO countries led by the U.S., have set 
up a powerful information operations (IO) system and are going on expanding and 
improving it. Information weapons are being produced continuously and dissemi-
nated practically with no controls to keep them in check on the world market, with a 
fallout that instances of their unlawful use are multiplying (Dylevsky, Elyas, Komov, 
Petrunin and Zapivakhin, 2015, p. 8). 
The US has been acting unilaterally to define and defend its own information envi-
ronment as the aggregate of individuals, organizations and systems that collect, pro-
cess, disseminate or act on information (JP 6-0 Joint Communications System (10 
June 2015), p.ix, p. II-I - II-II; DOD, 2016, p. 3). As the US doctrine separates in-
formation operations from cyberspace operations, the US conception of cyber secu-
rity threats excludes information as a weapon. 
Recent US national security policy assessments question the potential of ICTs as 
tool of hard conflict. According to Director of NSA, cyber threats to US national 
and economic security, while expanding and increasing, are not likely to result in 
catastrophic attacks from any particular actor. Clapper categorizes the threat as one 
of ‘low-to-moderate level cyber attacks from a variety of sources over time, which 
will impose cumulative costs on the US economic competitiveness and national se-
curity’ (Clapper, 2015). 
Acknowledging the military advantage provided by cyber attack capabilities and the 
role of cyberattacks in future military conflict, Lewis (2010) explains that cyberat-
tacks are never decisive in winning a conflict, thus lacking the element of annihila-
tion. Of the 100 most visible cyber attacks between 2006 and 2014, 60% constituted 
either industrial or classical cyber espionage and, of the rest, 30% resulted in disrup-
tion of online resources or services (ICT4Peace, 2015). This is in line with Libicki’s 
analysis of no warfare having taken place in Ukraine in 2014-15. Libicky emphasises 
that cyber war is no ‘silver bullet’ and asks whether conventional assumptions of the 
feasibility of cyber war are correct. For him the evidence of absence speaks of too 
fast and too easy assumption ‘that cyber attacks would unquestionably be used in 
modern warfare’ (Libicki, 2015, pp. 50–51). In sum, while there is some evidence of 
covert government-on-government cyber operations, accounts of politico-military 
cyber attacks hardly speak of an existential threat or potential of mass destruction.  
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Arguments Against Cyber Arms Control 
The strategic contestants have come to face the somewhat inconvenient situation 
where their attempts to stretch arms control measures to their cyber differences may 
have caused them more problems than solutions. Absent will to extend the arms 
control umbrella to criminal use in ICTs and non-state actor threats, the two con-
testants have hard time finding the true surface of conflict between them. In addi-
tion to obvious political challenges, there is a mismatch between the concept of 
arms control and the practical use of ICTs. Finally, where theories of soft arms con-
trol may be applicable, there are considerable alternatives to be considered for fram-
ing and deliberating matters of international cyber security. 
Lack of Political Feasibility 
Labelling cyber attacks ‘a behaviour rather than technology’, Lewis takes the view 
that information superiority in warfare and the ability to gain real military advantage 
from the use of information assets makes digital infrastructures too valuable a target 
to be declared off limits or for cyberattacks to be relinquished (Lewis, 2010). Simi-
larly, Lewis points out that a commitment not to spy would not be agreeable (Lewis, 
2010). Russian analysts are equally sceptical as to the US ever pursuing cyber arms 
control agreements (or any other regulation regarding the use of these capabilities) 
in this domain, referring to the US as the world leadership in information operations 
(Komov, Korotkov and Dylevski, 2007, p. 37). 
The political impasse of cyber arms control is not limited to the factors characteriz-
ing the approaches of the strategic contestants, Russia and the US. By way of wide-
spread adoption of ICTs, the theme of cyber security has become a topic concern-
ing the majority of states. The gaps in their capacity, skills and awareness result in 
very different priorities and ideas about what constitute the main and actual issues 
of international cyber security. Over the two decades that the theme of international 
information security has been open to discussion, 64 governments have contributed 
their views on ICT-related threats and ways to address them. It follows from na-
tional views that not all ICT related threats are to be regarded as threatening interna-
tional peace and security (…); that there are important other venues and processes 
that usefully contribute to international cyber security (…) and that many efforts in 
support of international cyber security are most usefully taken at national level. The 
predominantly pragmatic and experience-based national views emphasize the divide 
between the preferred focus of the strategic contestants on the one hand, and the 
general international community, on the other. Evident in national submissions to 
the Secretary-General are preferences for pragmatic and fruitful measures. 
Kerttunen’s analysis of the over 60 national cyber security strategies reveals that 
countries in general are mainly concerned and focussed on information society, (do-
mestic) information security, public awareness, countering cyber crime and critical 
infrastructure protection. International cyber policy, especially normative develop-
ment, governance, cooperation and capacity-building, is also a rather shared con-
cern. However, very few countries have actually defined the role of the defense sec-
tor in national cyber security, and if they have it is mainly to support other national 
authorities (Kerttunen, 2017). 
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National approaches to international security emphasize the need for coordination 
and guidance in rather practical areas and issues, including the establishment of legal 
and administrative frameworks including a national cyber security organization; en-
suring technical functionality and improving resilience (protection of governmental 
networks and system, vital services or functions, development of material and or-
ganizational capabilities). States also emphasize issues of supply chain security and 
trust in products and services as well as the need for skills and competencies 
through systematic workforce development and public awareness raising 
(Kerttunen, 2017). 
With 111 countries having supported the Russian sponsored resolution in the past 
11 years, it is obvious that international cyber security is a topic of acute concern for 
governments across the world. At the same time, discussions at the UN GGE have 
remained limited to 38 countries throughout the five rounds of discussions. The 
issue of international cyber security has not been opened in the UN Security Coun-
cil. One can therefore conclude that there is little appetite among the strategic con-
testants to call for actual restraining measures. At the same time, the political prefer-
ence and practical emphasis of the rest of the international community does not flag 
ICTs as a concern of international peace and security. Instead, the increasing inter-
est in international cyber security dialogue indicates the need for a more inclusive 
dialogue and pragmatic guidance. 
Lack of Conceptual Feasibility 
However, it should be emphasized that ICTs do not fit the concept of arms. In an 
increasingly technology-centric life and world order, applying arms control regimes 
to whole fields or groups of technologies would run contrary to their potential. Our 
still emerging ability to deal with harmful side effects of technological development 
should not be read as the requirement, let alone evidence, for the need to cap the 
advancement and proliferation of it. Early commentators emphasize that ICTs, albe-
it military capable technologies, carry the potential of limitation of weapon systems and 
their destructive effects, being thus likely to promote rather than threaten international securi-
ty (UN, 1990, p. 4). 
Ranking the economic significance of technologies, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) has demonstrated a fundamental differ-
ence between nuclear and information technologies, the former being the frame-
work technology of classical arms control. According to the OECD’s early assess-
ments, compared to nuclear, biotechnology, materials and space technologies, ICTs 
have the greatest significance in economic development (OECD, 1988). Despite the 
acknowledged competitive advantage that ICTs bring in military modernization, 
their competitive advantage is even larger in the industry. Combining that with the 
heavy private sector factor in both capability manufacturing, innovation and threat 
couriering, state-on-state arms control would remain short of expected efficiency, 
even in the possibly more bellicose cyber environment of the future.  
The prosperity promise of ICTs has been prominently highlighted in the early UN 
discussions of their potential: 
“Information technology is an extraordinarily pervasive technology. It 
underpins advances in materials, space, nuclear and biotechnologies 
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/…/ for a technology to have pervasive effect it should a) generate a 
wide range of new products and/or services; b) have applications in 
many sectors of the economy; c) reduce the costs and improve the 
performance of existing processes, products and systems; d) gain 
widespread social acceptance with minimal opposition; and e) gener-
ate strong industrial interest based on perceived profitability and 
competitive advantage (UN 1990: 15, para 61).” 
Obvious difficulties in applying arms control measures to cyber capabilities include 
the challenges of verification and attribution. Lewis anchors the issue of verification 
in the lack of transparency, noting the reluctance of states to discuss or even admit 
that they possess relevant capabilities, because of the nexus of cyberattack and cyber 
espionage means (Lewis 2010). Others add that essential parts of cyberattack capa-
bility are widely available from different sources and can be reproduced trivially and 
that accounting and verifying code is hardly possible (Owens, Dam and Lin, 2009, p. 
324). 
A thorough discussion of attribution is not achievable within this paper. The UN 
GGE reports undoubtedly consider the difficulty of attribution (UN A/65/201 para 
7; UN A/68/98 para 6; UN A/70/174 para 5) a key issue in international infor-
mation security. Attribution itself is a multi-layer capability that remains beyond the 
reach of technologically less advanced and dependent states: ‘few States now know what 
passes over their networks en route to somewhere else or what the intent of that traffic may be, due 
to the covert or clandestine nature of these exploits’ (Lewis, 2010). However, related to the 
attribution issue is the role of non-state actors in cyberattacks against government 
information systems and critical national infrastructure (Rid, 2012). The kind of at-
tribution that corresponds to the current type and level of cyber threats is not a mili-
tary capability per se. Principal network security is the main premise of the ability to 
identify the source of malicious activity.  
Alternatives to Cyber Arms Control 
Arms control is but one possible approach to achieve international cyber security. 
Peace in cyberspace or a peaceful cyberspace can be achieved not only through ma-
nipulation of military force and application of military strategy but extensively also 
by civil-military cooperation and civil defense. To question Schelling’s and 
Halperin’s assumptions, it is hard to conclude that ICTs in their current state of de-
velopment and deployment increase the likelihood of hard conflict or that there is 
an existential threat to the international community deriving from the development 
and proliferation of ICTs. To take Bull’s turn, ICTs definitely are a key to interna-
tional peace, security and stability in our days, especially due to their parallel promise 
of economic and societal progress. The missing link in the current state of affairs 
becomes the predominantly military interrelationship between the two. 
As little to nothing in the cyber discourse indicates a dire threat to international 
peace and security and there is little indication of the appetite to bring the issue to 
serious and transparent international security dialogue, one must regard considerable 
portions of the international cyber security problematique as lack of awareness, politi-
cal will and capacity. Cyber insecurity, in the current state of affairs, appears to refer 
to lack of confidence, understanding, skill and resources to properly address risks to 
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societal security that stem from the widespread adoption of ICTs. Inherent vulnera-
bilities in ICTs have only come to political awareness in the past decade, a time not 
long enough to get fully conversant in technologies of largely Western origin (Tikk-
Ringas, 2016, Chapter 10). As indicated by the processes of cyber security related 
confidence building and norm development, focal points in international cyber af-
fairs are in transparency and cooperation, with heavy emphasis on the need to better 
understand and govern the now ubiquitous technology. 
Even where states have found the purposes of arms control proper relevant to their 
cyber affairs, they have so far reached for political control measures to build confi-
dence, reduce insecurity and increase predictability and certainty of behavior. 
Confidence Building Measures 
With ICTs now being acknowledged as a source of great insecurity for states 
worldwide, avoiding miscalculation or misperception in case of a cyber incident and 
the consequent inappropriate escalation of a crisis situation get considerable atten-
tion. In 2013, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
countries signed up to 11 confidence building measures (CBMs), to ‘enhance inter-
state co-operation, transparency, predictability and stability, and to reduce the risks 
of misperception, escalation, and conflict that may stem from the use of ICTs’ 
(OSCE, 2013). According to the OSCE, the 2013 measures can be categorized as 
‘posture’ measures (exchange of national and transnational threats to ICTs (CBM 1); 
transparency on measures taken to ensure open, interoperable, secure and reliable 
Internet (CBM 4); exposure of national organizations, strategies, policies and pro-
grammes – including cooperation between public and private sector (CBM7); nomi-
nation of focal points (CBM 8); listing relevant national terminology (CBM 9)); 
‘communications’ measures: consultations to prevent possible emergence of political 
or military tension or conflict/protect critical ICT infrastructure (CBM 3); use of 
OSCE as platform for dialogue, exchange of best practices, awareness raising, and 
info on capacity building (CBM 5); use of OSCE platforms and mechanisms to ex-
change info on CBMs (CBM 10) and further meetings at least three times a 
year/development of additional CBMs (CBM 11). The third category of CBMs, 
‘preparedness’ measures, include commitments to facilitate cooperation among rele-
vant national bodies (CBM2), put in place modern and effective legislation to facili-
tate effective cross border cooperation between authorities to counter terror-
ist/criminal use of ICTs (CBM 6) and establish rapid communication lines between 
authorities on the policy levels (CBM 8) (Hiller, 2016).  
Additional measures agreed in 2016 include facilitation of further cooperation for-
mats and educational events; cooperation between public and private sector; region-
al and sub-regional collaboration and responsible reporting of vulnerabilities 
(OSCE, 2016). Further confidence-building programmes are built in the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and the Organization of 
American States (OAS). Also, the 2013 and 2015 UN GGE reports contain sections 
on confidence building measures. 
Despite their conceptual orientation at conflict prevention, these measures under-
score the developmental nature of ICTs and emphasize step-by-step development 
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of national understanding and responsibility for their ICT infrastructure as the main 
guarantee to stability and security in cyberspace.  
Upholding and Developing International Law 
In parallel to CBMs, the international cyber security discourse at the GGE has em-
barked on a discussion of voluntary and non-binding norms of responsible state 
behavior as well as ways to apply international law to acute and potential issues of 
cyber security. The UN GGE has emphasized the lack of common understanding 
regarding acceptable state behavior as a factor contributing to vulnerabilities, the 
risk of instability and misperception (UN A/65/201 para 7; UN A/68/98 paras 6 
and 8; UN A/70/174 para 8). As such, the UN GGE, despite their findings that 
uses of ICTs may result in threats to international peace and security, has decided to 
counter this prospect with better understanding and agreement on international law 
and the discussion of further voluntary norms for responsible state behavior. The 
GGE therefore confirms Larsen’s observation, whereby the mere act of (quasi-) 
negotiating arms control also could lead to better communication, deepened under-
standing and reduced hostility among adversaries (UN GGE, 2015; Larsen, 2002). 
In the context of international law the few observable state-on-state cyber opera-
tions testify of manipulation of existing international law below the UN Charter 
threshold of use of force, supporting the early cyber operators’ prediction that cyber 
operations put more pressure on application of the law of sovereignty and non-
intervention than they do on international humanitarian law (Antolin-Jenkins, 2005). 
While emphasizing the ‘soft’ nature of cyber threats, this observation highlights the 
need for legal certainty and predictability in international cyber affairs. 
National Due Diligence 
Many states see the threat related to ICTs a developmental rather than an existential 
one. States’ heavy reliance on information and, therefore, on the imperatives of 
modern information processing demonstrates how nations that fall behind in ICTs 
fall behind everywhere (UN, 1990, p. 18). State behavior widely indicates that ICTs 
are regarded more as a technology of development and economic and social pro-
gress than primarily a military matter. National IT and digital strategies seek to de-
velop prosperity and well-being of citizens, secure functional economic environ-
ment and promote sustainable way of life. National cyber security strategies echo 
these goals.  
Many of the states’ strategic goals require domestic rather than international action 
and solutions. The very pragmatic goals and priorities cannot be adequately solved 
by way of abstract discussions of international law or by creating international coop-
eration mechanisms where national capacity to cooperate is absent. The threat re-
sulting from ICTs is not a form of natural disaster – in most cases, we are dealing 
with self-inflicted vulnerabilities and exploitation opportunities that are best mitigat-
ed by domestic decision-making and tailored engagement with key partners. 
Appetite for role models might explain how alongside Russia and United States, 
small and agile ICT adopters have gained authority in the international cyber securi-
ty dialogue. Through its experience with large-scale cyber attacks against its gov-
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ernmental and critical private sector services, Estonia has emerged as a veteran 
country in the UN GGE dialogue. Agile countries like Finland, the Netherlands, the 
Republic of Korea and Singapore have excelled not only in having strategic vision of 
the role of ICTs in their societies, economies and ways of life but in being able to 
establish well-functioning services and well-protected cyber environments. Such 
states and their functioning are exemplary in individual ex ante cyber security ap-
proaches with emphasis on individual accountability for international security and 
stability. 
Implications on Arms Control Theory  
While the original Russian approach to cyber arms control has not proved a success-
ful route, this, in and of itself, does exclude the relevance of arms control theory and 
concepts to mitigating international cyber threats. We embarked above on Larsen’s 
observation that any form of negotiations may result better clarity of both feasible 
and non-feasible ways forward. There is also value in minding the arms control the-
ories for the purpose of more clearly and constructively positioning one’s specific 
question or proposition. However, two specific angles to arms control in the con-
junction of cyber merit extra attention. First, the current mismatch between the 
classic arms control theory and cyber security discourse does not rule out that arms 
control might be feasible in the area of ICTs at a later stage or in a narrower setup. 
Second, one therefore needs to keep tracking the ICT capabilities and to understand 
the role of ICTs in the dynamics of contemporary conflict and contestation. 
The Need to Keep Tracking the Observables 
Given the lack of appetite to allow restraining of development and use of military 
cyber capabilities, it would be premature to dismiss the possibility of military threat 
to information systems and data resident therein. Classical military strategy values 
deception and attacking enemy plans before attacking its force, thereby making in-
formation both a means and a target. Modern military operations, functions and 
weapon systems are dependent of constant flow of information-as are also other 
potential targets of contemporary high and low intensity conflicts. An important 
aspect in further analysing these positions and their implications is to consider the 
divergence of both definition and understanding of the terms ‘information warfare’, 
or ‘cyberattack’ in various actors’ vocabularies, national military doctrine and state 
practice. The ability to successfully apply arms control theories to ICTs will depend 
on the ability to detect and trace their actual value in politico-military affairs and 
define the parameters that make arms control not only necessary but also possible. 
Despite Lewis’s skepticism towards transparency of national capability development 
and deployment there are many objectively measurable and verifiable aspects in 
cyber capability development. Kerttunen (2017) concludes that rather many cyber 
capabilities are, in fact, quite tangible and observable. His typology of the measura-
ble aspects of military cyber capability includes military cyber doctrine(s); military 
cyber organization of cyber commands and cyber-specific units; the most essential 
technical platforms or technologies employed by the cyber-specific units; financial 
and human resources and major operations and exercises (Kerttunen, 2017). 
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Kerttunen proposes a simple template to detect and measure the level and devel-
opment of military capabilities:  
Capability  Measurement Criteria 
Cyber Military Strategy, 
Doctrine(s), or Field 
Manuals incorporating 
cyber operations 
Existence: yes/no 
Character: defen-
sive/offensive/active/reactive 
Published or otherwise 
known cyber-specific military 
strategy, doctrine or field 
manual. 
Doctrinal statements on 
cyber operations. 
Cyber-specific commands 
and units 
Name (designation) 
Number of 
Capacity to conduct CO 
(CNO, SIGINT and EW) 
and IO (if defined as an um-
brella term). 
Technical platforms Type (name and designation) 
Number of 
Capacity to create cyber ef-
fects; deployed to and em-
ployed by cyber-specific units 
Financial and human 
resources 
Total budget US$ 
Operational budget US$ 
Developmental budget US$ 
Number of personnel 
Allocated to cyber com-
mands, operations or re-
search and development 
Operations and exercises Type of operation or exercise Significance as a demonstra-
tor of national or cyber mili-
tary capability. 
Table 2. A template to detect and measure the level and development of military 
capabilities 
This approach could prove valuable in enhancing transparency for both research 
and political purposes and foster cooperation or joint action among willing partici-
pants. The question remains of the deployable cyber capabilities and the weaponry 
that these forces and facilities are developing and employing.  
The Need for Understanding of Contemporary Conflict and Appropriate Regimes 
A perhaps cynical question, still in line with the theory of arms control, is whether 
ICTs and their auxiliary technologies, mainly unmanned systems and autonomous 
weapons, may be an example of what states may in the future regard as categories of 
armaments that reduce the potential of another bloody conflict and unwanted esca-
lation. ICT infrastructure, let’s remind us, was the very measure of crisis communi-
cation in the 1960s. The frequency of state-on-state conflict and the number of cas-
ualties have steadily increased over the past 70 years. It might, therefore, be that 
instead soft arms control encompassing non-state actors we might be looking, in the 
not-so-distant-future, at the need to develop a de novo regulatory framework that 
expands the premises of adversarial conduct and its consequences to corporations 
and makes them part of an internationally agreed control regime. 
Developing a regime like this, or speaking against it, requires insightful and critical 
academic discourse. It requires the Bulls and Schellings of our own generation to 
come forward with ideas that build on, but also let loose of, the ramifications of 
their predecessors. Supporting this kind of research requires not only strong aca-
demic cultures but a policy-informed academic debate that governments must deci-
sively support.  
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Conclusion  
The evidence behind strategic contestants’ military cyber threat narrative makes it 
hard to satisfy Bull’s reconditions on antagonism and primarily military focus of the 
issue (Bull, 1961). Apparently, factors that pose danger to individuals, society and 
the state and their interests in the information space are many, but not predomi-
nantly military or state-centric. As it stands, in the context of ICTs, prevention of 
conflict comes secondary to developing confidence and transparency.  
An examination of the underlying principles and objectives of arms control in the 
context of ICTs indicates that these remain relevant today. One has to ask if it is 
necessary to try to apply them to the issues at hand. Just as the law of armed con-
flict, that has its roots and rationale in the devastating forms and effect of state-on-
state conflict is found to be of secondary relevance in the context of ICTs, it is per-
tinent to ask whether stretching the concept of arms control to technologies with 
great economic and societal promise can prevent us from finding the right incen-
tives and balance points for internationally responsible state behavior. Could securi-
ty simply lie in responsible state behavior and in equal and transparent access to in-
formation? 
Struggling with the answer to the above, we must not let go of other questions and 
leads. Nothing in the current state of international cyber affairs and states’ current 
focus on soft regulatory measures prevents ICTs from becoming a primary means 
of conflict in the future or the current soft regimes producing a ‘proper’ arms con-
trol regimes over time, when national capabilities and their use mature. There is little 
doubt that states will continue making use of advanced technologies in the full range 
of military, covert and intelligence operations.  
Finally, even at the time of reduced and covert antagonism, arms control theory of-
fers valuable anchoring points for achieving and maintaining international peace and 
security in the context of ICTs. They should not be dismissed simply because we 
believe they are currently of no dire use. As then, all discussed forms of politico-
military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of ensuring interna-
tional stability are to reduce the potential of conflict.  
To prevent our academic inquiries to remain just that, it is essential to consider all 
possible futures and the corresponding arsenal in our disciplines. It is, therefore, 
essential to be aware of parallel developments in theories of international peace, 
security and stability and anticipate the need for quick and out-of-the-box real world 
adaptations.  
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9 
Current Challenges Regarding Arms Control and the 
Law of  Outer Space 
Tamás Lattmann9 
Abstract 
his chapter examines the legal framework applied to stationing weapons of 
mass destruction in outer space and on celestial objects. It also outlines the 
most important organisations and tries to explore the current and near future 
challenges related to this issue-area. The legal framework is currently built on the 
1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), which has been ratified by nearly one hundred 
states and signed by nearly thirty more. In general, it prohibits the stationing of 
weapons of mass destruction in outer space and on celestial objects as well as any 
military activities. The general aim is to ensure the peaceful use and exploration of 
space. The chapter analyses the OST and evaluates its performance and politico-
legal results. Apart from the OST, the experts’ work in various international and 
domestic organisations has also produced results (e.g. UN resolutions). The chapter 
will give an overview of these as well. As a result of technical and political develop-
ment (e.g. the US missile defence programme, new weapons to be used in outer 
space), the system of the OST now clearly seems to be unsatisfactory to many polit-
ical actors, so plans for further international legal development are possible. This 
chapter will also outline those developments. 
Introduction 
Even before mankind stepped into outer space, experts of international law had 
already started to analyse potential legal questions connected to the use, exploration 
and possible exploitation of space, including celestial bodies, as indicated by the pa-
pers by Potter (1958), McDougal and Lipson (1958) or Mander (1958). Already at 
this early time, it became quite clear that one of the dangers is that states, especially 
those with potential space faring capabilities, will make sovereign claims to parts of 
space or planets and the possible resources therein. This danger has been recognised 
by the U.S. Senate (1961). One of the most important events leading to this recogni-
tion was the landing of the Luna 2 (Lunik 2), the first man-made robotic spacecraft 
reaching the surface of the Moon on 14 September 1959 – its ‘CCCP’ markings 
have been interpreted by many as a symbol of a modern ‘conquest’. As a result of 
this recognition, professional literature started to address the political elements of 
the Cold War quite early. As the space race between the United States and the Sovi-
9 Tamás Lattmann JD PhD is a senior researcher of the Institute of International Relations, Prague (IIR) and 
associate professor of the National University of Public Service, Budapest. He is an expert on international 
law and international humanitarian law. 
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et Union started and gradually intensified, the practical analysis of the ‘Soviet’ ap-
proach (Crane, 1962) was shortly followed by the theoretical, even a ‘Marxist’ ap-
proach (Crane, 1963). Later, some important practical and theoretical problems have 
been crystallized, for example the question of space debris (Roberts, 1992; Mirmina, 
2005), or issues regarding a possible space war (Kavka, 1985). Additionally, arms 
control, especially the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in outer 
space, has also become one of the most significant issues, of which the present 
chapter aims to give an overview. 
International Law Applicable to Outer Space 
Provisions of international law regarding arms control in outer space take the form 
of various documents and instruments. The goal is not only to provide for more 
security on Earth by trying to limit the arms race but to also to protect space, which 
is still mostly unknown to mankind. While currently existing rules set limits to the 
militarisation of outer space, especially as far as nuclear weapons and weapons of 
mass destruction are concerned, military activities are still possible and legally bind-
ing constraints could be stricter. 
International Treaties Applicable to Outer Space and Arms Control 
During the past decades, the following international treaties, which regulate the use 
of outer space and have relevance to arms control, have been adopted by states: 
– Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and
underwater (Partial Test Ban Treaty – PTBT), 1963;
– Treaty on the principles governing the activities of states in the exploration
and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies (Outer
Space Treaty – OST), 1967;
– Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of astronauts and the re-
turn of objects launched into outer space (Rescue Agreement), 1968;
– Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organ-
ization (INTELSAT Agreement), 1971;
– Convention on the international liability for damage caused by space objects
(Liability Convention), 1972;
– Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space (Registration
Convention), 1975;
– Agreement governing the activities of States on the Moon and other celestial
bodies (Moon Agreement), 1979;
– Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMAR-
SAT Convention), 1985.
While existing international treaties make references to the obligation of the peace-
ful uses of outer space and contain some provisions that prohibit or restrict the de-
ployment of various weapons, including weapons of mass destruction and nuclear 
weapons, as well as prohibit the use of force or military activities in some parts of 
space, these have not proven to be satisfactory to keep outer space weapons-free. 
Scientific and technological progress is usually not easy to follow for law, especially 
for international law, so international treaties have gradually tried to regulate various 
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aspects step-by-step, only to be often temporarily blocked by the political interests 
of various states. 
Later, we are going to look at some of the treaties which are relevant to the subject 
of this chapter. 
International Customary Law 
Apart from the provisions of international treaties, the norms of international cus-
tomary law are also legally binding. As early pointed out by McDougal and Lipson 
(1958), the short time period of any state practice in outer space has made it more 
difficult to recognise legal norms having any customary power. But the practice of 
international law has developed the concept of ‘instant’ customary law, meaning that 
customary power can also be established after a short time in the case of consensus 
– for example the principle of non-applicability of sovereign claims regarding outer
space became accepted after the first artificial satellites were launched by some 
states (Shaw, 2008, p. 78). This means that customary legal norms can be identified 
even in relation to outer space, regardless of the low number of states with actual 
outer space activities and the relative shortness of the time period in question. 
In terms of the arms race and weapons of mass destruction, especially biological and 
chemical weapons, the situation is better, as norms applicable to such weapons have 
already been recognised as having customary power, thus being legally binding re-
gardless of their location (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2009, p. 256, 259). 
UN Bodies Dealing with Questions Related to Outer Space and Arms Con-
trol 
United Nations General Assembly 
The main role of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is to serve as a 
venue for international debates and consensus-building. As all UN member states 
are represented in the Assembly, it provides an open and accessible place for states 
to participate in decision-making regarding outer space, including in matters of in-
ternational peace and security. The Assembly’s regular sessions convene annually in 
September but the majority of its work is organised in its six specialized committees. 
The most important one of these which is mainly responsible for the General As-
sembly’s work on disarmament is the First Committee, the Committee on Dis-
armament and International Security. 
Evaluating the role and the importance of the General Assembly, it has to be noted 
that while it does not have the power to create legally binding norms (like interna-
tional treaties) in itself, it has a role in creating political consensus and soft law 
sources. International treaties adopted in the framework of the Assembly become 
legally binding after states’ ratification, but sotf law norms are also very important. 
While not being legally binding, these soft law sources may reflect an already exist-
ing consensus on some questions and indicate directions for future international 
treaties. They can include ideas which may not be politically mature enough to meet 
the expectations and concerns of all states but may still serve as basis of future legal 
development. 
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For example, if the Assembly could reach a consensus to adopt a resolution drafted 
by Russia and China on transparency and confidence-building measures, it would 
mean a possible step towards a legally binding treaty on the prevention of arms race 
in outer space. 
Some of the most important resolutions of the General Assembly related to outer 
space and arms control are: 
– Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Uses of Outer Space (1963);
– Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space
(1992);
– Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (1999);
– Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities
(2006).
Conference on Disarmament 
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the primary body of the United Nations 
for negotiating various UN disarmament treaties. As such, it has an important role 
in the non-proliferation of arms in outer space as well. 
One of the main agenda items has been the prevention of an arms race in outer 
space (PAROS), on which the Conference established an ad hoc committee in 1985. 
It worked until 1994, without much success. The reasons will be explained later. 
UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
The Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS, often referred to as 
the Outer Space Committee) was established in 1959 by the UN General Assembly 
with its resolution titled ‘International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer 
space’. The tasks of the body cover a wide range: to coordinate international coop-
eration, to create UN programmes related to the peaceful use of outer space, to dis-
seminate information on outer space and to consider any legal issues that may arise 
from the exploration of outer space. The Vienna-based Committee has two sub-
committees, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommit-
tee. 
Accordingly, the activities of the Committee do not focus exclusively on arms con-
trol, but many of its achievements have at least indirect connection to this issue as 
well. One example of the Committee’s work are the debris mitigation guidelines 
which were adopted in 2007. 
The Outer Space Treaty 
The fundamental international convention governing the subject of this chapter is 
titled ‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’ (or simply just 
the ‘Outer Space Treaty’). It entered into force in 1967, and it has also been one of 
the first signs of the preparatory work potential of the United Nations. The 
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COPUOS has had an important role in the drafting of the treaty, just as the UNGA 
had served as a vital stage for hammering out any political differences. 
The Treaty has created the basic framework for a new field of international law, in-
ternational space law. In addition to drafting numerous norms for a new, unprece-
dented activity for the whole of mankind, it has also introduced rules regarding the 
proliferation of weapons in space. In particular, it has prohibited the placement of 
nuclear weapons or any kind of weapon of mass destruction both in outer space and 
on celestial bodies. Additionally, it has also established the basic principles of the 
peaceful use of outer space. One of the most important of these is the requirement 
that exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the 
interests of all states. To prevent any race for domination, it has also stipulated that 
the Moon and other celestial bodies cannot be subject to national appropriation or 
any claims of sovereignty. Consenting to this creates a consensus among the states 
party to the treaty. 
To ensure the peaceful use of outer space, the Treaty does not only ban the station-
ing of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in outer space, but also prohibits mili-
tary activities on celestial bodies, and spells out legally binding treaty norms regulat-
ing the peaceful exploration and use of space. 
Currently 105 states are parties to the treaty and 24 others have signed it but have 
not yet completed ratification. The importance and political weight of the treaty is 
shown by the fact that out of all those states with potential space-launch capacities 
and capabilities, only North Korea has not signed it yet. However, concerns of 
states (for example about the missile defence plans and the space policy of the Unit-
ed States) have led to negotiations and the adoption of additional international 
agreements on outer space. Of course, these proposals serve as a basis for political 
and professional debates on the international stage, for example China arguing in 
the UN Conference on Disarmament for a specific treaty on the prevention of an 
arms race in outer space, while the US opposes it, arguing that it is not needed, as 
there is no direct threat of any arms race in space. 
History of the Treaty 
International negotiations about preserving outer space for peaceful purposes began 
during the late 1950s in the framework of the United Nations. These negotiations 
supplemented the emerging space race between the two political blocs, more specif-
ically the United States and the Soviet Union. No wonder that initially the contest-
ers’ position determined their attitude towards the legal regulation of this field. A 
proposal from Western states in 1957, which was aimed to reserve space exclusively 
for ‘peaceful and scientific purposes’, including a control and verification system, 
was rejected by the Soviet Union, which had just prepared to launch the first satel-
lite from Earth and to test its first intercontinental ballistic missile. 
The UN General Assembly gained an important initiative role under these circum-
stances. In 1963, it adopted two resolutions on the question of outer space, titled 
‘Question of General and Complete Disarmament’ and ‘Declaration of Legal Prin-
ciples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space’, which have gained vital importance, as they became the basis for the treaty 
adopted later. The first resolution called upon all states to refrain from stationing 
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weapons of mass destruction in outer space, while the second one laid down the 
basic legal principles on the exploration of outer space, for example that all coun-
tries shall enjoy the right to explore and use outer space. 
The path broken by the Assembly finally led to the adoption of a mutually agreed 
text, based on different draft texts submitted separately by the United States and the 
Soviet Union in June 1966. The final text was adopted by the Assembly on 19 De-
cember, 1966, and the treaty was opened for signature in Washington, Moscow and 
London on 27 January, 1967. It entered into force on 10 October, 1967, after reach-
ing 5 ratifications. Currently 105 states, including all major space faring countries are 
parties to the treaty, and another 24 have signed, but not ratified it yet. 
General Obligations Deriving from the Treaty 
The Treaty’s provisions stipulate that space is not the domain of any single state, 
and that all of them have the right to explore it. Space itself and celestial bodies en-
joy exemption from any national claims of ownership and shall be spared from any 
contamination and harm by states. Those engaging in exploring space shall be re-
sponsible for any damage they may cause. 
The Treaty gives new substance to the general international legal principles of ‘co-
operation and mutual assistance’, for example by creating the obligation of astro-
nauts of one nation to provide aid to others belonging to another state in case of 
need. 
The provisions of the Outer Space Treaty can be amended, and state parties are able 
to withdraw from it. State parties can propose amendments, which can enter into 
force after being adopted by the majority of the parties, and those will only be bind-
ing on the states consenting to those changes. A state party to the Treaty can with-
draw from it unilaterally, which takes effect a year after the state has submitted a 
written notification to the depositary states (Russia, United Kingdom and United 
States). However, in this case, according to the general rules of international law, the 
state still remains bound by those treaty provisions that have gained customary 
force, which raises a special question: since the original adoption of the Treaty, pro-
hibitions under international law regarding weapons of mass destruction have grown 
to such a level that it is hardly imaginable that withdrawal from the Treaty could 
lead to any state instantly getting rid of all legal obligations. 
One of the weaknesses of the Treaty is that it does not provide for serious verifica-
tion or inspection procedures. It aims for cooperation among states, for example by 
requiring state parties in the case of a launch to consider requests from other states 
for ‘an opportunity to observe the flight’ of the space object launched. In addition, 
it calls for some transparency with possible confidence-building effects by stipulat-
ing that states shall allow access to each other’s representatives to their ‘stations, 
installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies’. 
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Arms Control Provisions in the Treaty 
Article IV of the treaty provides for its arms control provisions. Based on it, state 
parties to the Treaty take the legal obligation not to: 
– place in orbit around the Earth or other celestial bodies any nuclear weapons
or objects carrying weapons of mass destruction;
– install weapons of mass destruction on celestial bodies or station those in
outer space in any other manner;
– establish military bases or installations, test ‘any type of weapons,’ or conduct
military exercises on the Moon and other celestial bodies.
While the treaty seemingly operates with strong prohibitions, its provisions leave 
some gaps and open up interpretive space for various states. 
While it explicitly forbids any states from deploying nuclear weapons or any other 
kinds of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, it leaves the term ‘weapons of 
mass destruction’ undefined. Following the common interpretation, it is possible to 
conclude that the term refers to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, but this 
interpretation ignores the fact that some conventional weapons may have similar 
destructive capacities, as the ones listed above, for example the BLU-82/B or the 
GBU-43/B bombs, the overpressure of which can be compared to nuclear weap-
ons. The option of allowing those can work against the general goal of the Treaty, 
namely keeping space arms-free. 
Additionally, the Treaty does not explicitly prohibit the launch of ballistic missiles 
from Earth through space, which can be armed with warheads that can be qualified 
as weapons of mass destruction. This gap can arguably be filled up by referring to 
the specific prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction under interna-
tional humanitarian law, developed by the relevant treaties on bacteriological (bio-
logical) and chemical weapons. But as nuclear weapons are not covered by those, 
the prohibition is far from being exhaustive. Additionally, it may be worth mention-
ing, that even the International Court of Justice has found it hard to state that there 
is a clear prohibition of nuclear weapons under international customary law (I.C.J., 
1996). 
Since the Treaty persistently emphasises that space has to be used for peaceful pur-
poses, many analysts argue that it can be interpreted broadly, prohibiting not only 
weapons of mass destruction, but all other types of weapons systems in outer space 
as well. Contrary to this, by analysing the text we can conclude what sort of military 
activities are – at least implicitly – allowed by the Treaty, which argues against this 
broader interpretation: 
– As indicated above, transiting outer space (meaning leaving airspace, entering
space, then returning towards their target on Earth) by objects carrying nu-
clear weapons or weapons of mass destruction is not prohibited under the
Treaty, as long as these do not start to ‘orbit’ Earth.
– Similarly, the same kind of weapons are not prohibited to leave Earth’s orbit,
provided that they are not targeted on any celestial bodies, or objects ‘sta-
tioned’ in outer space.
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– The Treaty’s prohibitive rules are not so strict with other types of weapons,
that do not qualify as weapons of mass destruction. Under the Treaty, it is
not prohibited to place such weapons in orbit, only on the Moon or other ce-
lestial bodies. Employment of a restrictive interpretation of the treaty’s text
can lead to the logical result of the Treaty allowing attacks against targets in
space or on the surface of the Earth (with only provisions of international
humanitarian law setting restrictions), or the permission of the deployment
of armed spaceships.
– States party to the Treaty are not prohibited from creating military bases or
any installations in outer space, only on the Moon or other celestial bodies.
This means the possibility of sending military satellites in to orbit and outer
space, as constant and extensive state practice evidences today.
– The Treaty does not set any prohibition on anti-satellite or anti-missile
weapons, as long as they are not nuclear or do not qualify as weapons of
mass destruction, meaning that they can be based or operated either in outer
space or from the Earth.
– The Treaty allows any weapons tests (both conventional and weapons of
mass destruction) in outer space, but not on the Moon or other celestial bod-
ies.
The Partial Test Ban Treaty 
The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water (shortly: Partial Test Ban Treaty) has an important effect on arms con-
trol in outer space (apart from its enormous importance in non-proliferation of nu-
clear weapons, introduced in another chapter of this volume), as it has filled some 
of the gaps we have identified with the Outer Space Treaty. It was adopted in 1963 
and entered into force in the same year. Currently, 126 states are party to it, includ-
ing the states possessing nuclear weapons. 
The general goal of the Treaty is the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as state 
parties to it take the obligation ‘to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nu-
clear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its 
jurisdiction or control: in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; 
or under water’. 
The text provides for a prohibition of both test and live explosions of nuclear de-
vices in outer space, which are not explicitly prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty. 
Similarly to the Outer Space Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty has a weak and in-
sufficient inspection or verification regime. This may change in the future with the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), adopted in 1996, entering into 
force. It aims to make a full prohibition of nuclear test explosions by extending the 
ban to explosions conducted underground and it will also add more developed veri-
fication and inspection provisions, which could be used for controlling compliance 
with the Partial Test Ban Treaty as well. Unfortunately, the time of entry into force 
of this treaty is currently not easy to predict. According to Article XIV, it will enter 
into force 180 days after the ratification of all 44 states, which have operated nuclear 
installations at the time of the adoption of the treaty. 
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Developments Related to Arms Control in Outer Space 
As a result of continuous technical development and challenges posed by the con-
stantly changing international political environment, the normative content of the 
original treaties has become subject of intense scrutiny and analysis. Already since 
the early 1980s, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has taken these issues on its 
agenda and considered proposals for example under the title ‘prevention of an arms 
race in outer space’. These initiatives have included proposals for draft treaties on 
for example preventing the placement of weapons in outer space and prohibiting 
the use of weapons developed against satellites. 
Of course this was not only a profession-directed ambition from the UN or its 
agencies. While the existence of a professional policy-making intention is not to be 
denied, as is usual with the development of international law, actual state interests 
serve as a strong catalyst. This is true, even if from time to time the activities of 
these bodies seemingly slows down or even gets suspended for a certain period of 
time. 
In addition to individual states, the General Assembly has also kept its eye on the 
subject. For example in 1990, it requested the Secretary-General to employ a group 
of governmental experts to collectively carry out a study on the possibilities of con-
fidence-building measures in outer space, a work that came to its first result in 1993, 
in the form of a report (A/48/305, 1993). 
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and Prevention of the Placement of 
Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT)  
Concerns about an armed race in outer space have been raised by analysts ever since 
mankind has gained access to outer space, and it has constantly intensified with 
technical development (See for example descriptions by Garthoff (1980–1981), Din 
(1983), Rosas (1983) and Dahlitz (1988)). At the same time, public opinion also 
started to pay attention to the question, as shown by the analysis of Graham and 
Kramer (1986). While also political consensus seems to have formed among states 
about the necessity of preventing an arms race in space, with numerous resolutions 
and negotiation results in the framework of the United Nations, the adoption of an 
international treaty on this matter is still out of sight. A lack of compromise between 
states is a serious obstacle to that, as in the present framework of international legal 
regime, the lack of will and/or the strong objection of states prevents any adoption, 
especially if this will is missing on the part of one or more of the leading states en-
gaged in space activities. This may be especially problematic in cases when one par-
ty’s consent and willingness to cooperate is an obvious precondition of the other 
states’ willingness to engage in legally binding measures, which means a natural re-
striction of their own potential as well. As a result, no such international treaty that 
is able to comprehensively prevent the deployment of weapons in outer space or to 
prevent a possible arms race there has yet been negotiated. 
The persistent position of the United States is, that as there is no actual arms race in 
outer space, any international treaty on the issue or any action on the issue is unnec-
essary. On the other hand, other states argue that even if it does not exist yet, pre-
vention is justified and needed to make sure that space will not become weaponised. 
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During the past several years the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has served as 
the institutional framework of negotiations and debates related to the burning ques-
tions of arms control in outer space and also as a legal-political battlefield between 
states arguing on these. China and the United States have engaged in a long and not 
really constructive debate on this issue: the operation of the Conference has been 
stalled for years, as China has been preventing consensus within the CD to initiate 
other topics as long as the United States is unwilling to engage on the issue. The 
relationship develops slowly, for example as the result of first successful Chinese 
test of anti-satellite weapon in 2007 (Zhang, 2011) that clearly changed the political 
dimensions. 
The General Assembly resolutions on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer 
Space (PAROS) have aimed at developing the Outer Space Treaty, based on the 
recognition that the existing international legal system does not in and of itself guar-
antee the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They call for states, especially 
the ones with space capabilities, to refrain from actions contrary to the objective of 
PAROS and for them to contribute to the reinforcement of the outer space legal 
regime. Building on the earlier work of the Conference a new treaty would be 
adopted that would complement the Outer Space Treaty. It would prevent use of 
space weapons and development of technology related to space-weapons, including 
missile defence systems. This treaty would be capable of preventing states from 
gaining a military advantage in outer space, limit a space arms race and reduce the 
military uses of outer space. 
As we saw, the United States has expressed resistance towards PAROS, as a result 
of which the Conference on Disarmament has stepped away from it, and instead has 
started to focus on a possible treaty to prevent the placement of weapons in outer 
space (PPWT). 
Changing the title and the language from the prevention of an ‘arms race’ to the 
prevention of ‘placement of weapons’ in outer space can be seen as a cosmetic 
change to try to circumvent the earlier arguments that the US raised against PA-
ROS. However, many questions still remain from the earlier negotiations and de-
bates, for example related to definitions (e.g. border of outer space), to the prohibi-
tion of certain types of weapons and verification. 
During the recent years both China and Russia have introduced draft texts aiming at 
creating a new treaty to prohibit placing weapons in outer space. A joint working 
paper was submitted by them (with additional contributions from Belarus, Indone-
sia, Syria, Vietnam and Zimbabwe) in 2002, titled Possible Elements for a Future Interna-
tional Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the 
Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (Working Paper..., 2002) Two draft trea-
ties have been presented to the CD, the first one in 2008 (Letter Dated 12 February 
2008…, 2008), the second one, an updated draft in 2014 (Letter Dated 10 June 
2014…, 2014). 
The Russia-China draft Treaty of 2008 was rejected by the United States: by both 
the Bush and the Obama administrations, arguing that its aim is only political, it 
tries to gain a military advantage and calls upon universal adherence to already exist-
ing treaties (United States Opposes…, 2008), though the attitude of the latter later 
seems to have softened (Zhang, 2011). The second draft introduced by Russia on 10 
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June 2014 showed many changes from the 2008 version, for example related to def-
initions and procedural parts, but the United States still seems to reject it. Its posi-
tion is based on arguments related to a lack of a verification system and to provi-
sions that would prohibit the possession, testing and stockpiling of weapons that 
could be placed in outer space. The negotiations are still on-going and the draft is 
open for the proposal of amendments, which hopefully will help to hammer out a 
compromise in due time. 
Both of the preambles to the drafts (and to the 2002 paper) reaffirm the importance 
of peaceful space exploration and recognise the need to maintain the weapons-free 
nature of outer space. Both of the drafts note the insufficient nature of existing 
arms control and disarmament agreements while recognising their importance. 
The beginning of the 2008 draft treaty defines certain terms still missing from the 
corpus of international treaty law, for example ‘outer space’ as ‘beyond the elevation 
of approximately 100 km above the ocean level of the Earth’. Then, building on 
these definitions, it defines ‘outer space object’ and ‘weapons in outer space.’ These 
definitions have been changed slightly in the 2014 version, while the definition of 
‘outer space’ has been completely removed. 
The definition of a ‘weapon in outer space’ in the 2008 version is ‘any device placed 
in outer space, based on any physical principle, specially produced or converted to 
eliminate, damage or disrupt normal function of objects in outer space’. This has 
been broadened in the 2014 version, as it does not require ‘physicality’ any more to 
reach the effect of ‘elimination, damaging or disrupting’ these objects and it is appli-
cable not only in outer space but also ‘on the Earth’s surface or in the air’. 
While both drafts recognise the rights of states ‘to explore and use outer space for 
peaceful purposes in accordance with international law’ and their right to self-
defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, the 2014 draft adds the 
option of collective self-defence into the text. As it is also included in Article 51, it 
does not seem to be a significant amendment, but it gives a more reassuring legal 
position to states with actual or potential space-warfare capabilities related to their 
alliances. 
Neither of the drafts have created vast development regarding compliance or trans-
parency: both of them create a system of voluntary confidence-building measures, 
while on verification and compliance enforcement both of them suggest application 
of a future additional or optional protocol. Both drafts mention plans for an execu-
tive organisation for the treaty. The organisation would be tasked with examining 
questions regarding the implementation or violation of the provisions of the treaty, 
with a vague provision of the 2008 draft to ‘take measures to put an end to the vio-
lation of the Treaty by any State Party’ clarified in the 2014 draft with a possibility of 
referring the dispute to the UN General Assembly or to the Security Council, in 
case of the violation being unresolved. While this can be considered a development, 
the inclusion of a clause establishing the possible jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice would provide for stronger control. 
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Transparency and Confidence-building Measures (TCBMs) in Outer Space 
Transparency and confidence-building measures are usually capable of preventing 
an arms race by raising trust between states, which may have a good effect on oth-
erwise tense international relations (Lattmann, 2011). It can be especially important 
regarding space activities as deploying weapons in this sphere is much more costly 
than elsewhere and thus states may be more open towards it. The UN Secretary-
General has decided to hear out UN member states on this question, and as a result, 
has decided to launch a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to elaborate on 
the possibility of transparency and confidence-building measures being employed to 
enhance space security (A/62/114/Add.1, 2011). 
The concept behind the Group of Governmental Experts is to create a small group 
of experts on international space that works on an ad hoc base and who represent the 
various states that have engaged in space-related activities. The most important task 
is to improve international cooperation and to reduce any possible risk of misunder-
standing and miscommunication between states related to their outer space activi-
ties. Apart from this direct goal, a more strategic aim of the group has been to assist 
in developing future international law: to deliver a report based on consensus which 
outlines conclusions and recommendations on some of the pressing questions re-
garding space security and sustainability, namely transparency and confidence-
building measures. 
The Group’s work is based on all previous documents and any other initiatives that 
exist. Logically, it means considering the Outer Space Treaty as the base, supple-
mented with other international treaties (e.g. already adopted bilateral transparency 
and confidence-building measures), other sources of soft law (e.g. the International 
Code of Conduct by the European Union) and results of other earlier professional 
work (e.g. the work of the previous GGE between 1991–1993, the COPUOS and 
its various working groups). 
The first session was held in New York in July 2012. The creation of this body was 
made possible by the renewed political interests of states regarding cooperative 
measures connected to the security of outer space. 
The group’s work has covered the revision of numerous proposals submitted by 
various governments during the recent time period, aiming at creating transparency 
and confidence-building measures in outer space. The proposals have covered a 
wide perspective; they can be grouped as: 
– measures related to the rules of conduct;
– measures aimed at expanding the transparency of space programmes;
– measures aimed at expanding transparency of space activities;
– mechanisms aimed at resolving concerns.
The group has had more sessions following the first one: in April 2013 in Geneva, 
then in June 2013 in New York. Its work has been supported by the United Nations 
Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), which generally serves as the secretariat 
of the group that does not only provide administrative but also substantive support 
to the group. 
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The report of the Group has been submitted to the UN General Assembly in the 
autumn of 2013. It has made a wide variety of recommendations both towards 
states and various organs. For the states’ considerations, it has recommended a set 
of voluntary TCBMs for outer space activities, for example on the exchange of in-
formation related to states’ policies and activities related to outer space; on risk re-
duction notifications and on mutual visits by experts to space facilities of the states. 
In regards to international institutions, the Group has called for increased coordina-
tion between UN organs and bodies. 
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities 
The European Union has initiated a procedure in 2008, aiming at developing an 
‘International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities’, often abbreviated ICoC. 
Instead of a legally binding international treaty, it is intended to become a set of 
principles and guidelines which are agreed to by the states on a voluntary basis, and 
as such, it lacks any formalised enforcement or verification mechanism, but can be 
seen rather as an additional consultation procedure. The draft version of the Code 
was first published in December 2008 under the title ‘Council Conclusions on the 
draft Code of Conduct for outer space activities’. The last version is dated 31 March 
2014. It was finalised based on the consultations in Bangkok with the interested 
states. 
The Code is being drafted under the auspices of the European Union, not the 
COPUOS or the CD. The argument for this is that it aims for both safety and secu-
rity of outer space activities and that this way even those states which are not mem-
bers of these bodies may participate in the process. Additionally, its legally non-
binding nature and wider scope of application make it non-contradictive with other 
negotiation processes related to space, for example the PAROS. 
It reaffirms already existing treaties, with the general objective of enhancing safety 
and security in outer space by means of developing and introducing more transpar-
ency and various confidence-building measures. The fundamental principles that the 
Code is based on are mostly familiar from earlier documents. Some of them, namely 
the recognition of the inherent right of all states to use space for peaceful purposes, 
the importance of security and reliability of space objects in orbit and the preven-
tion of harmful interference in outer space activities have all been raised in previous 
sources of space law. From the point of view of the present chapter, the considera-
tion for states’ defence interests is important to be mentioned: the Code explicitly 
recognises the inherent right for individual or collective self-defence in accordance 
with the United Nations Charter, and by stating ‘the responsibility of States, in the 
conduct of scientific, commercial and military activities, to promote the peaceful 
exploration and use of outer space and take all the adequate measures to prevent 
outer space from becoming an area of conflict’, it implicitly also recognises the 
states’ rights to use outer space for military activities as well. 
The Code is to be applied to all outer space activities conducted by both state and 
non-state actors, like corporations, NGOs and academia. Thus, legally speaking it 
aims to have a much wider direct applicability than a normal international treaty. 
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The draft Code has seemingly attracted some support from the international com-
munity: some of the states have already expressed their endorsement of it (e.g. Aus-
tralia, Canada, Japan, and the United States with the reservation that the Code does 
not prohibit anti-satellite weapons or missile defence systems, etc.). However, some 
states have raised concerns on being left out of its development (e.g. Brazil, China, 
India, Russia etc.), while some other states fear that it could be used in the future to 
limit their potential capacities for outer space activities, thus favouring states already 
engaged in this race. Some states have criticized the Code’s legally non-binding na-
ture, its lack of any enforcement or verification mechanism and the fact that it repli-
cates some already existing EU member states’ domestic policies on transparency 
and confidence building measures. 
While the Code is to be applied to all types of outer space activities – it is for exam-
ple aimed at environmental protection as well as at arms control – it directly ad-
dresses military activities in outer space. The Code prima facie limits the testing and 
use of both space-based and ground-based anti-satellite weapons by stating in Sec-
tion 4.2. that states shall ‘refrain from any action which brings about, directly or in-
directly, damage, or destruction, of space objects unless such action is justified: 
– by imperative safety considerations, in particular if human life or health is at
risk; or
– in order to reduce the creation of space debris; or
– by the Charter of the United Nations, including the inherent right of individ-
ual or collective self-defence
and where such exceptional action is necessary, that it be undertaken in a manner so 
as to minimise, to the greatest extent practicable, the creation of space debris’. 
However, a more thorough examination of the text shows that this prohibition is 
quite weak on the use of these weapons in the case of an armed conflict justified by 
self-defence, and in the case of adherence to the principle of necessity and distinc-
tion under the provisions of international humanitarian law. This means that an at-
tack against military satellites used for example for the coordination of military ma-
noeuvres or communication of the aggressor state may be legitimate under the 
Code. 
Conclusions 
Arms control in outer space does not only face hardships similar to the ones it faces 
on the surface of the Earth, but there are also some very peculiar elements as well. 
Technical uncertainties and states’ political worries about their potential future stra-
tegic positions and possibilities make it an uneasy task to build the necessary con-
sensus from time to time. International organisations and their various organs have 
struggled with this during the past decades and the institutional system, created to 
handle similar challenges, does not always seem to be capable of providing the 
needed solutions. 
While the legal tools may be adequate (international treaties, verification and control 
methods), the road to build these is not easy. Step-by-step development, gradual 
building of confidence, often initiated on a regional level (e.g. the EU-initiated 
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Code) may lead to a global consensus and assure a weapons-free, or at least regulat-
ed, space over the Earth. 
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